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ABSTRACT 
The aims of the research described in this thesis have been to examine the role of joint 
ventures in trade between Western countries and the former socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe up to and including 1990; and to provide original case study materials of East-
West joint ventures established in the former Cornecon area during this period. By 
choosing 1990 as a cut-off date the author was able to record the effect of the post-1989 
reforms on joint ventures before the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. 
The research methods of the thesis, namely literature search, structured interviews and a 
postal questionnaire survey enabled the author to examine the role of joint ventures from 
existing research on the subject as well as contribute new knowledge to the subject by 
recording Western companies' immediate responses to the rapidly changing economic and 
political environment in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The thesis begins by presenting the factors which led the author to research East-West 
joint ventures, gives the rationale for the application of the above research methods and 
the consequent practical implications of the methodology. This is followed by an 
examination of the role· of joint ventures in international business, and the effects of 
Soviet and East European reforms on East-West trade and industrial co-operation, thereby 
providing the theoretical and historical framework for analysing the role of joint ventures 
in East-West trade. This analysis begins with an examination of the legal provisions for 
joint ventures in the former CMEA countries, followed by a discussion of the data 
1 
obtained from literature searches. This data provides information about the number of 
joint ventures, the size of foreign capital invested, the joint ventures' activities and the 
extent of individual Western countries' participation in East-West joint ventures. The 
literature search is succeeded by the case histories of Western companies engaged in joint 
ventures collected between 1986 and 1989 which were up-dated in March! April 1992, and 
the results of a survey conducted in December 1990 among the British partners of Anglo-
Soviet joint ventures. These provide illustrations of Western companies' experiences at 
micro-level before and after the political changes in Eastern Europe in 1989. 
To conclude, the author comments on the effectiveness of the research methods employed, 
reflects on the findings of the thesis and makes suggestions for further research based on 
the evidence presented in the thesis. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CMEA 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (also known as Comecon). 
The CMEA was founded in 1949 to assist the countries of Eastern Europe 
in the development of international trade whilst implementing centralised 
planning systems within their countries. Intra-CMEA trade between the 
former Soviet Union and the East European countries developed on a barter 
basis, with the Soviet Union supplying oil and raw materials to the East 
European countries in exchange for industrial and consumer goods. The 
European member countries of CMEA have been Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the former German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the 
former Soviet Union and Albania; although some Asian and Latin 
American countries were also members of the Council. The CMEA was 
dissolved at the end of June 1991. 
CoCom 
Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. 
This Committee was established in January 1950, comprising almost all of 
the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) member countries. The 
member countries agree to co-ordinate export control lists, designed to 
prevent the sale of transfer of technology which might pose a threat to 
national security. 
viii 
East-West 
ECGD 
EFTA 
GDR 
The tenn 'East' is used in the thesis to refer to the fonner CMEA countries 
as defined above. 'West' refers to all developed market economies. 
Export Credit Guarantee Department, the British government department 
responsible for setting and guaranteeing government supported export 
credits and insurance to British exporters. 
European Free Trade Association. 
Member countries include Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Finland, Sweden 
and Iceland. These countries trade among each other as an economic free 
trade area. 
Gennan Democratic Republic. This abbreviation is used throughout the 
thesis to refer to the fonner East Gennany which was founded in 1949 and 
united with the Federal Republic of Gennany in 1990. 
IX 
G-7 
This refers to the group of seven major industrialised countries, namely the 
United States, Japan, Canada, France, Britain, Italy and Germany. These 
countries have been meeting together with advisers from the International 
Monetary Fond (IMF) and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD or BERD) to discuss trade issues of world-wide 
concern. Since 1989 the G-7 countries have negotiated, usually on a 
bilateral basis, aid to Eastern Europe, and more recently to the former 
Soviet Union. 
G-24 
IMF 
The twenty-four member countries include all European Community and 
EFTA countries, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and Turkey. These countries meet on a similar basis as the G-7 countries 
to discuss trade issues of world-wide concern, including those in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The International Monetary Fund was created at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in June 1944. The purpose of the IMF is to stabilise currencies 
in order to maintain an orderly market in world trade. It provides a 
framework in which governments can consult and co-operate in 
determining structure and functioning of the international monetary system; 
it extends technical assistance and temporary balance of payments 
financirig to members; and monitors the exchange-rate arrangements and 
policies of member countries. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
During the mid-nineteen eighties, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union introduced 
a number of economic and political reforms which had a con~equent effect on East-West 
trade and industrial co-operation, and particularly on the establishment and operation of 
East-West joint ventures located in the eastern economies. This is reflected in data 
presented in recent United Nations' publications, which report the number of such joint 
ventures to have increased sharply from 165 at the beginning of January 1988 to 13,722 
by January 1991. (I) The aim of the research presented in this thesis, therefore, has been 
to examine the development of joint ventures within the economies of the former socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe, and to analyse their role as a tool in East-West business, 
during a time of their rapid growth within a context of political and economic change. 
The author's research on joint ventures began in 1986 with a preliminary study visit to 
Hungary, sponsored by the British Council to investigate the effects of the 1985 
Hungarian joint venture amendments. The results of interviews held in Budapest with 
Hungarian ministry officials, joint venture partners and academics suggested that 
Hungary's decision to commit itself to the promotion of East-West joint ventures on its 
territory was achieving some positive results, as the number of joint ventures had 
increased from approximately 14 in 1985 to 50 by the beginning of 1986.(2) 
Since little joint venture activity had taken place in other CMEA countries, such as 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, where joint venture provisions already existed (see table 
8.1), the author initially set out to research East-West joint venture experiences in 
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Hungary, using a case study approach. In 1987, however, following the announcement 
by the Soviet Union to allow foreign equity capital on its territory, it became apparent that 
the parameters of the thesis should be extended to include the Soviet Union - clearly an 
important market for Western companies operating in the CMEA region (see chapter 5). 
Furthermore, it was also expected that all of the other CMEA countries would modify 
their legislation relating to inward investment. At an early stage of the research, therefore, 
it was decided to extend the study of the role of joint ventures in East-West trade to cover 
all of the European CMEA area. 
As joint venture numbers were still relatively low (168 in 1987), however, it seemed 
appropriate to continue with the case study approach since that method had already been 
used successfully in the nineteen seventies to record the experiences of a relatively small 
sample of companies engaged in East-West industrial co-operation.(3) Moreover, there 
appeared to be no research carried out by structured interviews about Western companies' 
joint venture experiences before 1986, except perhaps for some interviews by journalists 
for daily newspapers or the trade press.(4) The first comprehensive document to appear 
which included Western company experiences was published by the United Nations' 
European Commission in 1988. Although some of the company experiences in this 
document were based on secretariat interviews as well as trade press reports, it was not 
clear, however, whether the companies were interviewed according to a structured 
questionnaire. 
METHODOLOGY 
The aim of the early case studies was, therefore, to provide accounts of first-hand 
experience in the management and marketing of joint ventures by Western companies 
engaged in this type of activity. Owing to the small number of joint ventures the author 
chose structured interviews to obtain the case histories of those Western fmns willing to 
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be interviewed. Much of the preparation for the early case studies was completed in 
1987, whilst the actual field research using structured interviews, was undertaken in the 
first half of 1988. 
By 1989, however, the expectations for change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
were clearly gathering momentum. Revisions and improvements to joint venture 
legislation in various CMEA countries brought about a rapid increase in the number of 
joint ventures, hitherto not experienced in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
the profound political changes in the various CMEA countries accelerated the introduction 
of more far reaching economic reforms and provisions for foreign equity shareholding, 
including 100% foreign shareholding. Following the introduction of these reforms, the 
number of joint ventures rose sharply even in some of those CMEA countries where joint 
venture developments had been quite static (e.g. Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland). 
Consequently, the research was yet again extended to include an analysis of those reforms 
within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which affected foreign trade. 
By that time, however, the number of joint ventures had risen well into the thousands 
which meant that the case study sample needed to be supplemented with additional field 
research in order to focus on a specific sample of joint ventures. Owing to the large 
numbers of joint ventures in the USSR and the radical changes occurring in Soviet joint 
venture legislation, the author consequently decided to carry out a questionnaire survey 
on Anglo-Soviet joint ventures which would highlight British companies' experiences in 
the Soviet market; and to also update the previous case histories of Western partners' 
operations in joint ventures. 
Whilst the rate of increase of the numbers of joint ventures demonstrated the growing 
importance given to joint ventures by East-West trade partners, thereby making the 
selected research theme a very topical area to research, statistical data became out-of-date 
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soon after it was published, or was sometimes incomplete as research institutes struggled 
to set up databanks that could cope with the rapidly changing scene in the CMEA area. 
Attempts have been made in this thesis to obtain a quantitative assessment of the 
development of East-West joint ventures, (see chapter 8), but the reliability of the 
available statistical evidence has sometimes been a limiting factor in this area. 
THE THESIS 
As mentioned in the first paragraph, the aim of this thesis has been to examine the 
development of joint ventures and to analyse their role as a tool in East-West business. 
The material presented in the thesis has therefore been divided into three main parts. 
Part A forms the introduction to the thesis, including this chapter and an examination of 
joint ventures as a tool in international business (chapter 2), thus highlighting in 
particular the marketing and management aspects of joint ventures. Part B provides a 
survey of the political and macro-economic background of joint ventures in the former 
USSR and Eastern Europe by discussing the role of concessions during the nineteen 
twenties in the former Soviet Union, foreign trade under centralised planning, and the 
impact of recent economic and political changes on foreign trade in the former Soviet 
Union and socialist countries of Eastern Europe (chapters 3 and 4). The background to 
the subject is further extended by tracing the pattern and volume of East-West trade and 
industrial co-operation from 1970-1990 (chapter 5) as well as tracing the development of 
East-West joint ventures, beginning with a review of the emergence of East-West Soviet 
and East European wholly-owned and mixed companies in the West (chapter 6) which 
highlight the experience gained by Comecon countries with joint ventures in a market 
environment. 
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Part C focusses on the emergence of East-West joint ventures in the East by examining 
the legal provisions for joint ventures in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and 
their potential for Western investors (chapter 7). This is followed by a review of joint 
ventures in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, analysing the number of joint ventures 
and the amount of capital invested by Western companies, in order to obtain an estimate 
of the Western response to joint venture possibilities (chapter 8). These chapters are then 
followed by accounts of case study research into the operation of joint ventures in the 
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe in the late nineteen eighties (chapter 9) and 
a questionnaire based survey on the operation of Anglo-Soviet joint ventures in 1990 
(chapter 10). 
The final chapter (chapter 11) presents the author's comments and conclusions on 
East-West joint ventures and their role in East-West trade, and on the basis of these 
findings discusses areas for future research on East-West trade and industrial co-operation. 
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Chapter 1: Notes 
1. United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, "East-West Joint Venture News", 
no.2, July 1989, Geneva, p. 6. 
- United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, "East-West Joint Venture News, 
no.3, November 1989, Geneva, p.3. 
- United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, database on East-West Joint 
Ventures (up to 1.01.91), Geneva, 1991. 
2. cf. table 8.1, and 
- United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, "East-West Joint Ventures: 
Economic, Business, Financial and Legal Aspects", ECE/TRADE/162, New York, 1988, 
p.73. 
3. Hill M.R., East-West Trade, Industrial Co-operation and Technology Transfer, Gower, 
Aldershot (UK), 1983. 
- Paliwoda S.1., Joint East-West Marketing and Production Ventures, Gower, Aldershot 
(UK), 1981. 
4. United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (1988). 
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CHAPTER 2 
JOINT VENTURES: A TOOL IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the role of joint ventures as a tool in export marketing, providing 
a theoretical framework for evaluating the role of joint ventures in East-West trade. The 
literature included in this survey has focused on the marketing and management aspects 
of joint ventures, including company motivation, partner selection and types of joint 
venture model; as well as reasons for joint venture success and failure in both developed 
and developing economies. The data has been obtained from studies carried out on joint 
ventures in the nineteen seventies and eighties during which time their numbers increased 
world-wide.(l) This general literature survey is followed by an examination of the same 
issues raised in the literature about joint ventures in the East. 
MOTIVATION 
As a tool in international business, joint ventures (together with other industrial co-
operation agreements such as turnkey projects and licensing) are frequently presented in 
the literature as an alternative strategy to exporting, a means to achieve market 
penetration, and a vehicle to demonstrate commitment to a particular foreign market. 
Recent research into foreign direct investments by Rugman, Lecraw and Booth (see figure 
2.1) has shown that companies invest in joint ventures after having gained long experience 
of the foreign market through other export activities.(2) The degree of commitment on 
the part of the foreign company to the host country is measured in terms of the time spent 
trading with the country as well as the amount of resources invested by the foreign firm. 
At the first stage of market penetration, the sale of a licence requires only limited after-
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sales contact or follow-up, whereas with each subsequent stage towards foreign direct 
investment, the foreign company is obliged to commit more and more of its resources to 
strengthening its market presence in the recipient country. 
FIGURE 2.1 
Depth of 
iavolvement 
ill foreign 
maBell 
Entry into foreign markets: 
the internationalisation process 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Local packaging/assembly 
Export throll£~ OlD saln RpreJealllive/di,tribitor 
via agent or distributor 
SOURCE: Rugman, Lecraw, Booth (1985), p.90 
Other reasons why firms have entered into joint ventures have been put forward by 
Datta(3), namely that the increased globalisation of markets together with the slowing 
down of economic growth in the major industrial nations during the nineteen seventies, 
caused companies to look at opportunities in underexplored markets, particularly in the 
developing countries, where direct modes of entry were not always possible. In those 
instances, joint ventures with a local partner have facilitated market entry and made it 
possible for foreign firms to operate within the market Moreover, host governments, 
especially in developing countries, have tended to place pressure on Western companies 
to form joint ventures in an attempt to increase local employment, provide import 
substitution and curb spending of foreign currency. Using joint ventures as a means of 
penetrating the market has, therefore, been particularly relevant where government 
restriction and other less formal barriers inhibited market entry. (4) 
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By contrast studies carried out in the nineteen eighties by the United Nations on joint 
ventures in developed countries. particularly in the European Community. showed that 
companies participated in a joint venture when they were able to pool resources in 
research and development or establish better economies of scale. In the case of non-
European Community firms. particularly of Japanese or American origin. they chose to 
establish joint ventures in order to secure a stronger market position within the European 
Community's internal market. thereby avoiding restrictions to market entry.(5) 
Another important motive for seeking a joint venture partner has been the acquisition or 
sale of technology. Table 2.1 summarises the advantages to be gained by joint venture 
partners involved in acquiring and selling technology. illustrating that the main advantages 
to be gained by the partner acquiring the technology have been access to newer 
technology and help from the partner in implementing that technology. without great cash 
expenditure; as well as opportunities for joint research and development. The seller of 
the technology on the other hand. has been able to achieve greater market penetration with 
relatively low capital input. whilst ensuring the successful transfer of technology; and 
where technology has been sold to firms in less developed economies. it has also been 
possible to sell older technology no longer marketable in developed economies.(6) 
Table 2.1 Joint Venture Advantages for Firms Acquiring or Selling Technology 
Acquiring Selling 
cutting/rationalising research market entry with low capital input 
and development costs 
obtaining up-to-date technology rationalisation of production! 
processing technology 
help in implementing technology "- to. closer supervision and control of 
y technology 
new opportunities for product to. opportunity to sell older technology to 
development "I developing countries 
Source: Killing (Fall 1980) 
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Research undertaken by Hendryx(7) on the implementation of technology transfer in a less 
developed economy, revealed that in the People's Republic of China, joint ventures rather 
than licensing agreements have been the preferred vehicle for the sale and acquisition of 
technology because the parent of the technology was committed to its implementation. 
Furthermore, studies carried out by Davies and Killing confirmed that the greater the 
technology gap between companies engaged in technology transfer, the stronger their 
relationship had to be for the successful implementation of the technology.(8) Seventy-
eight per cent of the joint ventures in Davies' sample engaged technical personnel from 
the supplying parent company to supervise plant construction, whilst only 26% of 
companies in a licensing agreement did so. 
Moreover, data by Killing (see table 2.2), albeit of a small sample of 30 joint ventures in 
developing countries with Canadian, American and other Western firms, illustrates that 
the technology supplying parent is more inclined to supervise the implementation of the 
transferred technology. According to the data in table 2.2 the "technology parent" in 
shared joint ventures preferred to send permanently assigned staff to the joint venture (17 
out of the 25 shared joint ventures in Killing's sample did so), rather than sending staff 
for a visit or on a temporary basis (only 4 out of the 25 joint ventures did this for each 
of the temporary categories). The sample size of "technology parents" in the dominant 
joint ventures (5 joint ventures) is, however, too small a sample to permit any definite 
conclusions to be reached about the assigning of permanent and temporary staff, although 
only two "technology parents" provided staff on permanent assignments. 
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Table 2.2 Personnel Transfers 
I Employees from Foreign Technology Parent I 
Visits Only On Loan Permanently Total 
Assigned 
Majority 1 2 2 5 
50:50 N 4 4 17 25 
Total 5 6 19 30 
Source: Killing (Fall 1980), p.40. 
Companies have, therefore, entered a joint venture agreement to achieve particular 
advantages in the transfer and acquisition of technology, but they also had certain other 
needs which could be provided by their partners, namely: 
(i) capital needs: items readily capitalised such as "capital" itself, raw material supply, 
technology or equipment; 
(ii) human-resource needs: general managers, marketing personnel, technical personnel for 
the transfer of technology and know-how, low-cost labour for competitive output; 
(iii) market access needs: access to local market, and local partners' need to have access 
to export markets; 
(iv) government/political needs: to meet host government requirements, thereby gaining 
political advantage, government strategy for import substitution; 
(v) knowledge needs: local knowledge concerning operational conditions, labour laws, 
factory regulations, customs and marketing methods.(9) 
PARTNER SELECTION 
Having established the various motives or needs for establishing a joint venture, this 
section examines the criteria for selecting a joint venture partner based on research 
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findings conducted in the nineteen eighties, on joint ventures in developed and less 
developed economies. 
According to Beamish(lO) a company interested in penetrating a less developed foreign 
market would look for a local partner who had access to sound market information and 
good local contacts. Where the major motive was the transfer of technology, the parent 
company selling technology looked for a partner who not only required the technology, 
but had the ability to implement it successfully with their help.(ll) The foreign company 
searched, therefore, for a partner with the necessary technical skills and capacity to absorb 
the technology. Where a brandname was involved, the company passing on its brandname 
required a partner who was able to manufacture the products to a satisfactory standard, 
worthy of the brandname being given to those products. Where joint ventures were 
engaged in production activities the foreign partner ensured that the recipient had access 
to good quality raw materials. 
Companies wishing to combine their research and development strengths, however, have 
chosen partners with complementary strengths, so that both parent companies have made 
significant contributions to any product or technological developments. 
Where better economies of scale have been an incentive for a joint venture, a partner has 
been sought who was able to offer production capacity to meet this major objective. The 
foreign partner also looked for someone who could offer skilled, low-cost and efficient 
labour and who was able to participate in a wider market outreach, enabling greater profits 
to be achieved. 
In examples, however, where foreign companies were complying with the wishes of a host 
government, it has sometimes been the case, that they would have preferred other forms 
of industrial co-operation to a joint venture. However, in pursuing their major objective 
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of wanting to do business with that country, they agreed to form a joint venture. In this 
sort of situation, where the local host government exercised such pressure and control, the 
partner selected often came by recommendation from the government, or was expressly 
chosen because it had good government backing and contacts. 
The local partner, for its part, was likely to choose a foreign partner who was able to 
provide for them a combination of strengths, including assets, technology and know-how, 
access to the company's distribution outlets as well as access to external finance. 
Multinational corporations have usually been the most capable to meet all of these 
requirements.(l2) 
Figure 2.2 which has been developed by the present author from the summary points in 
the last paragraph of the previous section, presents the factors which determine partner 
selection. It also shows how all these factors influence the type of joint venture model 
chosen by the partners. 
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Figure 2.2 
Objectives of the Foreign 
Joint Venture Partner: 
a) market penetration 
and knowledge of 
market 
b) sale and acquisition 
of capital, including 
sale of technology and 
licence 
c) human resource needs: 
management and 
marketing know-how, 
research & development 
d) host government 
pressure (market entry) 
Choosing a Complementary Partner 
Attributes of Foreign 
Partner 
assets, experience, good 
product/service 
newer technology, brand-
name, know-how, capital 
goods 
developed expertise, 
technical skills 
sound reputation, 
multinational company 
Attributes of Local 
Partner 
good local market 
knowledge and reputation 
sound technical skill, 
production capacity, 
premises, raw materials 
developed expertise, 
technical skills in a 
complementary field 
state enterprise, political 
approval, good market 
contacts 
• Establishing Complementary Attributes 
and 
Negotiating Terms of Partner Contribution 
I 
Deciding on a Joint Venture Model 
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JOINT VENTURE MODELS 
Various joint venture models grant the partners different degrees of control. According 
to Killing (13) there are 3 joint venture models, namely the dominant parent model, the 
shared management model and the independent joint venture model, which each have the 
following features: 
(a) the dominant parent model 
In this type of joint venture one of the parent companies owns the majority shareholding 
and runs the joint venture as if it were one of its own subsidiaries, playing an important 
role in selecting its operational managers and in deciding the joint venture's strategic and 
operational policies. Multinational companies, therefore, tend to prefer majority 
shareholding, as a matter of policy, in order to maintain control of all their operations. 
Similarly a parent company having sold its brandname to a joint venture may insist on 
majority shareholding in order to ensure the quality of the joint venture products. Some 
host governments, however, may insist on local companies holding majority shareholding 
as a way of protecting local employment and their national economy from outside 
influences.(14) 
(b) the shared management model 
In this type of joint venture model both parent companies have an equal share in the joint 
venture and its management. The partners are able to complement each other's attributes 
in a balanced way, thereby maximising each other's potential through the joint venture. 
'" This is often the model chosen by companies where one supplies the technological 
know-how and the other is able to offer its knowledge of the local market. 
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(c) the independent joint venture model 
This type of joint venture runs relatively independently from either parent company's 
control and as such operates as an autonomous enterprise, although several links inevitably 
exist between the parent companies and the joint venture. 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Strategy and Operation 
As already discussed earlier the choice of joint venture model depends very much on the 
needs or the motives of the parent companies. Of the three previously described models, 
the first two have been more common. The third, independent model has been rarer 
because parent companies have been generally reluctant to lose control of the joint venture 
and its activities, especially when they have invested their resources in the operation. The 
choice of model, however, has been partly influenced by its capability to resolve the 
management issues evolving from joint venture operation. These have been summarised 
by Holton as (15): 
(i) Strategy: devising a plan to achieve the objective of the joint venture. Use of resources, 
planning of time- scales, setting of targets. 
(ii) Decision-making process: communication flows between partners, trust, consultation 
between technical personnel and management, parent company control and dominance, 
state interference. 
(iii) Financial management: decisions on policies regarding investment, reinvestment of 
profits, debts and debt- equity ratios, financial cash infusions, raising or running down of 
assets, partners' financial contributions. 
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(iv) Accounting and control methods: accounting methods, frequency and detail of reports 
to be submitted to partners, deciding on the auditors. 
(v) Marketing policies and practices: deciding on products/product improvements, markets, 
customers, services, means of promotion, stocks. 
(vi) Production policies: determining quality control standards, implementing quality 
control, transferring technology and implementing it. 
(vii) Human Resources: staffing of joint venture, expatriating staff, industrial relations, 
choosing the Board of Directors and the Chairman. Establishing a reporting system, 
hiring and firing staff, pensions, social security, employees' rights. 
(viii) Research and development policy:the size of the budget, emphasis on research and 
development efforts, use of research and development efforts. 
(ix) Government and trade relations: managing taxation, import/export regulations, 
observing joint venture regulations, subsidies. 
These management issues relate broadly to the management, marketing and operational 
activities of the joint venture both in the short and long term, as well as to the company's 
internal and external policies. The ways they have been managed, therefore, have 
depended on the joint venture model adopted by the partners and the degree of control 
that they were able to exercise through it. With the dominant and independent joint 
venture model, conflicts have been less likely to develop than in the shared management 
model. This has been due to the fact that, where a partner has had control through its 
dominant position, the weaker partner has been more likely to accept the decisions taken 
by its dominant partner. In the independent model, the joint venture partners may have 
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been less concerned with control or complying with parent companies' policies than with 
developing their own independent company policies. The management problems 
discussed in existing literature on joint ventures have related mainly to the problems 
encountered by partners in shared joint ventures. and have included the following issues: 
(i) harmonisation of parent company objectives; 
(ii) cultural differences of parent companies; 
(iii) developing an independent management system for the joint venture; 
(iv) establishing an atmosphere of mutual trust; 
(v) ensuring loyalty of employees to the joint venture.(l6) 
An analysis of other management issues of shared joint ventures is presented in the 
following paragraphs. These issues relate to one of the major problems confronting the 
Managing Director of a shared joint venture. namely the lack of a set of well-established 
guidelines or a framework of procedures for him or her to follow. which have affected 
communication flows between the joint venture and the parent companies.(l7) In surveys 
undertaken by Killing on the problems and activities of 37 managers and by Schaan on 
10 managers. the joint venture managers frequently complained about ambiguous 
relationships. allegiances and the matter of trust in their relationship with the parent 
companies as well as their struggle for autonomy. which affected their ability to manage 
the joint venture effectively.(l8) In addition to these questions of relationships. 
allegiances and trust. cultural differences influence the management of a joint venture. and 
associated frameworks. procedures and communication flows. 
Ambiguous Relationships 
A shared joint venture has not always provided a clear hierarchy or chain of command. 
with staff below and above the Managing Director. In the case of divisional managers 
transferred to the joint venture. their first allegiance has been to the parent company. 
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especially as many anticipated promotions from the parent company rather than from the 
joint venture. The problem for the Managing Director of the joint venture, in such 
instances, was therefore one of authority. This situation became particularly intense if 
these divisional managers felt that the Managing Director was proposing actions which 
appeared not to be in the parent company's interest. 
In liaising with superiors, the Managing Director faced an equally ambiguous relationship, 
especially when the hierarchy was not clearly defined. When making any decisions, 
therefore, the Managing Director had to decide which parent company to involve in the 
process. (I 9) This implied, however, that the Managing Director had to be able to 
recognise in advance the interests of each partner, which required him or her to be not 
only familiar with the joint venture issues, but also with the structure and workings of 
both parent companies, and their policies and strategies, in order to make the right 
decision for the joint venture and the interested parent company. Managing Directors, 
however, were often not informed by the parent companies of their long-term objectives 
for the joint venture.(20) 
Allegiance 
According to Killing's findings, joint ventures which had an independent Managing 
Director were more likely to succeed than those which had a Managing Director who 
worked part-time for the joint venture and part-time for one of the parent companies. 
Unlike the part-time Managing Director, the full-time Managing Director was less likely 
to experience a conflict of loyalties between the joint venture's interest and those of the 
parent company. (2 I) Independent managers were, however, less common. In his sample 
of 20 managers, 7 worked part-time for one of the parent companies, whilst 12 of the 
remaining 13 managers indicated that there was a greater than fifty per cent probability 
that they would work for one or other of the parent companies when they left the joint 
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venture.(22) 
Cultural Differences 
In joint ventures between partners from different cultural backgrounds, for example 
between Japanese and European or between Iranian and European firms, the difference 
in languages and management systems have sometimes led to misunderstandings, poor 
communications and ambiguous relationships.(23) 
The difference in management systems, in particular, has been discussed by Killing in his 
examination of the influence of the partners' corporate cultures on the joint venture.(24) 
Killing defined the partners' corporate cultures in terms of their size and personality 
which determined the way in which the partners dealt with bureaucracy, hierarchy and 
decision-making. Thus large companies would be used to dealing with bureaucracy and 
delays when trying to obtain a decision, whilst a manager in a small company would 
approach line managers directly in order to obtain a fairly speedy decision. 
The features of the corporate culture, however, were influenced by the industry the 
company was engaged in rather than its nationality. Thus, companies in the same 
industry, but not necessarily from the same country, such as oil or engineering, were 
likely to have more in common with each other than for example a bank or service 
company in the same country.(25) These different corporate cultures usually operated 
different management systems (e.g. accounting, planning and control systems). The study 
showed that, where parent companies had different corporate cultures, it was difficult for 
the joint venture to formulate mutually acceptable policies on issues such as distribution, 
quality control or the hiring and firing of personnel.(26) 
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Although these studies highlighted the cultural problems of joint ventures with partners 
from different countries or industries, it was possible, according to Janger, for joint 
ventures to work out a management system designed to cope with these difficulties.(27) 
He proposed the implementation of the following systems to enable joint ventures to 
manage the operation successfully: 
(i) writing of financial reports 
(ii) informal visits by parent company executives 
(iii) regular financial audits 
(iv) formal planning systems 
(v) staff performance reviews 
(vi) management audits 
Finding a Managing Director, however, who was capable of functioning in this rather 
complex and often ill-defined corporation was difficult. Nevertheless, a shared joint 
venture could succeed, if the Managing Director's allegiance and commitment was to the 
joint venture, rather than to one or the other of the parent companies. 
REASONS FOR JOINT VENTURE FAILURE 
Having examined the motives and objectives of companies deciding to collaborate 
together in a joint venture and having studied the complexities of managing a joint 
venture, it is evident that joint ventures have been confronted with many difficulties which 
have sometimes led to their dissolution. These have been summarised by Scanlon(28) as 
misreading of market opportunities, inadequacies in human resource management and 
information systems, falling short of objectives, and growing disillusionment. These are 
explained in more detail in the following subsections: 
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(a) Misreading of market opportunities: 
Estimating wrongly the market potential of their products or services under development, 
or failing to make a detailed assessment of the underlying technologies required, led to 
a misjudgment of market opportunities by many joint ventures. Examples were given by 
Scanlon of incomprehensive studies of the market place from which incorrect or distorted 
market data were obtained. Other joint ventures erroneously assumed the local partner 
already possessed an understanding of the market place because of his experience in the 
market or their location. 
(b) Human Resource Management and Informations Systems: 
The problem of employee identification and allegiance was raised when parent companies 
supplied personnel to a joint venture. This issue often remained unresolved as few 
companies were willing to provide special programmes to help the joint venture 
employees to identify more strongly with the joint venture. On the contrary, some parent 
companies preferred to retain the loyalty of their employees seconded to the joint venture. 
The consequences of divided loyalties as discussed in previous sections led to the 
dissolution of the joint venture. 
Setting up a reporting system which met the requirements of the joint venture was often 
neglected. The reporting system of one of the parent companies was, therefore, adopted 
in most cases, which was not always appropriate to the joint venture's needs. Impaired 
information flows right at the start-up phase, and later when the joint venture was running, 
impeded the smooth operation of the venture. 
(c) Falling Short of Objectives: 
The most frequently mentioned reasons for failing to meet the objectives set by the joint 
venture partners included misreadings of the market place, cost overruns and unforseen 
changes in the economy or governmental actions. Out of a sample of 38 companies 
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asked, nearly half said that the collaborative venture did not live up to expectations and 
there was an undercurrent of disagreement between the partners. 
(d) Growing Disillusionment: 
Whilst many partners were very satisfied with the collaboration at the conceptual phase 
of the venture, they were less satisfied with the development of the business plan and the 
resolution of human resource issues. Scanlon measured this growing disillusion with a 
percentage breakdown in his study (see figure 2.3). 
The reduced levels of enthusiastic satisfaction with the business plan and human resource 
management, compared with conceptualisation, legal agreements and management systems 
were explained by the fact that the former areas were difficult to manage as they tended 
to be rather unpredictable. In addition, when compared with legal agreement and 
management systems they were less easily put into an operational framework. A business 
plan and human resourcing were also more vulnerable to unforeseeable factors such as 
changing market demands and changing industrial relations. 
Figure 2. 3 Partner Satisfaction with the Joint Venture 
Conceptual Business Legal Human Management 
Phase Plan* Agreement Resources Systems 
Satisfied: 
Very 79 57 80 50 66 
Somewhat 14 26 18 41 27 
Dissatisfied: 
Somewhat 7 10 2 9 5 
Very 7 2 
TOTAL 100 100 100 lOO 100 
Source: Scan Ion (1986), p.83. 
*excludes 4 collaborative ventures that did not develop a business plan. 
Sample Size: 38 companies. 
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In the survey carried out by Buckley, Mirza and Sparkes on successful investments in 
Japan by American and European companies, factors for success and failure are 
summarised in figure 2.4. Their findings showed that being well acquainted with one's 
partner and the market were prerequisites for a successful joint venture.(29) They 
stressed the importance of sound management systems and good labour relations, which 
also support Scanlon's findings. Key problems, besides those that referred specifically 
to the Japanese market, included cultural differences and communication problems at top 
management level. 
Figure 2.4 Key Factors in Joint Venture Success and Failure in Japan 
Success Factors 
Frequently mentioned: 
· Long-term commitment 
· Development of relationships 
· Technological lead 
· Special niche in the market 
· Good partner in joint venture 
· Successful product adaptation 
Often mentioned: 
· Sensitivity to Japanese conditions 
· Good labour relations 
· Sound finance 
· Dedicated personnel 
· Combination of European technology 
and Japanese marketing 
· Close liaison between Europe and 
Japanese partner 
Key Problems 
Frequently mentioned: 
· Language problems 
· General cultural differences 
· Intense competition 
· Distribution system 
· Meeting Japanese quality requirements 
· Long time horizons needed 
· Price structure in Japan 
(too low) 
Often mentioned: 
· Standards approval 
· Protectionist attitudes 
and laws 
· Advertising costs 
· "Secrecyll 
· Insufficient profit 
· Difficulty in obtaining 
top level management 
Source: Buckley, Mirza, Sparkes (19 September, 1986) p.102. 
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Holton's study(30) on international joint ventures identified two main reasons for joint 
venture failure, namely decision-making and partner disagreement as outlined below. 
(a) Decision-making 
According to his findings joint ventures failed when the decision-making could not be 
delegated from headquarters to the joint venture (usually in the case of a multinational 
company) and the local partner was, therefore, unable to participate in the decision-
making process. 
(b) Partner disagreement 
When partners disagreed about operating strategies, policies and methods which 
concerned, for example, dividend pay-out policies, debt-equity ratios, market policies and 
quality control, they often reached an impasse which prevented the joint venture from 
being able to continue operations. 
According to Holton a joint venture agreement had a greater chance of working if a 
business plan was included because it defined the objectives of the joint venture and the 
partners' commitment to them.(31) The business plan, had to specify, therefore: 
- the prospective partners' qualifications for participating in the joint venture; 
- their financial capability; 
- the company's market position in the product line being considered; 
- the availability of management/technical and other personnel; 
- the level of research and development expenditure; 
- the willingness to divulge new technology. 
To ensure the viability and effectiveness of the business plan, Holton recommended that 
this be checked by a reputable bank or relevant embassy. In this way, both partners could 
gain assurances whilst at the same time working out on paper some of the operational 
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difficulties to be encountered by the joint venture. It also provided clear objectives to the 
Managing Director. 
JOINT VENTURE BENEFITS 
Despite the difficulties of managing a joint venture, there are nevertheless, positive 
benefits to be gained by companies engaged in this type of business arrangement which 
have been highlighted by Berlew (32) and Killing.(33) Berlew pointed to the success of 
joint ventures in achieving market penetration, whilst Killing presented the benefits to 
parent companies from the joint venture in the form of pay-off through sales, fees and 
royalties. Their findings are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
Market Entry 
Joint ventures have enabled companies to establish a market presence with small 
capitalisation, especially if one of the partners capitalised the venture by contributing 
know-how or technology and the other partner was able to provide local staff and 
resources. Moreover, this type of co-operation was also able to provide the foreign 
partner with readier access to market information obtained from a local partner. This was 
especially the case, where host governments were promoting joint ventures. 
Equity holding 
The equity holding of a joint venture was likely to increase more than earnings from a 
distribution outlet or licensing agreement and give a greater return on the initial 
investment. 
Pay-offs 
In the shared joint ventures interviewed by Killing (19 joint ventures) more than half of 
the foreign partners (11 foreign partners) received pay-offs through technical fees and 
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through the sale of goods to the joint venture. By contrast, the local partners' main pay-
offs were through dividends and the ability to obtain goods through the joint venture 
(approximately 7 and 6 local partners respectively). 
JOINT VENTURES IN THE EAST 
Introduction 
As already stated at the beginning of the chapter, this section focusses on the business 
aspects discussed in earlier research on international joint ventures, with particular 
reference to East-West joint ventures in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The 
following pages examine, therefore, joint venture motivations, the type of joint venture 
model preferred, the management issues raised by East-West joint ventures, the reasons 
for joint venture failures and the joint venture returns, thereby providing the theoretical 
framework for discussing the case studies in chapters nine and ten of the thesis. The most 
comprehensive data on these issues, giving Western companies' experiences, has been 
published by the United Nations in 1988.(34) Where possible, other sources from the 
trade press and East European sources have also been included. 
Partner Objectives 
According to the United Nations' survey in 1988, Western companies have had the 
following objectives in wanting to establish a joint ventures in the former CM EA markets: 
(i) to sell their company's goods or services in Eastern Europe (i.e., market penetration); 
(ii) to sell their technology or licences to their East European partner ( i.e., capital 
transfer); 
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(iii) to achieve greater economies of scale by gaining access to low-cost labour, cheaper 
raw materials and factory premises (i.e., capital transfer); 
(iv) to establish joint research and development (i.e., rationalising or expanding technical 
resources); 
(v) to respond to host government pressure.(35) 
These objectives correspond closely with those summarised in figure 2.2 of this chapter 
and have been defined as fulfilling certain' needs such as market penetration, capital and 
human resource needs, as well as the need to respond to host government pressure. 
East European partners have published their objectives in the respective joint venture 
decrees. Taking the former Soviet joint venture decree as an example of East European 
partners' objectives, clause 3 of the decree (36) states that a joint venture with a foreign 
partner must: 
(i) attract new technology and managerial expertise (i.e., capital and human resource 
acquisition); 
(ii) stimulate import substitution (i.e., capital acquisition); 
(iii) stimulate exports (i.e., market penetration abroad). 
Moreover, in 1984 a United Nations' report (37) also noted that East European partners 
wanted to modernise their enterprises and improve their export performance in order to 
earn more hard currency. These partner objectives are also similar to those mentioned in 
figure 2.2 of this chapter. They reflect the need for capital and human resources, as well 
as the desire to achieve market penetration in hard currency markets. However, whilst 
it may be possible for partners to find compatible joint venture partners to meet their 
capital and human resource needs, partners who disagree on the joint venture market 
outlets may find it difficult to continue a joint venture partnership, unless a compromise 
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solution is found. 
Choosing a Joint Venture Model 
The type of joint venture models encountered in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union prior to 1989 (see table 2.3) fell into two categories: the shared management model 
and the dominant parent model. In the dominant parent model before 1989, it was usually 
the East European partner who had the dominant position through majority equity holding. 
Moreover, most East European countries and the former USSR insisted on the managing 
director of the joint venture having the appropriate East European or Soviet citizenship. 
According to United Nations' statistics the trend up to 1988 seems to have been slightly 
in favour of the shared joint venture model (40% of the total in table 2.3), although 29% 
of the total sample had a dominant East European partner and 31 % of the joint ventures 
did not specify their equity shareholding. 
Table 2.3 Types of Joint Venture Models in Eastern Europe up to 1988 
COUNTRY *SHARED **DOMINANT 
Bulgaria 5 2 
Czechos- 2 I 
lovakia 
Hungary 48 36 
Poland 1 I 
Romania 4 1 
USSR 7 7 
TOTALS 66 48 
* Partner has 45% of equity shareholding 
** Usually the East European/Soviet partner 
UNKNOWN 
8 
0 
27 
11 
0 
5 
51 
TOTAL 
15 
3 
III 
13 
5 
19 
166 
Source: Compiled from statistics in the report by United Nations, Economic Commission 
for Europe (1988) pp.75-90. 
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Management of Joint Ventures 
As discussed earlier on in the chapter the management structure of the joint venture is 
determined by the type of joint venture model adopted and the operational and cultural 
environment of the host country. Moreover, as mentioned above, in the legislation 
governing joint ventures in the former CMEA countries before 1989, the authorities 
preferred the East European partner to be the controlling or at least an equal partner in 
the joint venture. 
Since the shared joint venture model was generally preferred before 1989, this section 
discusses the relevant issues relating to the management of shared joint ventures in the 
former Comecon countries. The main management tasks confronting the managers of a 
shared joint venture are to achieve harmonisation between both partners' business 
objectives, and to understand each other's management cultures and business 
environment.(39) The following paragraph presents the way in which some partners have 
managed to overcome some of these difficulties. 
a) Different business objectives 
In order to compromise on business objectives, East-West joint venture partners have 
agreed to carry out aspects of their joint venture activities in both markets, thereby 
satisfying both partners' business desires. Examples of compromise include the 
HeinemannlOrdzhonikidze, German-Soviet joint venture which has been engaged in the 
manufacture of machine tools and the Burda Moden, German-Soviet dressmaking 
magazine joint venture.(40) In order to sell to the former Soviet market and gain access 
to Western technology and know-how, the partners in the machine tool joint venture have 
set up a factory in Moscow, where the joint venture pays labour and material costs from 
rouble profits, and Russian workers have been sent to the German based plant for training. 
The Burda joint venture also managed to find a compromise solution in which Burda met 
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their Soviet partners' objective of gaining access to Western markets by building a 
printing press in the former Soviet Union which sells to Western and Soviet customers. 
In return, Burda has been allowed to circulate and sell the Burda magazine for roubles 
throughout the former Soviet republics. 
b) Cultural differences 
The cultural differences referred to earlier on in the chapter include linguistic, corporate 
and operational differences. According to literature .on East-West joint ventures the 
cultural problems have been mainly concerned with ·the corporate and operational 
differences.(41) The main corporate differences have been due to the differences in the 
partners' economic systems which have resulted in Western firms being market and profit-
oriented, and East European firms being more preoccupied with quantative output rather 
than efficiency, quality and consumer demands. As for the operational aspects, Western 
firms have had to overcome certain day-to-day difficulties within a centrally planned 
economy. These have often included coping with the inefficiencies of the supply system, 
which have sometimes led to shortages and caused firms to stockpile goods. as a 
precaution, inadequate postal and telecommunications, making communications with the 
parent company in the West and customers difficult, as well as bureaucracy and state 
interference, making it difficult for the joint venture to reach speedy decisions. Although 
the economic reforms since 1989 have eliminated some of the corporate and operational 
obstacles between former socialist and Western companies, differences will continue to 
exist as long as the economies.of·the former socialist countries lag behind those in the 
West. 
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Despite these advantages, however, national and corporate differences as well as the 
conflict over market outlets in East-West joint ventures have sometimes required the 
partners, particularly in shared joint ventures, to harmonise and sometimes compromise 
on their objectives in order to meet both partners' needs. The evidence has shown that 
joint venture, partners have been in a better position to do this as a result of working out 
an appropriate joint venture strategy for overcoming their differences. 
According to the literature on international and East-West joint ventures, this type of 
partnership is a complex form of industrial co-operation between firms, particularly if the 
partners have equal shareholding. However, if carefully managed, they offer advantages 
to both partners with minimal capital outlay and enable the foreign company to penetrate 
foreign markets with considerable help from their partner(s). 
Having examined joint ventures as a tool in international and East-West business the 
subsequent chapters\exte_n~ > the economic and political framework for discussing East-
West joint ventures by tracing the important economic and political changes which have 
contributed to the rapid growth of East-West joint ventures in the late nineteen eighties. 
These background chapters establish, therefore, the necessary framework for discussing 
the case studies presented in chapters nine and ten of the thesis. 
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Joint Venture Failures 
Despite the cultural differences outlined above, there was only a 5% joint venture failure 
rate up to 1988.(42) According to the United Nations report(43) four joint ventures 
ceased operations in Romania, two in Hungary and one in Bulgaria. Four of the failures 
were attributed to either bureaucratic inefficiencies or supply difficulties, two were due 
to miscalculation of demand for the joint venture products, and one was due to the 
Western partner going bankrupt. Since 1988, however, there has been no statistical 
information to show whether the rate of joint venture failures has changed, although it is 
likely that as the number of joint ventures have increased so the failure rate may also 
increase.(44) 
Joint Venture Returns 
It would appear that the partners' objectives for entering into a joint venture agreement, 
if fulfilled, determine the partners' returns. Benefits from the joint venture may range, 
therefore, from gaining access to the local or export market to meeting capital, human 
resource or raw material requirements.(45) 
CONCLUSION 
The literature search on international and East-West joint ventures has demonstrated that 
companies have entered into joint venture agreements because it has enabled them to 
penetrate a foreign market more effectively with relatively low capitalisation; and in some 
cases to meet host government pressure as well as meet the partners' respective capital 
and human resource needs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SOVIET UNION: FROM THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 
TO MARKET SOCIALISM 
INTRODUCTION 
The application of the Soviet economic model has been extensive in East European 
economies during the post-war period, and as such needs to be understood and placed in 
context in any discussion of East-West trade and joint ventures. This chapter traces, 
therefore, the development of the Soviet economy from the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
to the creation of Stalin's central planning system, followed by post 1957 attempts to 
restructure and improve economic efficiency and technological development up to 1990. 
It examines the main features of each stage paying attention to the role of concessions in 
the nineteen twenties, the function of foreign trade under the centralised planning system 
and the emergence of joint ventures in the nineteen eighties. 
THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 
This section begins by outlining the main events in Soviet economic history which led to 
NEP and the introduction of concessions, thereby providing the historical background for 
a discussion of the role of concessions. 
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After the First World War, the 1917 October Revolution and the ensuing Civil War, the 
economic problems faced by the Soviet government in the early nineteen twenties were 
largely due to the supply crisis of 1921. A shortage of agricultural produce, following the 
reported famine of 1921 - 22, and a fuel crisis, caused many industrial enterprises to halt 
production, and large numbers of skilled workers and engineers to move back to the 
villages, away from the main industrial centres. Consequently skilled industrial labour 
became scarce and their places were often filled by unskilled workers, ill-equipped for the 
required task. These factors, when combined, contributed to a slump in productivity 
which led to the rouble being devalued and the formal distribution system being 
bypassed.(2) 
Thus the closure of several state factories occurred as a result of supply and labour 
shortages which caused the Soviet government to become mainly concerned with the task 
of reorganising state industry and increasing industrial output. In order to achieve this 
objective speedily, the authorities decided to abandon temporarily the introduction of a 
centralised planning system through which extensive industrial growth could be effected. 
Consequently, with the aim of making industry self-sufficient and more independent from 
the state, a government decree was issued on the 9 August 1921 dividing industry into 
autonomous units (trusts) which controlled several enterprises.(3) The enterprises 
themselves fell into two categories: 
1. large enterprises, which were to be supplied with raw materials, and to 
be controlled by the state; 
2. factories, which were to be leased to private individuals and foreign 
concessions.(4) 
40 
Those not falling into these two categories were closed down and workers transferred to 
operating factories in an effort to rationalise industrial production. The remaining plants 
were then regrouped into trusts which were intended to attract foreign technical 
assistance.(S) 
However, whilst the early Soviet government sought to cope with the problems of 
rebuilding industry and investing in agriculture by allowing market forces to play a major 
role, the 'Left' of that time continued to advocate the implementation of socialist central 
planning. (6) Support for the latter policy became increasingly stronger in the latter half 
of the nineteen twenties and is discussed in a subsequent section. 
Planning and control in the nineteen twenties(7) 
Having temporarily rejected the socialist policy of extensive industrial development in 
favour of a mixed market economy, the authorities decided during 1921 - 22 to 
decentralise the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) which had been set 
up in December 1917 to control the planning of production from the centre. 
Responsibility for planning production was, therefore, transferred from the Council of the 
National Economy to newly created trusts which were responsible for groups of 
enterprises. Several trusts were, nevertheless, still subordinated to the VSNKh, whilst 
others were placed under the control of local sovnarkhozy (councils of national economy). 
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The VSNKh, however, retained control over: 
- finance (credit, price policy, etc.), 
- administration (hiring and firing of trust officials, transfer of material resources), 
- production planning (drafting of simple output plans, checking on their execution). 
Moreover, whilst the VSNKh was responsible for the formulation of the production plan 
and budget of industries of all- union importance, it merely examined the production plans 
of those industries under republican control (republican council). Thus key industries for 
the economy were given orders by VSNKh via the trusts, determining their production and 
outlets. Many trusts, however, especially in the consumers' goods industries, made up 
their own production plans which took the market into account. 
The role of Gosplan (the State Planning Commission set up on 22 February 1921) was 
to work out the overall state economic plan together with the methods and means for 
implementing it. Moreover, on 21 August 1923 its duties were re-defined to include 
preparation of the budget, examination of questions on currency, credit and banking 
matters as well as making decisions on industrial location and ensuring industrial 
standardisation. Its main function, therefore, in the nineteen twenties was to act as a co-
ordinating body which examined and expressed views on all plans and production 
programmes put forward. In this respect it overlapped somewhat with the planning 
division of VSNKh. 
To summarise, the type of planning which was undertaken by these bodies was concerned 
(except for some key sectors) with strategic investment decisions and industrial co-
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ordination rather than providing output plans for all trusts and enterprises. Many trusts, 
for their part, worked out their own targets with only partial supervision from these 
central authorities. Most large trusts, however, such as the Baku Oil Organisation (the 
Soviet Union's largest oil producer) were closely linked with the relevant sub-division of 
VSNKh. 
Concessions 
Having been refused loans from international financial institutions in the early nineteen 
twenties and having decided to respond to the immediate economic problems within the 
USSR, the Soviet government encouraged foreign direct investments. This investment 
took mainly the form of foreign participation in concessions.(S) 
In the first half of the nineteen twenties the largest group of concessions were operating 
in the raw materials sector which helped to promote exports and brought quick returns of 
hard currency earnings. Technical assistance contracts and the purchase of complete 
plants and equipments also became more usual, once the rouble (backed by gold) had 
been stabilised through the currency reform of July 1922. 
During the NEP period there were basically three types of concessions in operation which 
are summarised in subsequent paragraphs. All involved investments by foreign 
companies to varying degrees and participation in profits in keeping with their share-
holding. 
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Type 1 predominated at the beginning of the nineteen twenties and were "pure" 
concessions which operated in all sectors of the economy. This type of concession 
permitted foreign companies to exploit and develop a business opportunity with the Soviet 
Union without any property rights. Their role was, therefore, to provide capital, organise 
finance and introduce the latest technology. These concessions, could be described as 
mixed companies without equity. 
Type 2 concessions were mixed companies with equity. To begin with, foreign companies 
were allowed a 50:50 shareholding. This was later reduced to minority foreign 
shareholding of 49%. The chairman of the board of directors, a Soviet citizen, was also 
given the deciding vote. The foreign contribution in this instance, was similar to that 
made in type 1 concessions, except that it involved equity investments. 
Type 3 concessions were technical assistance contracts, where the foreign contribution 
consisted mainly of technology, for which the Soviets paid.(9) 
Table 3.1 on the next page shows the number of applications for concessions and the type 
of concession applied for between 1921 and 1930 and although the data in table 3.1, is 
incomplete, it nevertheless, permits the following observations to be made: 
(i) the number of applications for concessions by foreign investors far 
exceeded the actual number of concessions established (at least up until 
1926); 
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(ii) the greatest number of applications were received in the years 1922-23 
and 1925-26 (i.e. 1 year after the NEP had been introduced and at the 
height of the NEP respectively); 
(iii) as the NEP became less popular, it appears that the number of 
applications for concessions declined (i.e. 1926 onwards); 
(iv) as far as is available from the data, type 1 and 2 concessions were far 
more popular between 1921 and 1926, than type 3; 
(v) technical assistance contracts increased in the latter half of the nineteen 
twenties. 
Table 3.1 Concession Applications and Agreement 
Year Applications No. of Agreements Type 3 
Types 1 and 2 
1921-22 224 18 0 
1922 - 23 579 44 1 
1923 - 24 396 55 0 
1924 - 25 256 103 4 
1925 -26 482 110 7 
1926 - 27 263 not available 13 
1927 - 28 200 not available 17 
1928 - 29 270 nol available 33 
1929 - 30 not available not available 59 
TOTAL 2.670 330 134 
(To 1928 - 29) (To 1925 - 26) (To 1929 - 30) 
ouree: >Onlalov ano ~egaJ. OVlet olon ear o IW; ~U1lon. Vol. I \I~OO). p.~. 
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As the popularity of the NEP declined in the latter half of the nineteen twenties, the total 
number of applications for concessions also declined. The increase in type 3 concessions 
after 1926, suggests that the Soviet authorities became less interested in having capitalist 
participation in their economic activities and preferred instead to "buy in" Western 
technology and expertise through type 3 concessions as a way of preparing for the 
introduction of a centralised planning system. 
The Role of Concessions during NEP 
Writers commenting on the period of concessions in the Soviet Union have differed in 
their opinions about the impact of concessions on the Soviet economy. Nove for example, 
points out that of the remaining 68 concessions which still existed in 1928, their 
contribution to the Soviet Union's industrial output amounted to only 0.6% of industrial 
output,(1O) Equally Dobb argued that concessions with foreign firms had not had a great 
impact on the development of the Soviet economy after 1917 because concessions had 
only succeeded in attracting an estimated 10 million gold roubles during a 10 year period. 
(11) In his concluding remarks Dobb stated that ""the policy of granting concessions on 
a large scale to foreign companies had little success, apart from one or two special cases, 
while the concessions which were granted were more often in the sphere of foreign trade 
than in production." (12) 
A Soviet writer of that period was also dismissive of the importance of concessions. 
Thus, Luibimov, former professor of economics at the University of Moscow, stated: 
"Any discussion of concessions in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics must emphasize 
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their relative un importance in Soviet activity ... "(l3) According to the above writers, 
therefore, concessions and foreign capital and technology did little to rebuild the Soviet 
economy, except in one or two cases, and tended to be engaged in import and export 
activities (i.e. "foreign trade"). 
Quite a different view, however, was presented by Sulton on the role of foreign 
concessions on Soviet economic development. In a detailed analysis of the amount of 
technology transferred through foreign concessions, he established a correlation between 
productivity and the transfer of Western technology.(l4) According to his findings, 98% 
of all sectors in the Soviet economy had benefited from foreign technology. In his volume 
covering the 1930 - 45 period of the Soviet economy, Sulton remained convinced that any 
production increases (except in petroleum refining and timber industry) were due to the 
increased output of plants built between 1930 and 1933 with the help of Western 
technology and type 3 concessions, rather than new Soviet plants. Moreover, this was 
substantiated by showing that no major technology or major plant under construction 
between 1930 and 1945 was implemented by purely Soviet efforts alone.(l5) 
By taking the above points of view into account, it is possible to conclude that in terms 
of capital investment and direct contribution to national production output, foreign 
concessions were unimportant to Soviet economic development, except in one or two 
cases (including the Balm oil fields). Nevertheless, strong evidence exists, that Western 
technology obtained through concessions, especially type 3, did help the Soviet economy 
to emerge from the slump of the very early nineteen twenties. 
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On the basis of the above, concessions appeared, therefore, to have had the following 
objectives: 
a) to attract foreign investment, technology and skills; 
b) to set in motion idle industries; 
c) to boost exports, particularly in the raw materials sector. 
As discussed in earlier paragraphs, however, concessions were only successful in meeting 
these objectives to a limited extent. Nevertheless, concessions enabled the USSR to 
obtain some important Western technology and know-how and improve its export 
performance in the raw materials sector. 
The End of the NEP 
With signs of only small improvements in industrial productivity during the latter half of 
the nineteen twenties, the opponents of the NEP were able to argue more convincingly for 
the introduction of a socialist centralised planning system. Their arguments against the 
continuation of the NEP were strengthened in particular by the situation brought about by 
the government's price policy which had led to high prices being charged by the private 
sector for goods in short supply in the state sector.(l6) The conflict between the state and 
private sector was further aggravated by the fact that many goods sold at high prices by 
the private sector on the open market had originally been purchased at low prices from 
the state sector.(l7) 
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The gap which widened between free and official prices (see table 3.2 below) in the latter 
half of the nineteen twenties, helped Stalin and the advocates of a centralised planning 
system to succeed in outlawing the employment of labour for private gain in 1930. This 
brought the NEP period officially to an end.(l8) 
Table 3.2 Private and Official Prices of Food and Manufactures 
(1913 = lOO) 
Year Food Food Manufactures Manufactures 
Private Official Private Official 
1926 (Dec.) 198 181 251 208 
1927 (Dec.) 222 175 240 188 
1928 (Dec.) 293 184 253 190 
1929 (June) 450 200 279 192 
Source: Malafeyev A., Istoriya tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR, (Moscow, 1964), pp. 384,385, 
in Nove (1982), p.157. 
THE SOCIALIST CENTRAL PLANNING SYSTEM(l9) 
With the rise of Stalin and the demise of NEP, it was possible for the Soviet government 
to lay the foundations for a centrally planned economy which was later to provide the 
model for the development of the economies in Eastern Europe in the post-war era. This 
section summarises, therefore, the main characteristics of the centralised planning system, 
the organisation and role of foreign trade within it, and outlines the major reform 
elements, beginning with the 'sovnarkhozy' reforms of 1957, followed by the Kosygin 
reforms of 1965 and the Brezhnev reforms of 1973 and 1979. (See table' 3A-for summary I _ 
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of reforms.) 
The planning and management structure of the centralised planning system of the Stalin 
period had the following major features: 
i. centralised decision-making - the state planning committee (Gosplan) created in 1921, 
was charged by the Communist Party with the task of determining not only the 
macroeconomic, but also microeconomic policies of the economy through detailed five 
yearly plans which included targets for enterprise production; 
ii. a vertical chain of command - plans and targets were passed down to enterprises 
through the People's Commissariats (later known as ministries), which ensured that the 
plans were implemented by the enterprises. Inter-enterprise activities of supplying and 
purchasing was also subject to ministerial control and supervision. Thus enterprise 
requirements were communicated to Gosplan through the ministries, which acted as a 
filter for information flows from both ends; 
iii. Production targets - legally binding directives were passed down the hierarchical ladder 
requiring enterprises to put their energies into meeting the targets set by the central 
planners; 
iv. Physical balancing - output was measured both at central and operational levels in 
physical units, rather than in terms of efficiency or cost.(l9) 
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The aim of the centralised planning system was, therefore, to use extensive sources of 
growth in order to achieve economic development and industrialisation.(20) To this end, 
the command economy was successful: between 1928 - 1955 Soviet GNP growth was 
estimated to have been in the range of 4.4 - 6.3% per annum which were considered to 
be very high growth rates from a low industrial base (c.f. GNP growth for approximately 
the same period in USA increased by 2.7 times, UK by 2 times), .(21) 
The weaknesses of the centralised planning system, however, were its inflexibility to 
respond to anything outside the plans and the binding nature of the plans, which had to 
be fulfilled even when inaccuracies in the physical balancing of resources existed. 
Consequently this method of balancing resources placed emphasis on quantifiable outputs 
and inputs, without regard to efficiency (22), except for continued planned increases in 
enterprise output with proportionately smaller increases in allocated resources. These 
factors contributed subsequently to a slow-down in growth and innovation which led 
successive Soviet governments to introduce reform programmes in an attempt to deal with 
these problems.(23) 
The Foreign Trade System under Centralised Planning 
Whilst foreign trade and concessions had been actively promoted in the NEP period in 
order to aid Soviet economic reconstruction, foreign trade under the centralised planning 
system became just another branch of the economy, governed by the Ministry for Foreign 
Trade.(24) Import and export targets were, therefore, set centrally. Moreover, their role 
within the economy was diminished, in as far as imports were meant to overcome supply 
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shonages in the domestic market and exports were to enable the authorities to pay for 
these imports. Thus, exports took second place to imports in the planning process.(25) 
Table 3.3 demonstrates the vertical flow of the import- decision making process and the 
lack of horizontal communication between foreign trade organisations, enterprises and 
their customers. As with any other planning of supplies, the ministries passed on import 
allocations received from Gosplan to enterprises and vice versa, aggregating and adjusting 
any discrepancies between the import requirements of both parties. The final decisions 
regarding imports were then made by Gosplan which in turn set the export targets in 
keeping with import requirements. 
Foreign trade, therefore, did not contribute directly to economic growth, but only 
indirectly by providing resources not available in the domestic market. Moreover, 
whenever the value of the rouble was overestimated in import and export transactions, 
Soviet importers made large profits which were transferred into budget calculations. 
However, whenever exporters sold at low prices, their losses were compensated by the 
State budget.(26) Consequently, Soviet exports in particular, were seen to have a negative 
impact on the Soviet economy, depending on the value of the rouble. 
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Table 3.3 Foreign Trade Organisation Pre-1987 
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Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
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4 The draft of the aggregated foreign trade plan was passed to Gosplan. and 
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Source: Powell (1977) pp. 51 -76. 
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Owing to the relatively unimportant role given to foreign trade, therefore, under the 
centralised planning system and the poor economic situation in the West, brought about 
by the Depression in the thirties, East-West trade declined in general, except for Soviet-
German trade which continued until the dissolution of the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1941. 
Although trade with the Western allies increased again during the war years because of 
the USSR's need for large quantities of machinery, it nevertheless decreased once more 
after the Second World War, owing to the onset of the Cold War and increased political 
tension.(27) 
Reforms (1957 - 1979) 
After the death of Stalin in 1953, new Soviet leaders emerged who were prepared to 
discuss the weaknesses of the system and seek to find ways of improving output and to 
improve relations with the West. The weaknesses of the centralised planning system were 
thus attributed to the following: 
- low level of mechanisation (or non-implementation of new technology and lack of 
innovative activity at enterprise level), 
- labour problems (due to bad discipline and over- manning), 
- the production of goods which were generally below world standards, 
- the imbalance in the supply and demand of certain goods within the economy.(28) 
Although successive governments attempted to solve the inefficiencies of the Soviet 
economy by different reforms, they, nevertheless, had some fundamental elements in 
common. None of the reforms, for example, sought to remove the Communist Party's 
control of the Soviet economy, nor did they intend to remove any of the gains (eg., full 
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employment, low prices on basic commodities, egalitarianism) achieved through 
socialism.(29) The reforms hoped, therefore, to reinforce and improve the planning 
system, thereby increasing efficiency of production. 
Table 3.4 summarises the main changes which occurred and illustrates how the reforms 
sought to alter control of central planning and the management of enterprises, introduce 
incentive or bonus schemes and price calculations for outputs and inputs of enterprises. 
The only attempt at decentralising the centralised planning system in this era of Soviet 
economic history, however, took place under Khrushchev's reforms which aimed to hand 
over control of the management of enterprises from Gosplan and the ministries to newly 
created 'sovnarkhozy' (regional economic councils). This act of decentralisation was to 
promote the interest of enterprise activities at the local level which were intended to result 
in increased efficiency by the enterprises. Owing to conflicts between local and all-union 
interests which led to a certain amount of confusion, the reforms were reversed. 
Consequently, the Supreme Council for the National Economy (VSNKh) was recreated 
in February 1963 and placed in overall control of the targets. 
Another reform introduced shortly before Khrushchev's removal in 1965 was an incentive 
scheme designed to increase efficient productivity by allocating bonuses to enterprises 
which demonstrated cuts in their production costs. This reform failed, however, because 
planners continued to emphasise the need for fulfilling quotas, thus causing enterprises 
to channel their efforts on meeting the targets, whatever the cost. 
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Following the 'sovnarkhozy' refonns, the Kosygin refonns in 1965 concentrated on 
returning control to the centre and improving the mechanism for planning. Another 
incentive scheme was introduced which required enterprises to measure their production 
outputs and inputs by means of a cost-accounting scheme, whereby bonuses could be 
allocated on the basis of enterprises' sales volume. This involved a revision of some 
wholesale prices. Moreover, prices were revised in such a way as to en,!ble all enterprises 
to begin their accounting as a profitable concern. (30) 
To sum up, the 1959 - 1965 refonns failed in their effort to decentralise effectively central 
control of enterprise activities. Consequently, subsequent refonns undertaken in 1965 
concentrated on reorganising Gosplan with the help of planning committees in an effort 
to consolidate central control. (See table 3.4) The bonus scheme, however, failed to 
improve enterprise efficiency because enterprises merely increased sales volumes by 
increasing resource inputs which negated any increases in profits. (31) 
The Brezhnev refonns in 1973 continued to focus on improving the centrally controlled 
planning system by subordinating groups of enterprises in the same branch throughout the 
USSR to the control of all-union industrial associations (VPO), created for this purpose. 
The VPOs were given the added responsibility of managing the production and scientific 
activities of their enterprises. Moreover, the incentive scheme begun in 1965 of 
rewarding enterprises for increased sales volumes was developed and bonuses were 
allocated on the basis of enterprises' nonnative net output which meant that inputs were 
included in the returns from the sales volume. Despite some emphasis on profitability, 
enterprises were still mainly rewarded not only for meeting, but for exceeding annual plan 
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targets, and enterprises consequently continued to be rewarded for quantitative rather than 
qualitative output. 
To summarise, in view of the confusion caused by the sovnarkhozy reforms, they helped 
to reaffirm the Soviet authorities' belief that control of the economy was best achieved 
through central administration. Subsequent reforms, therefore, concentrated on refining 
the mechanism for devising and directing plans from the centre. The Soviet Union's 
second concern was the inefficient use of resources at enterprise level brought about by 
including 'inputs' in the performance figures. Despite various attempts at providing 
incentives for increased efficiency, however, growth declined and the quality and 
technological gap between goods available in the West and at home continued to widen. 
Furthermore, whilst other countries in Eastern Europe governed by a centralised planning 
system recognised the importance of foreign trade as a contributing factor to economic 
growth and implemented reforms accordingly (see chapter 4 for details), the Soviet Union 
still viewed its foreign trade activities as a stop-gap for supply shortages in the home 
market.(32) 
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Table 34 
Reforms to: 
GOSPLAN 
MINISTRIES 
INCENTIVE SCHEME 
PRICES 
FOREIGN TRADE 
RESULT 
~ Hewett (1988) pp.221-225. 
Nove (1986) 
Nove (1986) pp344 . 346. 357 . 380. 
SUMMARY OF MAIN REFORM FEATURES 1957 1979 
Khrushchev 1957 Kosygin 1965 
Operational planning powers Sovnarkhozy dissolved. Full power 
transferred to 100 regional economic returned to Gosplan.New committees 
councils (sovnarkhozy) under created for prices.material and 
control of regional gosplans. technical supply, science and 
technology. 
Ministerial control of enterprises Ministerial control reinstated.Total 
broken down. of 23 ministries setting obligatory 
targets for enterprises.(Reduced 
from 35-40 to 8 canpulsory targets.) 
Based on enterprise cutting cost. oot Gross output indicator replaced by 
plan fulfilment still took priority. target for sales volume. 
None Industrial price refolTl1:centralisation 
of price-setting mechanism through 
new committee. Goskomtsen. revised 
and controlled prices. 
None None 
C11aos in the planning system. affect- Slow implementation of changes. 
ing enterprises' performance.Conflict System not in operalion until late 
between regional and union interest. sixties. 
Brezlmev 1973 
No major changes. 
Glavki* merged into ministries. 
Creation of VPO (all- Union 
industrial association).Took on re-
sponsibility from ministries for 
groups of enterprises in same branch 
in all USSR. Still central control. 
No major change. 
No major change. 
None 
Power of suppliers increased through 
VPO.Control shifted from one 
bureaucracy to another. 
* Production and technical administrative bodies. which controlled a group of factories or technical establishments within an industrial ministry. 
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Brezhnev 1979 
No major changes. 
No major change. 
Rewards given for adopting more 
ambitious largets than set in I year 
plan. Nonnative Net Output (output-
inputs) rewarded. 
No major change. 
Nooe 
1979 decree never fully 
implemented. System therefore. 
continued to emphasise gross output. 
Reforms in the early nineteen eighties 
In the years between Brezhnev and Gorbachev (1982 - 1985), the Soviet Union was under 
the short leadership of Andropov and Chernenko. It is generally recognised that the 
Andropov government set the scene for open and frank discussions about the economic 
shortcomings of the system which helped to prepare the way for 'glasnost' .(31) 
Moreover, Andropov introduced new plan indicators and incentives, and tried to improve 
discipline in the factories in an effort to improve productivity. Enterprises were, therefore, 
rewarded for fulfilment of contracts rather than number of orders, increased labour 
productivity and cost reductions, and managers were rewarded for implementing new 
technology in the production process. However, as in the past, interference from branch 
ministries overshadowed the effectiveness of these initiatives.(33) 
ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN TRADE REFORMS (1985 - 1990) 
Following the election of Gorbachev as Secretary General of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in 1985, the former USSR implemented not only a new wave of economic 
reforms, but major changes to its political and foreign policies which have had a 
considerable impact on East-West and East-East relations. This section will confine itself, 
however, to a discussion of reforms relating to the planning and management of the 
former Soviet economy, foreign trade and joint ventures, excluding Comecon trade which 
is discussed in chapter 4 of the thesis. 
As in the past, the Soviet authorities were very concerned about the continuing fall in 
productivity of capital which Gorbachev openly attributed to the emphasis of the Soviet 
system on "quantitative growth". Moreover, a gap in the use of advanced technology and 
techniques was singled out as major contributing factor to the stagnating economy.(34) 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the consistent fall in productivity between 1960 and 1985. 
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The negative effect on the balance of payments by this declining productivity was, 
however, more than outweighed by the increased sale in hard currency of oil and fuel. 
(See figure 5.1) 
Perestroika 
Having therefore, acknowledged several shortcomings regarding economic performance, 
the Communist Party announced at the XXVII Party Congress (held in Moscow 25 
February - 6 March 1986) its intention to: 
1. create "a unified, effective and flexible administrative system." 
2. continue with the "economic experiment on a large scale" and reorganise the wage 
payment system. 
3. promote the co-operative sector (small private businesses in the service sector) of the 
economy and individual labour activity in the field of trade and industry.(35) 
In practice, this meant the planning and management of enterprises were to be 
decentralised, the performance related wage system developed further, and consumer 
demand satisfied by the introduction of small "private" businesses.(36) Reform to foreign 
trade, however, was, as in previous years, directed separately from central economic 
reforms. Foreign trade reforms were, therefore, administered from August 1986 by the 
Politburo under the directorship of Nikolai Ryzhkov in isolation from the Law on State 
Enterprises. 
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Among the organisational changes which occurred mainly in 1987 and 1988 were: 
- the reorganisation and decentralisation of Gosplan; 
- the merging of branch ministries by reducing the numbers of staff(37); 
- the release of control from the centre to the ministries, thereby granting the ministries 
greater autonomy;(38) 
- the self-management and self-financing of enterprises. 
These measures were meant to encourage ministries to engage in long-term planning and 
promote technical development, whilst enterprises were given greater autonomy and 
responsibility for operational planning. Moreover, by introducing the election of 
enterprise managers and foremen by the workers, and making enterprises responsible for 
their profits and losses, the reformers hoped to increase qualitative output.(39) 
Operational planning, the five-year and the one-year plans (based on the 5-year plan) were 
to be worked out by enterprises independently and were to take into account any of their 
concluded economic agreements.(40) Nevertheless, enterprises were still required to 
include in their plans control figures, state orders, long-term economic normatives and 
quotas, all of which were set by the central planners and passed down through their 
ministries. Although Gosplan was expected only to give enterprises state orders for 
50 - 70% of their production capacity, enterprises were still bound by requirements 
specified by central planners. Moreover, it appeared that in practice, many enterprises 
were given state orders for up to 100% of their capacity.(41) 
An important factor in helping enterprises to achieve better self-management concerned 
the allocation of supplies. The 1987 decree, however, merely stated that supplies should 
be allocated by wholesale trade or centrally, and that enterprises should seek to establish 
greater links for selling and purchasing resources (from other enterprises).(42) A 
wholesale market per se was to be established over a period of four to five years, which 
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would eventually reduce the role of Gossnab as the supplier of inputs. By the end of 
1990, however, there not only appeared to be no effective whole:sale market, but the 
distribution system was causing great imbalances of supplies.(43) 
Reform efforts since 1985 were unable to eliminate shortages of goods, reduce excess 
money supply, and improve the large state budget deficit.(44) Consequently, 
conservatives within the party began increasingly to question the effectiveness of the 
reforms, whilst the more radically minded within the party saw this as a reason for 
advocating a greater move towards a market economy. At the end of the nineteen 
eighties, therefore, two types of reform models emerged with the aim of improving the 
economy of the former USSR which are outlined in the subsequent sections. 
Progressive and Conservative Reform Models(45) 
a)The progressive reform model 
At the end of 1989 a coherent programme of restructuring was put forward by Dr. Leonid 
Abalkin, the then deputy prime minister in charge of economic reform, outlining more 
clearly than hitherto perestroika' s objectives and the means by which to achieve them. 
As a progressive programme, the following eight points aimed to introduce market 
conditions and included: 
(i) denationalisation of property; 
(ii) financial reorganisation through a unified tax system, use of credit 
leverage through the banking system and drastic stabilisation of the money 
supply; 
(iii) an active structural policy to revive the consumer sector, stimulate 
export growth and stop wastage of natural resources; 
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(iv) the gradual creation of a market, with production output exceeding 
state orders so that surpluses could be sold at free prices; 
(v) the gradual coming together of controlled state prices and free prices 
and adjustment to world market levels; 
(vi) the creation of a financial market, stock exchanges, and a 
state-controlled trade in securities; 
(vii) intensification of foreign economic ties; 
(viii) development of a currency market through auctions and regular trade, 
to introduce partial convertibility of the rouble. 
These measures concentrated, therefore, on the freeing of prices, which would enable 
supply and demand to determine prices rather than central planners; the development of 
conditions which would promote foreign trade such as partial convertibility of the rouble, 
private enterprise and money markets. Although the implementation of the above reforms 
would have resulted in a deliberate shift away from a plan-driven economy, the Soviet 
economy, hitherto shielded from any external economic influences through the non-
convertibility of the rouble, might in the first instance have been destabilised causing 
inflation, unemployment and a fall in production. The gradual time-table, however, for 
Abalkin's radical programme (see table 3.5) might have been able to soften the effects 
described above. 
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b) The conservative model 
In contrast to the above refonn model, the conservative programme, proposed by a fonner 
prime minister, Mr. Nikolai Ryzhkov advocated the following refonns to the existing 
Soviet system: 
(i) the channeling of resources away from heavy industry into the production of consumer 
goods and food; 
(ii) Comecon trade to be conducted in convertible currency from 1991 onwards; 
(iii) import restrictions; 
(iv) the abolition of the election of managers in state enterprises by their workers.(46) 
The first priority, therefore, of the conservative faction was as in the past, the 
consolidation and continuation of the plan-driven economy in an effort to maintain 
stability. As for import restrictions, this measure was frequently used by Comecon 
countries to overcome hard currency shortages. However, whilst the history of East-West 
trade has demonstrated that import restrictions were successful in curbing hard currency 
expenditure, the restrictions, nevertheless, resulted in a reduction of technology intensive 
imports. Consequently a technology gap developed, making it more difficult for the 
USSR to compete in international markets.( 47) (See chapter 5 for a discussion of the 
development of East-West trade in the early nineteen eighties.) Finally, the supporters of 
these refonns firmly rejected the efforts, outlined in the progressive model, to 
denationalise and introduce monetary refonns which they believed would cause a further 
decline in the Soviet economy. 
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Table 3.5 Abalkin's Time-table 
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1995 
1995 
To sum up, the conservative refonn package advocated the continued shielding of the 
Soviet economy which contributed, as in times past, to a slowing down in growth rates. 
The proposal, however, of carrying out Comecon trade in convertible currency (in effect 
since 1991 and discussed further in chapter 4) was to have positive implications for the 
Soviet Union's balance of trade with other CMEA countries as Soviet oil was estimated 
to be worth more in hard currency than East European expons. The fall in the world 
price of oil, nevertheless, resulted in reduced import orders from the former USSR. (See 
chapter 4 for a discussion of Comecon trade and chapter 11, section on the break-up of 
intra-CMEA trader p.341.) 
.~ ---
By the end of the nineteen eighties, however, the conservative faction won a majority vote 
in the Soviet government, causing the radical refonners to suffer a set-back. 
Consequently, the decision was taken to slow- down the implementation of those measures 
which would move the economy of the fonner Soviet Union further towards a market 
economy. Thus the conservatives succeeded in bringing about a delay of the price refonn, 
restrictions to the black market through police measures and cuts in foreign imports. (48) 
Foreign Trade Reforms since 1985 
Having suffered a 40% drop in the value of its exports between the years 1984 and 1986 
as a result of the drop in oil prices in the mid-nineteen eighties (see figures 5.1 and 5.2), 
the Soviet Union announced foreign trade refonns at the XVII Party Conference, which 
had the following aims: 
- to connect branch ministries and enterprises through foreign trade, 
- to encourage Soviet producers to export, 
- to raise the technical level and quality of products produced, 
- to reduce bureaucracy, 
- to organise more efficient allocation of imports, 
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- to improve the co-ordination of foreign trade.(49) 
These reforms showed similarities with those introduced in Eastern Europe in the nineteen 
seventies and illustrated the Soviet Union's increasing awareness of the importance of 
foreign trade for the economy.(50) 
As part of the drive to reduce bureaucracy and break down the monopoly over foreign 
trade by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry and the State Committee for Foreign 
Economic Relations (OKES) were amalgamated into the Ministry for Foreign Economic 
Relations (see table 3.6), which resulted in an initial staff cut of 30%.(51) Moreover, in 
1987 the state monopoly over foreign trade was broken down by the granting of foreign 
trade rights to 22 branch ministries and 77 large associations. By 1988 there were a total 
of 213 associations with foreign trade rights. However, by leaving the supply of raw 
materials and commodities in the hands of Oossnab and responsibility for the export of 
oil and other natural resource products with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, control was 
still retained centrally.(52) 
As an incentive to increase exports, enterprises were allowed to retain between 30 - 50% 
of their export yield (later interpreted as export revenues), although in practice many 
branch ministries confiscated 100% from their enterprises, demonstrating the domineering 
role of branch ministries in their relationships with enterprises.(53) 
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Table 36 ORGANISATION OF FOREIGN TRADE 1987 
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Furthelmore, by introducing a greater number of currency coefficients for commodities 
destined for foreign trade, varying from 0.3 - 6.0 in relation to wholesale prices in 
domestic roubles, the former USSR moved a step further towards the unification of its 
exchange rates and towards a wholesale price structure aligned with world market prices 
which would eventually facilitate exporting procedures.(54) Until the rouble is fully 
conveltible, however, being able to calculate the real export price and gains from exports 
for former Soviet enterprises remains a difficult task. 
The role of joint ventures 
By using the concession period in the nineteen twenties as ideological justification for 
promoting direct foreign investments on Soviet soil, the government of the USSR included 
in its foreign trade reforms a decree, issued with effect from I January 1987, allowing 
joint ventures to operate in the Soviet Union. 
The decree set out three main aims for joint ventures: 
1. to provide" .. fuller satisfaction of the requirements of the country for specific types of 
indusu'ial products, raw materials, and foodstuffs .. " 
2. to help, " .. the attraction to the national economy of the USSR of progressive foreign 
technology, management experience, and additional matelial and financial resources, ... " 
3. to bring about, " ... the development of the export base of the country, and the reduction 
of inational imports. "(55) 
Thus, the aims of joint ventures appeared to reinforce some of the more general foreign 
trade aims such as helping Soviet producers to expott by raising the technical level and 
quality of products manufactured through the help of "progressive foreign technology, 
management experience, and additional material and financial resources ... ". As to the 
effectiveness of joint ventures,however, doubts have been raised about the contributions 
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made by joint ventures to the economy in terms of foreign capital and technology. (See 
chapter 8, 9 and 10 for an examination of joint venture conu·ibutions). 
Political SUpp011, therefore, for joint ventures, as during the NEP period, remained divided 
between those committed to the centralised planning system and those supporting radical 
reform and joint ventures.(S6) NeveI1heless, the structure of the Soviet economy and the 
organisation of foreign trade before the break up of the Soviet Union posed different 
problems for joint ventures than the pre-command economy of the nineteen twenties did 
for concessions. These problems are discussed in the subsequent paragraph. 
Although joint ventures operate under different conditions from state enterprises, being 
self-managing and self-financing, they are, nevertheless, subject to the same domestic 
conditions and foreign trade structure such as the price system and the non-convertibility 
of the rouble. Other difficulties include the system of supply allocation, the relationship 
between joint ventures and their respective branch ministries as well as the work ethos of 
the population.(S7) 
CONCLUSION 
The necessity of reviving Soviet economic activity and attracting foreign capital and 
technology in order to overcome economic stagnation, persuaded the Soviet government 
in the early nineteen twenties to adopt the NEP and introduce concessions with foreign 
partners instead of introducing a centralised planning system immediately. Whilst the 
NEP was successful in relaunching industrial productivity by re-establishing a functioning 
supply system (albeit imperfect), concessions failed to attract foreign capital and the 
participation of many large foreign companies. Nevertheless, the work carried out by 
Sutton, with particular reference to technology agreements in the latter half of the nineteen 
twenties, suggests that concessions enabled the USSR to gain access to foreign technology 
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which aided its economic development to some extent. 
Political opposition to NEP and concessions, however, gained momentum with the 
introduction of a price system which permitted large ptice discrepancies between private 
and state enterprises and eventually resulted in the supporters of the centralised planning 
system gaining conu'ol of political and economic life. Consequently the centralised 
planning system was introduced in 1930 which has dominated Soviet economic 
development until 1991. The centralised planning system was designed to achieve 
extensive growth and exclude any free market forces. Inputs and outputs for the domestic 
market were, therefore, planned centrally and the role of foreign trade was reduced to 
overcoming domestic shortages only, without considering the effect such a policy might 
have on the balance of trade and economic growth. 
Although successive Soviet governments recognised the inherent weaknesses ofthe system 
and tried to improve its efficiency by concentrating mainly on the mechanisms for 
planning and valious incentives for raising enterprise productivity, they failed to produce 
the desired growth rates. Yet none of the reformers questioned (at least publicly) the 
fundamental socialist principles and values embodied in the centralised planning system. 
In this respect, perestroika followed the tradition of previous refOlms which was not to 
undermine the basic socialist principles. Nevertheless, the policy of 'glasnost' permitted 
at least discussions to take place on hitherto taboo subjects such as the introduction of 
market forces, inegalitarianism (of wages), bankruptcy and unemployment as well as 
alternatives to the Soviet system. 
Although most of the reforms introduced since 1985 aimed, as those reforms previously, 
to increase economic productivity by rationalising the central planning system, they 
distinguished themselves from the former reforms in two ways. They introduced private 
enterprise officially into Soviet economic activity and efforts were made to reform the 
foreign trade system. The importance of foreign trade to economic growth was, therefore, 
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finally recognised by the former USSR. As part of the foreign trade reforms, joint 
ventures like concessions in the nineteen twenties, have enabled enterprises in the former 
USSR to gain access to foreign capital, technology and markets with little hard currency 
expenditure. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1992, however, the 
individual republics now face the task of deciding on the speed and the extent to which 
they wish to move towards a market economy. Moreover, they are now having to face 
similar decisions about reform as the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe had to 
after 1989. The following chapter examines, therefore, the reforms in East European 
countries before and after 1989, paying palticular attention to those reforms affecting 
foreign trade and joint ventures, thereby providing the economic framework for the 
discussion of the development of East-West joint ventures. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE REFORM PROCESSES IN EASTERN EUROPE 
INTRODUCTION 
Having been placed under Soviet control soon after the end of the Second World War, the 
countries of Eastern Europe also adopted the Soviet-style system of central planning, 
which has been outlined in the previous chapter. In the early post-war period this cen-
tralization of economic policy, administration and strict political leadership caused the 
countries of Eastern Europe to develop economies which were more autartik than their 
counterparts in the West and included a heavy industrial and (where possible) a raw 
materials base. However, when the economies became more complex in the nineteen 
fifties as a result of industrial expansion, it became evident that the system of centralised 
planning was a factor causing growth rates to fall, leading to discussions among socialist 
economists about reforms. By the early nineteen sixties, Moscow had given the smaller 
East European countries approval to look at ways of experimenting with economic reforms 
in an effort to render their economies more efficient.(l) 
This chapter focusses, therefore, on the reforms attempted by the countries of Eastern 
Europe since the nineteen sixties through to 1990, thereby outlining the historical 
development of economic and foreign trade reforms in Eastern Europe. The reforms have 
been examined in three stages, beginning with the first reform efforts in the nineteen 
sixties and nineteen seventies, followed by reforms in the nineteen eighties and finishing 
with the post 1989 reforms. As individual East European countries introduced different 
reforms, each country has been discussed in turn. Consequently, the first section begins 
by examining the GDR's reform efforts in the nineteen sixties, a prime example of 
conservative reforms, and ends with Hungary, an example of more radical reforms. 
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Particular attention is paid throughout the chapter to those changes affecting foreign trade. 
The second stage analyses the development of reforms particularly in Hungary during the 
nineteen eighties, as in this period of economic and political stagnation in Eastern Europe 
Hungary's reform efforts were studied and sometimes copied by the other CMEA 
countries. 
The third stage discusses the post-1989 reforms, and the extent to which individual CM EA 
countries managed to introduce those economic instruments required to release central 
control such as measures for privatising state enterprises, making currency convertible, 
improving the banking system and capital flows as well as foreign investments. The 
former GDR, however, has been excluded from discussions at this stage as a result of 
having been integrated into the economic, political and social system of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in December 1990, thereby ceasing to be a member of the CMEA. 
Owing to the importance of intra-CMEA trading to the individual countries of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union prior to 1989, the chapter concludes by examining the role 
of the CMEA and the impact of the post-1989 reforms on intra-CMEA trade. 
REFORMS IN THE NINETEEN SIXTIES AND THE NINETEEN SEVENTIES 
Introduction 
The reforms introduced in the nineteen sixties and nineteen seventies had similar aims and 
objectives, namely to render the management of the economies more effective by impro-
ving the quality and efficiency of industrial output and increasing the foreign trade 
activities of enterprises. However, the economic reforms adopted by the individual 
countries of Eastern Europe can be seen to have followed two models: a conservative 
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model, which preferred to maintain control from the centre, and a more radical model 
which was based on comprehensive use of market forces combined with broad guidelines 
from the centre to create a socialist market economy. All the East European countries, 
except for Hungary, eventually adopted the conservative reform model which is outlined 
in the subsequent paragraphs.(2) 
The Conservative model 
The main features of this reform model included the grouping together of enterprises into 
industrial associations (e.g., VEB in the GDR, WOG in Poland, Khozraschet in Bulgaria, 
VHJ in Czechoslovakia and industrial 'centrals' in Romania) and the introduction of 
economic levers such as price reform as a way of assisting the new management organs 
to achieve the desired plan targets, producing goods at lower prices and of improved 
quality. The role of the industrial associations was to simplify the planning and 
management of the enterprises by assuming responsibility for the co-ordination of a group 
of enterprises within a certain sector. In this way the Central Planning Committees were 
able to reduce the difficulties by co-ordinating a smaller number of economic units. It 
was also expected that individual enterprises would increase their output and efficiency 
by taking advantage of large-scale production facilities within the association. These two 
main features of this type of reform model (i.e.,associations of enterprises and price 
reforms), introduced, therefore, some element of decentralisation whilst the system of 
central planning firmly retained its grip on the mechanism for steering the economy.(3) 
The following paragraphs outline how individual CMEA countries, except for Hungary, 
came to adopt the more conservative reform model. 
81 
German Democratic Republic 
In a deliberate attempt to remain finnly integrated in the socialist system and establish a 
separate identity from West Gennany, the authorities of the GDR decided at the outset to 
retain the characteristics of a centralized planning system. Moreover, the 1968 events in 
Czechoslovakia, when radical refonn processes had far-reaching political and social 
repercussions, strengthened the GDR's resolve to proceed cautiously with any refonns.(4) 
The GDR began preparations for its New Economic System (NES) in 1962. By 1963 the 
GDR had published its 'Guideline for the New Economic System', and other laws 
pertaining to the refonn as well as deciding on the number of state enterprises and 
associations of enterprises (VEB) which were to take part in the refonn experiment. 
The second phase (1964 - 67) was devoted to putting into practice the concepts outlined 
in the Guideline. This included the introduction of a price refonn with the aim of trying 
to align production costs with product costs, thereby cutting down on subsidies, and 
transferring management and investment decisions to enterprises with the only proviso that 
they keep within the planned target guidelines set by the State. Certain factors, however, 
which are presented in the following paragraph, prevented the refonners from achieving 
their objectives. 
Prices which were supposed to be based on costs, did not take sufficient account of capital 
costs, namely the effect of depreciation and interest on capital, which led, therefore, to 
actual miscalculations of prices. Moreover, the effect of shortages in production supplies 
and the high demand for some goods was also excluded from their calculations, with the 
result that consumer demands were not always met. Consequently, the exclusion of 
correct price calculations for consumer goods led to economically incorrect price ratios. 
The price changes induced by the price review meant, therefore, that official gross capital 
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stock valuations which were based on 1962 prices, no longer corresponded to actual 
replacement costs.(5) 
Besides the price reform, the GDR attempted to decentralise decision-making by allowing 
the VEB to make certain management and investment decisions. However, owing to 
unclear definitions of the rights of the State Planning Commission and those of the VEB 
a certain amount of confusion occurred. Whilst the VEB felt there was interference from 
the State in their business operations, it was evident, that the VEB lacked necessary 
management expertise at enterprise level.(6) Consequently, this rather unsuccessful 
attempt to decentralise the management structure of the economy caused the reformers to 
re-centralise the system and concentrate instead on improving its planning mechanism. 
Thus, the third phase of the NES, the "corrective phase", took place between 1967 and 
1968 and lasted until 1970. During this time the emphasis was on the better planning of 
production which would bring about economic structuring (i.e., product constrained 
planning). By returning to a more centralised system of priority planning and planning of 
supplies, the GDR was in a better position to control its economy and enterprises, 
although the enterprises themselves had their decision-making powers restricted through 
this process.(7) 
As regards foreign trade, the view held in the nineteen fifties by socialist countries was 
that foreign trade was a necessary means for overcoming temporary supply difficulties in 
the internal market (see chapter 3). By the nineteen sixties, however, this view began to 
change among CM EA countries, except for the Soviet Union, and foreign trade was 
regarded as an important factor for economic growth.(8) As a result, the new GDR 
constitution of 6 April 1968 confirmed the state monopoly of foreign trade (an.9,5) and 
with the resolution of the Council of State of 22 April 1968 foreign trade activities were 
gradually included in the economic accounting of enterprises. This meant, significantly, 
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that export deliveries which had hitherto been excluded from operational calculations, had 
to be included in their operating results. Export deals could, therefore, raise or reduce an 
enterprise's operating profit depending on how successful its export performance had 
been. Although the reforms sought initially to grant enterprises more control in this area, 
the resolution of I December 1970 brought a return to stricter state management and 
control of foreign trade, requiring enterprises to work strictly according to planned 
targets.(9) 
Czechoslovakia 
Reforms in Czechoslovakia were initiated in 1958 and revived in the mid-nineteen sixties 
as a result of a slowing-down in the economy. Although the first set of economic reforms 
in 1958 aimed at improving rather than changing the centrally planned system by granting 
firms greater freedom regarding investment decisions (cf. GDR) the economy did not 
improve, despite signs of positive results initially. Czechoslovak economists, therefore, 
reached the conclusion that these reforms were not far-reaching enough and that market 
mechanisms should replace aspects of the command-system.(IO) The Central Committee 
of the Communist Party eventually accepted guidelines for economic reforms in January 
1965 entitled 'Main Directions for the Improvement of Planned Management of the 
National Economy'. Despite being a fairly radical document, it still emphasised the 
dominant role of the central plan and retained several specific production quotas. 
However, the radical elements included virtual elimination of obligatory targets, flexible 
competitive pricing and considerable decentralisation of investment decisions. The reform 
'package' also maintained centrally fixed prices alongside 'free prices' and grouped 
enterprises into about 100 large associations. These reforms were to be achieved over a 
prolonged transition period, making the changes gradually. These initial changes included 
the setting free of only 10% of prices and permitting the central plan to give 'orientation' 
rather than prescribed targets. However, it soon became evident that even these measures 
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were not far reaching enough in order to improve performance. Another revised reform 
document was thus published in May 1966 called 'The Principles of Accelerated 
Implementation of the New System of Management' with the aim of yet again speeding 
up the reform process.(ll) 
To summarise, the tools for accelerating changes were price reform, the introduction of 
competitive prices and the removal of planned targets and quotas. Enterprises were to 
have autonomy, especially as regards investment and all enterprises were to have access 
to foreign markets. The role of the central plan was to act as government policy. 
As a result, therefore, of the radical political changes which took place in 1968, three 
major reforms were incorporated into the Action Programme of the Communist Party in 
April 1968 with the aim of achieving market socialism. The programme had the 
following aims: 
(i) separation of economic management from the state and from the party apparatus; 
(ii) management control for enterprises; 
(iii) creation of workers' councils; 
These measures involved a political as well as an economic commitment to change which 
were, however, abruptly stopped by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.(l2) 
Following the crushing of these radical reform efforts, Czechoslovakia reverted 
immediately to managing its economy in accordance with the principles of central 
planning. As the reform efforts of 1968 had not been allowed to gather any momentum, 
this reversal did not prove too difficult. Throughout the nineteen seventies the economic 
policy pursued by Czechoslovakia demonstrated a clear tendency towards centralisation, 
especially regarding the freezing and controlling of prices centrally.(13) 
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By the end of the nineteen seventies, however, it became necessary to consider new 
reform effons in order to try and improve economic efficiency. Clearly any radical 
reforms were rejected and the formula adopted, therefore, resembled very much the earlier 
reform attempts of 1958 as well as those reforms introduced by the GDR in the nineteen 
sixties. Consequently, the state imposed only long-term plan targets on a number of 
enterprises which had been grouped into associations (VHJ) for the purposes of the reform 
experiment. Moreover, by 1980, the authorities decided to extend this grouping of 
enterprises, despite remaining doubts about its economic effectiveness. For the large 
majority of enterprises outside the VHJ scheme, however, the state continued to set 
detailed output indicators.(l4) 
As with the GDR, expon earnings were fed into the price conversion system which could 
affect an enterprise's profitability. This reform introduced in the late nineteen sixties 
survived the return to the conservative centrally planned economic system.(15) 
Poland 
Although Poland had already begun reasonably ambitious reforms in the nineteen fifties 
(1956-1960), few were actually implemented in that period, owing to strong 'StaIinist' 
political opposition. Despite this opposition, however, Poland established workers' 
councils (in 1956) and set up industrial associations which took part in the economic 
administration and management of enterprises and decollectivised extensive areas of land. 
(16) Moreover, in the resolutions of the IV Pany Congress (1964) and the IV plenary 
meeting of the Central Committee in July 1965, it was decided to transform industrial 
associations into units of a more economic character by reducing the number of direct 
orders, binding targets and placing constraints upon industrial associations. The industrial 
associations for their part were to develop a similar relationship with their subordinate 
enterprises which would result in a reduction of control from the centre. During this 
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period the number of associations was reduced from 163 to 121.(17) 
Moreover, further refonns in 1968 continued the idea of altering the traditional system of 
economic planning and management from an instructing to a guiding and controlling 
system, particularly in industry, building and foreign trade. The central economic 
authorities were to limit themselves to defining the strategic growth targets and leave the 
implementation at decentralised levels. To this end, 'large economic organizations' 
(WOG) were set up in 1973 to enable enterprises to participate in the experiments of 
self-management subject to their control.(18) An interesting feature of this refonn was 
the 'incentive' scheme offered to managers and workers of the nearly 2000 industrial 
enterprises participating in the experiment. Financial incentives were worked out for 
managers and workers based on fulfilments of plan targets over five years. Other factors 
used to calculate the premiums included the amount of additional resources the association 
was able to procure and the perfonnance of the enterprise (in tenns of profit or improved 
production output).(19) 
The system, however, had one great disadvantage in that it fixed the upper limit of 
possible wage and salary increases for five years in advance without actually improving 
economic perfonnance. Although meant as a wage incentive, it actually acted as a wage 
restriction, especially in the face of growing economic difficulties and rising prices.(20) 
Soaring prices and insufficient wage increases led, therefore, to the workers' revolt in 
December 1970 which in turn forced the Polish government's hand into pursuing a 
massive investment programme aimed at modernising capital stock, raising personal 
incomes and keeping prices for basic foodstuffs stable in the 1971-1975 plan period.(21) 
In line with improVed tenns of trade and the availability of Western credits, particularly 
for investment goods and licences, Poland was able to pursue its investment policy 
vigorously. However, Poland remained unable to solve its supply and demand imbalance 
even with large imports and credits from the West.(22) Consequently further social unrest 
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was experienced in 1976, followed by a renewed attempt at reviving the idea ofa special 
status for WOG. Efforts were once again made to link the wage fund with increasing 
production by establishing more direct links between export performance and bonuses 
through the retention of a quota from foreign currency earnings.(23) 
As is well recorded, Poland's economic policies of the nineteen seventies created a 
situation where foreign credits provided a period of artificial affluence, followed by a 
period of austerity in an attempt to curb import spending which resulted in social and 
political unrest that could only be curbed by martial law in 1981. 
As with other centralised systems, foreign trade had been traditionally operated separately 
from domestic production. However, along with the 1971 measures introduced by 
Gomulka's regime, foreign trade was revised, resulting in the separation of the specialized 
foreign trade corporations (centrale handlu zagranicznego) from the subordination of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade. Moreover, industrial ministries and associations were granted 
permission to organize their own foreign trade enterprises or to arrange their export 
business through a specialised foreign trade corporation on a commission basis. This 
resulted in industry becoming more greatly involved in foreign trade. As with Hungary 
and the GDR, the price system was to be replaced by charging the user or producer enter-
prises the so-called transaction price (i.e., the price of the foreign currency converted into 
zlotys by a coefficient for the respective currency area of convertible currency, rouble and 
clearing).(24) These foreign trade reforms resembled very much those undertaken in the 
other CMEA countries and enabled industrial enterprises to take a greater interest in 
foreign trade. 
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Bulgaria 
Having enjoyed good growth rates in the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties, the need for 
refOllTI became only apparent in the nineteen seventies when Bulgaria began recording 
poor economic results.(25) Some attempt at improving the centralised planning system 
had, however, begun in 1965 and included a series of measures which aimed at providing 
a wider margin for action. These refOllTIS resembled Czechoslovakia's early attempts, 
where the most 'progressive' features included planning from below, the lifting of controls 
over the wage fund and the three-tier price system (i.e., fixed prices for capital goods and 
consumer goods in daily demand, prices that could fluctuate between state-fixed upper and 
lower limits for the majority of deliveries of goods agreed in inter-enterprise contracts, 
and free market prices for goods of seasonal or local importance.) (26) 
From 1963 onwards, enterprises of the same branch and with similar production were 
grouped into state economic associations (Darzavenski Stopanski Obedinenije DSO). 
After 1968, economic planning agencies, the State Planning Committee and the State 
Committee for Science and Technical Progress were reorganised and given the task of 
concentrating on broader issues such as the improvement of planning methods and the 
elaboration of guidelines for science and research. This meant the DSOs were given 
greater powers to oversee the management of enterprises including distribution of raw 
materials, marketing, authorising changes in product-mix, concluding co-operation 
agreements with other elllerprises, and ratifying foreign trade deals under the supervision 
of the minisllY of foreign trade.(27) 
Having witnessed, however, the political consequences of such refonn attempts in 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria reversed its reform measures at the July 1968 Plenum of the 
BCP CC, concentrating its efforts instead on catching up with world technical standards 
and creating a more effective central administration.(28) In 1977 wage regulations were 
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introduced which rewarded or penal ised workers and managers in specified wage groups 
(e.g., industry, conSU"uction and agriculture) for fulfilment or non-fulfilment respectively 
of the quantitative and qualitative plan. At the same time an attempt was made to 
reorganise labour on the basis of self-supporting brigades which aimed at providing peer 
control, whereby each person's pay would depend on the pelformance of the entire 
brigade. These efforts had, however, very little impact on economic performance. As 
a result Bulgaria began investing instead in computerised and automated management 
systems in order to improve the efficiency of economic management rather than introduce 
market forces.(29) 
As for changes to the foreign trade system, the price reform adopted in 1965 aimed at 
granting enterprises a greater degree of self-determination as well as giving them a greater 
incentive to take pal1 in foreign trade. These more progressive reforms, however, were 
rejected in the late nineteen sixties, and the return to central control prevented the 
effectiveness of these measures being tested to the full. Despite such economic levers as 
the wage system, economic output was not rendered any more efficient. Bulgaria's 
balance of trade was still in deficit because of its need for imported capital goods required 
for the expansion of its machinery production destined for its main export market, the 
Soviet Union.(30) 
Romania 
Romania was the last of the CMEA COl1l1tl'ies to introduce any kind of reform. The first 
economic reform was announced in 1967 and lasted only into the early nineteen seventies. 
Unlike the other East European countries, who had tried to experiment with ways of 
releasing central control of the economy, Romania began its reform efforts by trying to 
perfect the management and planning of the national economy. To this end, central 
control was reorganised and included the grouping of enterprises into associations 
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(centralele) which were under the control of the ministries.(31) After 1969 each ministry 
supervised a branch of industry, agriculture, and transport, drew up its own plan draft, and 
had responsibility, under its statute, for the fulfilment of the plan and budget for that 
branch.(32) 
Besides the setting up of centralele there occurred little change in the economic 
management of Romania until the late nineteen seventies when the 'new economic 
mechanism' was introduced (1978) which stressed the principle of self-management and 
the principle of a unitary national plan. This contradictory position was made very 
apparent by the way in which enterprises were given responsibility for foreign trade 
activities, making investment decisions and production deliveties, whilst at the same time 
being closely monitored by the central administration regarding the spending of their 
profits and their performance of target fulfilment in the areas of exports, imports, 
investments, production, deliveries to the home market and technical progress.(33) 
Clearly, this constant and close supervision by the central administration defeated the 
object of self-management. 
Similarly foreign trade was initially decentralised under the first economic reforms of 
January 1970, transferring the competence of foreign trade corporations from the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade to appropriate central offices. By May 1974, however, the process was 
reversed, placing all, except four foreign trade corporations, under the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade again. Licences and transactions for each product group were dealt with by a single 
agency (cf.decree of 22 March 1974, 'Buletinul oficial', No. 43).(34) The decision made 
in the March 1978 Resolution, however, to replace the coefficients relating to foreign 
trade prices with a normal exchange rate in January 1981, was a simplification enabling 
the cost of imponed and exported goods to be made without complicated calculations 
between domestic and world prices.(35) 
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Before turning to Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, the similarities between the 
reforms attempted by the above East European countries have been summarised in order 
to highlight the contradictions inherent in them and their inability to achieve the desired 
results. 
To begin with all reform efforts were triggered off by a decline in economic performance 
experienced in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the admission on their 
part that the Stalinist system of central planning was unable to convert "extensive" into 
"intensive" growth (in other words from bulk output to increased productivity).(36) 
Furthelmore, the countries of Eastern Europe began to recognise the importance of foreign 
trade for the improvement of the economy. As a result, the reformers attempted to relax 
control from the centre to the enterprises, thereby granting them decision-making powers 
for investment and foreign trade as well as incentives for managers and workers in an 
effOlt to render the enterprises more profitable. These initiatives were met, however, with 
limited success for the following reasons: 
- despite the semblance of decentralisation, central control was always retained through 
the setting of planned targets and supply allocations to enterprises, causing a certain 
amount of confusion between central and enterprise responsibility; 
- having been conditioned to meeting targets and still being expected to do so, enterprises 
lacked not only the experience and know-how to become profit oriented, but also the 
incentive. 
Having recognised the inconsistencies of these reforms which tried to retain a system of 
centralised planning and hold fast to socialist principles at the same time, some countries 
took the decision to concentrate instead on improving the system's planning mechanisms. 
Any country as for example Czechoslovakia, however, hoping to achieve fundamental 
political and economic reforms were speedily prevented by Soviet military action. 
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The Progressive model, 
As Hungary is a prime example of a CMEA country which was able to loosen control 
from the centre more effectively than the other East European countries discussed above, 
the policies of the New Economic Mechanism, which was launched in 1968, and changes 
to the foreign trade system have been examined in the following paragraphs, 
The aims of the New Economic Mechanism were, therefore to; 
(i) achieve greater autonomy at enterprise level in the day-to-day running of the business; 
(ii) allow enterprises to participate in the macroeconomic planning of the centre by 
providing information and proposals to the authorities; 
(iii) regulate the economy centrally through the National Economic Plans confined to 
macroeconomic aspects only and by using regulators such as income tax, credit terms, 
creation and utilisation of funds and other fiscal and monetary policies to control enter-
prises,(37) 
In practice, however, these aims could only be partly realised in the nineteen seventies 
owing to certain economic difficulties such as a sharp increase in import prices as a result 
of the 1973 oil crisis, investment booms and increased borrowing, causing the authorities 
to place restrictions on imports, wages and prices, freeze investments and withdraw 
liquidity, Nevertheless, these aims were to be achieved by pursuing three major polices; 
namely a price, incomes and investment policy which are discussed in subsequent 
paragraphs,(38) 
a) The price policy 
The price policy was intended to bring about vertical integration between production and 
consumer prices, domestic prices and world market prices, In 1968 prices in certain 
sectors were regulated in specified proportions by the authorities with a view to being 
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eventually deregulated. This meant that prices could vary from being fixed to having a 
maximum ceiling put on them, or by having a range of price levels attached to them.(39) 
, 
This policy proved so successful that by the mid-nineteen seventies, the gap between 
producer and consumer price levels had been reduced (cf. consumer price level in the 
early nineteen sixties was 38% higher than the producer price level; in 1976 the consumer 
price level was 2% below the producer price level). Despite this success, however, a 
conscious decision was taken by the Hungarian government to recreate the price disparity 
that existed pre-1968 because it wanted to finance a larger part of the state budget through 
this type of consumer taxes, whilst granting reductions in capital charges that had been 
imposed on producers. This meant that prices in the latter half of the nineteen seventies 
reverted to being fixed by the government.( 40) As regards the effect of world market 
prices on domestic prices, this was treated with less interventionism by the authorities. 
The increase in world prices in the early nineteen seventies owing to the first oil crisis 
and inflation resulted in increased import prices for Hungary and worsening terms of 
trade. Consequently, prices were revised to take into account the increased cost of 
imports.(41) 
b) The income policy 
The aim of the income policy was to Improve performance at enterprise level by 
introducing profit-motive and encourage autonomous action whilst retaining 
macroeconomic control at the centre. The reformers had difficulty, however, in 
motivating enterprises to become profit-oriented when they had hitherto been concerned 
with plan-fulfilment and had enjoyed complete job security. Moreover, with the virtual 
absence of private ownership there were only few companies run on a profit basis that 
could provide some sort of example. Enterprises were, therefore, reluctant to think of 
taking calculated risks in order to maximise the company's, and thereby their own profits. 
Furthermore, the notion of profit-making and being able to earn large sums of money as 
a result of such efforts was not permitted by the authorities, who preferred to avoid the 
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emergence of large wage discrepancies.(42) 
Owing to the 1973 oil crisis, however, which led to a sharp increase in import prices, as 
well as investment booms and increased borrowing in the early nineteen seventies, the 
price and income policies suffered from governmental interventionism.(43) Despite 
central interference, enterprises were, nevertheless, permitted to make independent 
decisions about investment in research and development, rationalisation and improved 
production methods as well as investment decisions in the expansion of production which 
affected sectoral and regional economic structure, as long as it did not conflict with 
central conceptions.(44) 
To sum up, the combination of a direct and indirect investment policy resulted in an 
investment boom in the early nineteen seventies (in 1969 investment rose by 30%; by 
20% in 1970) which was difficult to curb, despite government credit controls and centrally 
defined investment projects.(45) Control of foreign trade was released by removing the 
obligatory plan indicators to exports and imports and by allowing increasing numbers of 
enterprises to engage in foreign trade without the assistance of a foreign trade 
organisation. By requiring enterprises to obtain import and export licences before being 
able to engage in foreign trade activities, however, enabled the Hungarian authorities to 
impose indirect restrictions from the centre.(46) 
Had Hungary pursued its pnce policy fully in the nineteen seventies, massive price 
increases would have occurred, enterprises would have becomei ~isibly. unprofitable and I __ •• 
financial inequalities between workers in profitable and unprofitable enterprises would 
have arisen. As these consequences were at that time politically and socially unacceptable 
to a socialist state, a certain degree of governmental interventionism seemed to be 
inevitable. 
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REFORM IN THE NINETEEN EIGHTIES 
Introduction 
At the beginning of the nineteen eighties the East European countries faced similar 
economic problems: high debt repayments on Western loans borrowed in the nineteen 
seventies, falling productivity and growth rates, stagnating export figures and import 
restrictions for hard currency goods.(47) In order to overcome these problems, the CMEA 
countries had the following choice: to turn inward, thereby withdrawing further from trade 
with the West, or to "restructure" their economies with the aim of competing on world 
markets. The CMEA countries chose the latter in the first half of the nineteen eighties, 
causing them to seek greater socialist integration and "intensification of social production" 
within the CMEA.(48) This move towards greater integration was reiterated by the Soviet 
leaders in 1985 and 1986 who spoke about "perfecting" socialism and "speeding up" the 
socio-economic development of the Soviet Union. A few years later, however, it became 
evident to the Soviet leadership, that fundamental changes leading to radical economic and 
political reforms were, nevertheless required if economic performance was to be 
improved.(49) The choice made by the former Soviet leadership was, therefore, to 
reform and adapt their economic and political system in order to be able to operate more 
effectively in world markets as discussed in the previous chapter. 
As already discussed, Hungary's reforms provided an example to the other East European 
countries in the nineteen eighties, and have therefore been examined in the following 
paragraphs. 
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Hungarian Reforms in the nineteen eighties 
Despite the imposition of restrictions during the nineteen seventies, the Hungarian Central 
Committee reaffmned its intention to continue with the reforms of the New Economic 
Mechanism in Spring 1984.(50) The new reform activities included: 
- a commitment to provide income incentives, and grant selected enterprises a greater 
degree of autonomy; 
- a revision of the price system and turnover tax in order to achieve a closer ratio between 
consumer and producer prices; 
- more flexible export and import regulations; 
- greater scope for transferring capital between enterprises and sectors by creating a 
two-tier banking system in which the National Bank of Hungary controlled monetary 
policy and interest rates, whilst other newly created commercial banks dealt with credit, 
leasing and other specialised banking services. The aim was to enable greater flows of 
capital between enterprises, provide greater flexibility and competition; 
- the creation of a stockmarket for bonds; 
- the introduction of workers' councils to help run enterprises; 
- ministerial reform involving the merger of several ministries resulting in the reduction 
of personnel by 50% and the transfer of decision-making powers to enterprises; 
- permission for small private businesses to open, and create conditions for market forces 
by increasing competition and introducing risk of liquidation. 
To sum up, these reforms were intended to promote the productivity and profitability of 
enterprises through wage incentives and greater enterprise autonomy. The creation of 
workers' councils was supposed to involve workers more actively in the management of 
enterprises as well as safeguarding their interests as workers within the firm. By 
establishing a capital market and a banking system with several commercial banks, the 
supply of money was to be improved and made more flexible and enterprises were 
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permitted to compare offers on business loans and credits made by the banks. A 
reorganisation of the ministries meant further decentralisation and removal of bureaucratic 
hurdles for enterprises. Finally, by allowing small private businesses, Hungary was able 
to introduce the idea of capitalism on a small scale, whilst also going part way towards 
meeting consumer demand. 
Foreign Trade Reforms and the Rise of Joint Ventures 
Major changes during the nineteen eighties to foreign trade included the granting of 
foreign trade rights to a larger number of Hungarian companies (thUS, the number of 
companies with foreign trade licences rose from 129 in 1981 to 226 at the beginning of 
1984). Furthermore, small manufacturing companies were also encouraged to participate 
in foreign trade through foreign trading houses, especially created for them.(51) Changes 
to the joint venture legislation, especially in the latter half of the nineteen eighties (1986 
and 1989) which granted foreign partners greater tax incentives and investment 
opportunities as well as those economic reform measures outlined earlier (e.g., liberalised 
banking system, stockmarket, guarantees of profit transfers), resulted in a large increase 
in the number of joint ventures with foreign partners (rising from 50 joint ventures in 
1985 to 2000 in 1990).(52) 
As the success of the Hungarian joint venture activities became evident, the other East 
European countries, including the former USSR began to experiment with similar reforms. 
Their joint venture legislation and economic reform measures were, however introduced 
. rather more slowly and demonstrated a more conservative approach. (For a detailed dis-
cussion of joint venture legislation in the CMEA see; chapter 7). Only the former GDR 
remained isolated in its refusal to grant permission for joint ventures with Western 
partners because it did not want to encourage any West German investments in the GDR. 
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During the latter half of the nineteen eighties, therefore, joint ventures became the most 
talked about activity in East-West trade because East European governments hoped that 
they would attract foreign capital and enable enterprises to overcome import restrictions, 
as well as give them the opportunity of improving their export potential.(53) Moreover, 
joint ventures were popular among reform-minded socialist countries because this type of 
industrial co-operation did not require major institutional or political reform. Joint 
ventures, nevertheless, enabled socialist enterprises which were engaged in a joint venture 
with a foreign firm to operate more independently within (and in the case of joint ventures 
in free trade zones, outside) the state system. Furthermore, joint ventures were given the 
right to apply for a foreign trade licence which enabled them to act independently from 
foreign trade organisations and benefit from tax exemptions or reductions. Finally. co-
operation with a foreign partner meant that certain supply difficulties in the domestic 
market could sometimes be overcome by the foreign partner obtaining these supplies from 
abroad. (See chapter 2 for discussion of partner motivations for entering a joint venture 
agreement) 
REVOLUTION AND REFORM: THE EVENTS OF 1989 
Introduction 
Following the announcement by the Soviet authorities in 1985 to restructure the Soviet 
economy and their decision not to interfere in the economic and political matters of its 
East European neighbours. a wave of new political and economic reforms began to sweep 
across the countries of Eastern Europe which led to fundamental changes to their Soviet-
style economic and political systems. Unlike the reforms of the nineteen sixties and 
nineteen seventies which tried to render the centralised economies of Eastern Europe more 
efficient. the post-1989 reforms aimed to break away from the old command system and 
move towards a more flexible market economy. Moreover. the removal of any political 
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and military restraints by the fonner Soviet Union, enabled the countries of Eastern 
Europe to choose freely their own political direction.(54) The revolutionary events 
occurring in 1989 brought about the collapse of the traditional political systems in the 
GDR, Czechoslovakia and Romania which resulted in free democratic elections taking 
place for the first time in 40 years.(55) 
Having gained their new political freedom, the countries of Eastern Europe continued to 
undertake economic refonns. The main decision facing these countries at the end of the 
nineteen eighties, however, was whether to retain some aspects of socialism and opt for 
a socialist market economy, or whether to go the whole way towards a market economy. 
This continued to be much debated in the post-revolutionary parliaments of Eastern 
Europe. A study of table 4.1 illustrates the extent to which these countries have gone 
towards releasing central control by examining refonn activities relating to the price 
system, privatisation, convertibility of currency, introduction of capital markets and 
revisions to the banking system. A comparative study of the individual countries' refonn 
efforts in these areas has been made in the following paragraphs. 
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To date, all countries have introduced proposals for privatising the economy to some 
extent, and include the setting up of small private businesses as well as the selling of state 
enterprises. Hungary and Poland took the lead in this activity, having allowed small 
private businesses to operate for some time. ( For example, permission for Poland's 
Polonian companies was granted in 1976, and Hungary gave pennission for small private 
businesses to open in 1982.) The privatisation of state enterprises, however, began only 
after 1989, and were pursued most vigorously by Hungary and Poland in 1990, followed 
by Czechoslovakia in 1991. By comparison Bulgarian and Romanian privatisation 
attempts were much less successful. Although Romania introduced a law in 1990 
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pennitting small businesses to operate, the response rate by the end of the decad7~ 
been very disappointing.(56) As for Bulgaria's privatisation proposals in 1990, they were 
rejected causing the Bulgarian prime minister to resign over the issue in December 
1990.(57) 
This refonn aimed at withdrawing state subsidies in an attempt to align consumt';r_pdces 
with producer cost Rrices. Once again, Hungary led the other East European countries, 
having halted subsidies already~_n_1987.. Poland and Romania did so in 1990, whilst 
~ 
Czechoslovakia was expected do so in 1991. Bulgaria introduced only a partial price 
refonn on consumer goods in 1990 owing to oil shortages brought about by reduced oil 
deliveries from the fonner USSR and embargoed deliveries from Iraq. To have removed 
subsidies entirely would, therefore, have had catastrophic consequences for their 
economy.(58) Only certain consumer prices, therefore, were increased by 25%. 
Currency Convertibility~ 
r 
To enable enterprises to operate more effectively in other market economies and attract 
foreign business activities in their own countries,,.convertibility of the national currency 
remains a pressing issue for the countri!;.S of Eastern Europe._However, the full effects 
... 
of introducing full convertibility of currency have been experienced by the East Gennan 
economy, where conversion to the D-Mark exposed the fonner GDR to the full impact 
of world prices, resulting in sharp increases in food, housing, energy and consumer prices, 
as well as increases in raw material and commodity prices for industry, without the 
corresponding increases in wages.(59) 
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Table 4.1 A SUMMARY OF EAST EUROPEAN REFORMS UP TO 1990 
HlUlgary Poland Czechoslovakia Bulgaria Romania 
Privatisation Private ownership of small Private ownership of small Private ownership of small Proposal for private owner- Private ownership of small 
businesses. Stale enterprises businesses. Stale enterprises businesses. Stale enterprises ship of small businesses re- businesses. No state finns 
floated. floated. floated. jected floated. 
Price Reforms 1987 subsidies withdrawn. 1990 subsidies withdrawn. 1991 price alignment between 25% increase on certain 100% increase on coruumer 
Alignment of consumer with Alignment of consumer with consumer and cost prices. coosumer goods. No prices. No alignment of 
producer cost prices. producer cost prices. aligrunent of consumer and coosurner and producer cost 
cost prices. prices. 
Currency Internal convertibility. Internal convertibility. Noo. Noo. Noo. 
conversion 
Banking 2-tier banking system. 2-tier banking system. No decision taken at end of Stale bank ooIy. Slate bank only. 
1990. 
CapUal Market 1987 stockmarket introduced. 1991 introduction of No decision taken at end of Noo. Noo. 
stockmarket. 1990. 
Foreign 100% foreign 100% foreign 100% foreign 100% foreign 100% foreign owned 
Investments owned companies. owned companies. owned companies. owned companies. ccmpanies. No certain de-
Foreign share· Foreign share- Foreign share- Foreign share- cision reached at end of 1990 
holding possible. holding possible. holding possible. holding possible. to float state-owned finns. 
Sources: The Times, (29 and 30 December 1986); The Financial Tunes (20th November. 1990). p.VI; The Financial Times. (1 November. 1990 a). p.2: The Financial Times (1 November 1990 b). p.2; East 
European Ma,x.ts (10 July 1989), pp.2.3.5. 
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Consequently, the more progressively reforming countries, such as Poland and Hungary 
opted, in the first instance, for internal convertibility of their currencies. The other East 
European countries, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were not prepared, by the end 
of the decade, to expose their economies to the inevitable economic and social hardships 
which follow the withdrawal of subsidies and the introduction of partial convertibility to 
their currency. 
Under the previous communist system, the banking system was characterised by 
centralised control which ensured that the distribution of finance was carried out in 
accordance with the economic plan, and credits and debt repayments were controlled by 
the State.(60). The latter is still a task retained by the National or State Bank in Eastern 
Europe. Since 1989, however, some commercial banks have been set up which have 
introduced an element of competition into the banking services of East European 
........... ..... -...."........,'~ 
countries. The effect of the Jlresence of these commercial banks has been to provide an 
--
improVed service to customers in areas such as interest rates, depreciation allowances, 
--~'~'-" '. 
loans and credits as a result of competition for business between the banks. 
Leaders in the introduction of a two-tier banking system (national bank for policy 
decisions and other banks for commercial and investment activities) were Hungary in 
1987, followed by Poland in 1991. At the time of writing, however, the other countries 
had not published any details regarding the liberalisation of their banking systems. 
Capital Markets ~ 
A necessary requirement for the successfu!.privatisation·of·enterprisesis-tlie' establishment 
of capital markets which enable the free movement.oLcapital-and-the-f]oatinglifstocks---
------ c~ - .,.,....--_. 
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and shares for foreign and home investors. Nevertheless, by the end of 1990 only 
Hungary had set up a stock exchange (opened in 1987) through which it issued bonds.(61) 
"-Company shares, however, were floated on the Vienna stock exchange. Except for 
Poland, the other East European countries had not announced any plans for creating a 
stockmarket in the near future.(62) 
Whilst reforms in some of those areas mentioned above have been slow, the countries of 
Eastern Europe have been quick to change laws on foreign investments, granting improved 
conditions for joint ventures and permission to set up wholly owned foreign subsidiaries 
which aim to promote the inflow of foreign capital (see chapter 7 for legislative changes 
~-.......:.--------- .. 
up to 1990) in an attempt to bolster their economies~ Although these changes provide the 
necessary legal framework for foreign investments, the economic and political conditions, 
which are discussed in the following paragraphs, play an important role in attracting 
foreign investors. 
Despite progress made by Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia these countries alongside 
Romania and Bulgaria faced daunting economic problems at the end of 1990 which have 
been summarised below: 
- in 1989 Poland, Czechoslovakia (and the former GDR) had a GNP growth of 0.5%, 
whilst Hungary and Bulgaria had negative growth rates and Romania had zero growth 
rates; 
- foreign debt in the region had grown from $71 billion in 1985 to $101 billion in 1989; 
- agricultural output grew by only 1.2%; 
- industrial output grew by a mere 0.5%.(63) 
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Furthennore, Western direct investment in the CMEA area, estimated to be $2 billion in 
1989, was negligible compared to the US $500 billion which West Gennan bankers' had 
estimated would be required to bring the East Gennan economy alone up to the level of 
the West.(64) 
These factors together with Comecon's switch to hard currency trading from 1st January 
1991 give a bleak economic picture for the nineteen nineties.(65) As a result of hard 
currency trading among the CMEA countries, the price of oil from the fonner USSR has 
risen to the level of world oil prices, hitting the oil dependent countries in particular. This 
in turn will bring about further inflationary measures in the fonn of price increases to 
enterprises which may lead to possible bankruptcies. By contrast, the rise in oil prices 
should have some positive consequences for the former USSR's balance of payments.(66) 
Those countries, however, with severe hard currency shortages, as for example Bulgaria, 
will be obliged to return to using barter trade.(67) 
INTRA-CM EA TRADE 
Since its establishment in 1949, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance played an 
important role in the foreign trade activities of the fonner socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe. This section sets out, therefore, to examine the aims of the CMEA, its impact 
on the foreign trade activities of the fonner Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern 
Europe, as well as its attempts at progressing from bilateral to multilateral trade . 
. _- .---
(~e CMEA was originally founded to link the countries of Eastern Europe whilst 
i consolidating the development of the centralised planning system within their countries. I The fonner USSR's vast oil supplies and the non-convertibility of currencies among the 
I I members of the CMEA meant, however, that intra-CMEA trade developed mainly a barter 
\ trade system, with the former Soviet Union supplying oil and raw materials to the East 
, .. 
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European countries in exchange for industrial and consumer goods.(68) 
In the early days of the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties, the Soviet Union sold its oil 
to the other CMEA countries below world prices. However,with the onset of the first oil 
crisis in 1973, the Soviet Union began to align its prices with those of the world market, 
although they still lagged behind the world price for oil. The rise in Soviet oil prices, 
nevenheless, meant that the oil dependent CMEA countries were obliged to increase their 
production of goods for sale to the Soviet Union, leaving fewer goods for sale in Western 
markets, which were also in recession. Consequently, by the nineteen seventies and the 
nineteen eighties, the East European countries were heavily committed to intra-CM EA as 
demonstrated in table 4.2 overleaf. 
The statistics in table 4.2 show that in 1983 (when trade was stagnating world wide and 
hard currency was in short supply) Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland conducted 
approximately three quarters of their foreign trade activities with other CMEA countries. 
In the same period, the GDR's trade with the CMEA stood at over 60%, whilst both 
Hungary and Romania's foreign trade seemed to be almost evenly balanced between its 
CMEA panners and the rest of the world. 
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Table 4.2 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CMEA COUNTRIES' FOREIGN TRADE (IN % SHARES IN CURRENT PRICES) 
1970 1975 1980 1983 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
SOVIET UNION 
Socialist countries 65.4 65.1 60.7 52.4 54.2 53.2 55.6 56.5 
of which CMEA 55.4 57.0 55.6 48.3 49.0 48.2 50.7 51.7 
Developed West 18.7 24.0 25.6 36.4 32.0 35.4 28.9 31.4 
LDCs 15.9 10.9 13.7 11.2 13.8 11.4 15.5 12.1 
BULGARIA 
Socialist countries 79.3 76.2 80.0 72.3 70.8 78.9 76.4 79.8 
of which USSR 50.1 57.2 
Developed West 14.2 19.1 9.3 23.6 15.8 17.2 10.5 13.9 
LDCs 6.5 4.7 10.7 4.1 13.4 3.9 13.1 6.3 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Socialist countries 70.6 69.4 71.6 69.8 69.6 70.2 74.6 79.2 
of which USSR 35.7 36.0 
Developed West 20.4 24.5 19.8 24.6 21.7 24.3 16.4 16.7 
LDCs 9.0 6.1 8.6 5.6 8.7 5.5 9.0 4.1 
GDR 
Socialist countries 3.9 69.4 73.2 66.6 68.7 63.3 63.6 66.1 
of which USSR 34.9* 34.9* 
Developed West 21.9 26.7 22.4 29.0 24.1 30.5 29.9 28.9 
LDCs 4.2 3.9 4.4 7.2 6.2 6.5 6.5 5.0 (continued 
overleaf) 
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1970 1975 1980 1983 
Exports Imports . Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
HUNGARY 
Socialist countries 65.6 65.0 72.2 66.2 55.1 51.1 54.3 52.8 
of which USSR 29.3 27.7 
Developed West 28.0 28.8 21.4 27.0 33.9 39.4 32.6 34.2 
LDCs 6.4 6.2 6.4 6.8 11.0 9.5 13.1 13.0 
ROMANIA 
Socialist countries 58.1 53.9 46.0 34.5 44.3 38.2 48.0 58.7 
of which USSR 19.0 15.8 
Developed West 31.9 39.5 31.5 41.9 35.5 31.2 52.0 41.3 
LDCs 10.0 6.6 22.5 14.6 20.2 30.5 
POLAND 
Socialist countries 63.9 68.6 59.9 45.8 55.9 55.6 67.2 75.2 
of which USSR 31.2 33.2 
Developed West 28.4 25.8 31.5 49.3 34.4 35.0 23.5 19.9 
LDCs 7.7 5.6 8.6 4.9 9.7 9.4 9.3 4.9 
Table 4.2 contd. 
*in 1979 
Source: Wallace, Clarke, (1986) pp.113-114. 
N.B. The source does not state whether Intra-German Trade is included in these figures or not. 
LDCs Less Developed Countries 
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In an effort to progress away from barter trade, there were some attempts at introducing 
multilateral trade agreements. Moreover, the "convertible rouble" was used as an 
accounting unit to calculate the value of goods supplied and acquired by CMEA countries 
in order to overcome the problem of non-convertibility of the currencies among the 
CMEA countries.(69) 
The first proposal at rendering intra-CMEA trade more multilateral was put forward by 
Khrushchev in the early nineteen sixties. He advocated the creation of a "united planning 
organ", responsible for co-ordinating multilateral trade activities between the CMEA 
members. This proposal, however, was rejected by Romania (because of its preference 
to expanding its trade with the West), thus failing to pass the unanimity vote required at 
that time for the acceptance of any proposals.(70) Despite the failure to set up a central 
planning organ for integrating and harmonising intra-CMEA trade, a degree of multilateral 
co-operation was achieved through associations involving the participation of several 
CM EA countries. (e.g., the Organisation for Co-operation in the Ballbearing Industry was 
set up in 1964 with the participation of all CMEA countries, except Romania).(71) 
With the preoccupation of individual CMEA countries in the nineteen sixties and nineteen 
seventies with their own reform efforts which included promoting foreign trade with the 
West, intra-CMEA trade continued to be conducted as barter trade.(72) Nevertheless, a 
new attempt was made to strengthen CMEA integration in 1971 through the Complex 
Programme proposed during Brezhnev's time in office. This had the aim of promoting 
greater integration of socialist countries through multilateral co-operation in special 
projects. The programme also laid down rules for co-operation in specific areas such as 
engineering, mining and transportation. The main instrument for achieving this integration 
was to be through plan co-ordination of CMEA activities, including international Comecon 
projects in the resources sector such as the Mir power grid, the Druzhba oil pipeline, and 
the Soyuyz gas pipeline, the Yermakovo ferro-alloy and the Ust-I1misk cellulose plants 
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in the USSR; and the Katowice iron and steel combine in Poland, the Devna soda factory 
in Bulgaria, and the Boehlen ethylene complex in East Germany.(73) 
But despite these much cited examples, most of the CMEA trading activities still 
remained on a bilateral basis owing to the non-convertibility of the currencies of the 
CMEA countries and the fact that the "convertible rouble" was not convertible because 
the "convertible roubles" eamed from trade with one country could not be used to 
purchase goods from another country.(74) 
As already discussed at the beginning of this section, many of the smaller oil dependent 
CMEA countries were made to cut back their trade with the West in the nineteen eighties 
in order to pay for their oil requirements from the Soviet Union which had set a ceiling 
on the amount of oil deliveries made to CM EA countries, by limiting oil deliveries to the 
1980 ceiling and charging hard currency for supplies in excess of the ceiling. 
Consequently, trade with the West stagnated and even declined (see following chapter for 
details), leading the countries of Eastern Europe to look for alternative means of acquiring 
Western technology in their battle to create new productive capacity.(75) 
The decision announced in 1990 to conduct future intra-CMEA trade in convertible 
currency, which has already been referred to in an earlier section, signalled the end of 
fixed barter agreements between the CMEA countries, and led eventually to the 
dissolution of CMEA co-operation at the end of June 1991. (76) It seems, therefore, that 
in the future, individual East European countries are likely to "shop around" for 
competitive suppliers and new customers which may alter the former trade patterns 
depicted in table 4.2. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite attempts in the nineteen sixties and the nineteen seventies to refonn the political 
and economic structure of their countries in an effort to improve economic output, the 
countries of Eastern Europe were unable to effect any significant changes. Only Hungary 
succeeded in introducing and sustaining a degree of flexibility in the economic 
management of the country with its New Economic Mechanism which laid the foundations 
for the later refonns in the latter half of the nineteen eighties. 
As trade in the early nineteen eighties continued to stagnate and political control was 
being relaxed by the new Soviet leadership from 1985 onwards, a series of foreign trade 
refonns were introduced which were designed to re-activate trade with the West. Hungary 
in particular was in a better position than other CM EA countries to stimulate economic 
activity through foreign direct investments, having already established its New Economic 
Mechanism during the nineteen seventies. Encouraged by Hungary's successes in 
overcoming some of the bottlenecks to imports through joint ventures, and the positive 
signals received by the fonner Soviet Union to these reforms, other East European 
countries began also to undertake economic refonns. 
The relaxation of political control by the fonner USSR over Eastern Europe led to the 
overthrow of communist control in most of the East European countries after 1989 and 
has resulted in the introduction of more radical economic refonns by the fonner CMEA 
countries, aimed at decentralising their economies. By exposing their economies to the 
effects of market forces, however, these countries have been experiencing problems such 
as inflation, unemployment and falling growth rates. Moreover, the decision to abolish 
trade among the CMEA member countries by "convertible rouble" resulted in the 
dissolution of the CMEA and its bilateral trade agreements. 
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The importance of foreign trade for stimulating economic growth was already recognised 
by the countries of Eastern Europe in the nineteen sixties. However, the effect of the oil 
crisis in the nineteen seventies, the mounting debt and repayment problems experienced 
by some of the CM EA countries (Poland and Hungary in particular) resulted in hard 
currency shortages. Consequently, some of the more oil dependent CM EA countries 
began to turn inward in an effort to consolidate trade with their CMEA partners, notably 
the Soviet Union. East-West trade began, therefore, to decline and the technological gap 
widened between the East and West, causing them to look for ways of achieving import 
substitution, thereby curbing hard currency expenditure. The following chapter provides, 
therefore, the necessary background to the growth of joint ventures by outlining the 
development of East-West trade and industrial co-operation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EAST-WEST TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Having noted in chapters 3 and 4 the features of centrally planned economies, notably in 
the area of foreign trade, this chapter traces the growth in East-West trade between 1960 
and 1988(1), and discusses possible developments of these activities in the nineteen 
nineties. As a major participant in East-West commerce, the former Soviet Union's 
trading activities are analysed in isolation, particularly in the nineteen eighties when 
falling oil prices had a negative impact on Soviet exports, and consequent imports, which 
contributed in turn to an overall stagnation in East-West trade. Following the discussion 
of East-West trade, an examination is carried out of the former CM EA countries' efforts 
to import and assimilate foreign technology in the nineteen seventies, and increase their 
industrial co-operation activities in the nineteen eighties. These surveys provide the 
necessary background to discuss the emergence of joint ventures as the type of industrial 
co-operation most favoured and actively promoted by the former socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe in the late nineteen eighties. 
THE GENERAL PATTERN OF EAST-WEST TRADE (1960-88) 
Introduction 
1960 has been chosen as a starting date for this chapter as Western and Eastern attitudes 
changed considerably between 1960 and 1975, from confrontation to detente, leading to 
liberalisation of trade between East and West.(2) This section begins by tracing the 
growth of East-West trade between 1960 and 1988 (table 5.1) and subsequently discusses 
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the importance of East-West trade in relation to wo-rid trade in the nineteen eighties (see 
table 5.2). This is followed by an examination of the USSR's export performance in the 
nineteen eighties and a summary of predictions made regarding the development of 
East-West trade in the nineteen nineties. 
The development of East-West trade 
------. 
Table 5.1 gives a year by year outline of the growth of East-West trade and world trade 
'between 1960 and 1988 and shows total CMEA exports and imports to have increased 
rapidly in the nineteen sixties and seventies (203% between 1960 and 1972. and·235% 
between 1972 and 1979). Eight of the nine years from 1972 up to and including 1980 
had the highest 'annual percentage increases recorded over the 29'· year period. Total 
imports by the former socialist countries and the Soviet Union rose by 321 %. and total 
exports from these countries rose by 296%. In real terms the growth rate was 
considerably less because the unit value (price) index in the West rose by 109% between 
1972 and 1978 as a result of the oil crisis in 1973. compared with an increase in the unit 
value (price) index of only 31 % between 1960 and 1972.(3) Moreover. the balance of 
trade shifted from a healthy 'surplus in the early nineteen seventies (US $ 1886 million fob 
in 1970; table 5.1) in the CMEA countries' favour to a substantial deficit in 1975 
(US $ 5307 million fob; in table 5.1). Whilst the USSR managed to regain its positive 
trade balance in 1976. :the other six socialist countries of Eastern Europe continued to 
record a negative.trade balance between 1975 and 1988. 
In :the nineteen eighties. however. import and export figures of the developed market 
economies (and world exports) declined. especially between 1980 and J 985 (see table 
5'-1). Consequently. imports and exports from the former CMEAcountries.also!stagnated. 
particularly between 1983 and '1985, as the socialist countries began to feel the knock-on 
effect of the world recession and the implementation of restrictive import policies.(4) 
Although the latter aimed at overcoming the former CMEA countries' debt repayment 
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problems, import restriction nevenheless had a negative effect on their domestic 
production and expon perfollnance which contributed to their stagnating trade figures. 
As Western markets began to recover from the recession experienced in the early nineteen 
eighties, East-West trade appeared to be recovering slightly in the latter half of the 
decade. Western expons to Eastern Europe and the fOllner Soviet Union rose, therefore, 
from US $ 33.7 billion in 1985 to US $ 43.1 billion in 1988, whilst exports from Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union to the West rose from US $ 38.0 billion in 1985 to US $ 
42.0 billion in 1988 (see table 5.1). These increases in East-West trade in the latter half 
of the nineteen eighties, however, were wOl1h less in real telms than export volumes at 
the beginning of the nineteen eighties, owing to inflation and a weakened dollar. 
Moreover, CM EA exports rose as a result of the former USSR's increasing its sale of 
Soviet oil and petroleum products by three million tons in 1986/87 (5); a period in which 
the spot price of Soviet crude oil recovered slightly from 1985 (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
122 
Table 5.1 World Tl1Id. (1958 - 79) 
(All figures in millions of SUS FOB) 
Ye'" Tollll Tollll SCEE Tollll SCEE ToIlIl ToIlIl ToIlIl ToIlIl Tollll DME ToIlIl DME 
World Imports Exports USSR USSR 6SCEE 6SCEE Imports Exports 
Exoorts Imports Exoorts Imports Exports 
1960 127,870 12,910 12,770 5,360 5,560 7,550 7,410 82,790 85,440 
1961 133,970 13,820 14,120 5,610 6,000 8,210 8,120 87,170 90,310 
1962 141,410 15,280 15,770 6,290 7,030 8,990 8,740 93,220 94,990 
1963 153,860 16,380 17,000 6,840 7,270 9.540 9,730 102,810 103,640 
1964 172,160 18,100 18,400 7,590 7,680 10,510 10,720 116,OOO 117,2SO 
1965 186,390 19,030 19,710 7,810 8,170 1l,220 1l,54O 126,530 128,ISO 
1966 203,400 19,670 20,910 7,640 8,840 12,030 12,070 139,340 141,470 
1967 214,190 21.11O 22,820 8,280 9,650 12,830 13,170 147,460 149,240 
1968 239,140 23,020 24,900 9,llO 10,630 13,910 14,270 165,960 167,670 
1969 272,710 25,240 27,500 10,050 11,660 15,190 15,840 191,240 193,190 
Table 5.1 continued ..... 
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Table 5.1 continued: 
Year Total Total SCEE Total SCEE Total USSR Total USSR Tota16 SCEE Total 6 SCEE Total DME Total DME 
World Export. Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
1970 312,348 28,637 30.523 11,451 12.800 17.182 17.723 220,390 224,236 
1971 348.266 30.941 33,290 12.108 13.806 18.832 19.484 246.260 250.737 
1972 413.168 38.272 39.416 15.735 15.361 22,538 24.054 293,554 297.737 
1973 517.948 50.390 52.253 20.335 21.462 30.052 30.790 406.079 406.918 
1974 838.269 62.694 64.637 24.361 27.405 38.264 38,264 585.780 541.660 
1975 '012.979 82.665 77.358 35.418 33.310 47.273 44.048 573.197 577.192 
1976 989.451 86.977 84.110 36.656 37.169 50.303 46.941 666.433 642.102 
1977 1.122.908 95.777 98.106 39.849 45.160 55.880 52,946 749,513 727,709 
1978 1.297,518 110.459 112.434 45.847 52.216 64.896 60,218 863,194 '011.9'01 
1979 1.631.250 126.477 133.421 53.498 64.762 72.979 68,658 1.116.398 1.079.041 
Table 5.1 continued .......... 
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Table 5.1 continued World Trade (1980 - 88) 
(All figures in millions of SUS fob) 
Year Total World To .. 1 SCEE' To .. 1 SCEE Total USSR Tolal USSR Total 6 SCEE Total 6 SCEE Total DME Total DME 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
1980 1,995,068 161,294 156,357 68,522 76.449 92,772 79,908 1,406,549 1,256,480 
1981 1,978,442 158,198 159,276 72,960 79,003 85,238 80,273 1,337,516 1,233,026 
1982 1,836,739 159,824 166,132 77,752 86,912 82,072 79,220 1,242,002 1,154,801 
1983 1,812,607 167,473 177,591 80,412 91,343 87,061 86,248 1,232,057 1,153,323 
1984 1,909,327 167,575 177,841 80,680 91,652 86,895 86,189 1,337,571 1,226,347 
1985 1,932,387 173,722 174,962 83,140 87,281 90,582 87,681 1,386,556 1,478,368 
1986 2,128,081 192,856 193,829 88,871 97,247 103,985 96,582 1,551,336 1,478,368 
1987 2,498,031 205,370 212,219 96,061 107,874 109,309 105,655 1,845,200 1,739,207 
1988 2,832,894 222,604 223,234 107,229 110,559 115,375 112,675 2,080,519 1,984,979 
~: 1958 - 1969: United Nations' Yeafb(x,k of International Trade Statistics 1969, Vol. l. Table B. 
19701979: United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1979. Vol. 1. Table B. 
United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1988, Vol. I, Table A 
N.B. Table B (UN Yearbook 1979) does not include intra-Gennan trade; table A (UN Yecubook 1988) includes intra-Gennan trade. 
SCEE Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe 
DME Developed Market Economies 
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Figure 5.1 
Soviet Exports to the West (billion roubles) 
-- (a) Total Exports 
-+- (b) Oil & Gas 
*" (c) Non-energy 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Source:East European Statistics Service, No.145. 10 May 1988, (East-West Publications, p.3) 
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Figure 5.2 
Spot Price of Soviet Crude Oil, Grade:Urals (API 32) on the Medit 
........ US dollars/barrel 
2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 
1985 I 1986 I 1987 I 1988 
Source: East European Statistics Service. 25 July. 1988. p.2 
127 
The importance of East-West trade 
An analysis of data in table 5.1 and 5.2 on East-West trade and total world exports, taken 
from the United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics between 1960 and 
1988(6), reveals the importance of East-West trade and its contribution to world exports. 
Based on the export figures in table 5.2, exports from the CM EA countries to developed 
market economies (DME) amounted to 29% of their total exports (in dollar value) at the 
beginning of the nineteen eighties and declined to 19% at the end of the decade. By 
comparison exports to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe (SCEE) by the developed 
market economies accounted for only 3.6% of their total exports at the beginning of the 
decade and declined to 2.2% at the end of the nineteen eighties.(7) These figures, 
however, may not reflect the real value of Soviet and East European exports and imports, 
owing to the complicated exchange rate system in operation at that time for Soviet and 
East European currencies, which caused their currencies to be considerably overvalued . 
. Nevertheless, these trade figures suggest that East-West trade has been of considerable 
importance to the former CM EA countries and of minor economic significance to the 
developed market economies. Moreover, in relation to world exports, exports from the 
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe contributed between 7.8% and 9.1 % of total 
world exports, whilst exports from the developed market economies contributed between 
63% and 70% of total world exports.(See table 5.2) 
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Table 5.2 East-West Exports in relation to World Trade 
World Exports by Commodity classes and by regions. Total trade (SITC, Rev. 2 and Rev. 3,0 - 9) (Million US dollars fob) 
Year *T otal world ·Share of ·Share of Total SCEE·s Share of SCEE·s Iotal Total DME·s Share of DME·s total 
exports Iotal SCEE·s Iotal DME·s exports to export turnover (%) exp:)Jts 10 export turnover (%) 
exports in exports in DME delivered 10 DMEs SCEE delivered 10 SCEEs 
world world exports 
exports (%) (%) 
1980 1.995.068 7.8% 63.0% 44.795 29% 46.268 3.6% 
1985 1.932.387 9.1% 65.0% 37.897 22% 33.735 2.7% 
1988 2.832.894 7.8% 70.0% 41.919 19% 43.051 2.2% 
* Based on export figures from United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1988, Vol. I, Table A 
Source: United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1988, Vol. 1, Table A. 
N.B. Table A includes Intra-German trade. 
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The USSR's export performance in the nineteen eighties 
The former Soviet Union's exports have accounted for 41.5%, 48.5% and 49.5% of total 
CMEA exports in 1971, 1979 and 1988 respectively, and the USSR plays, therefore, the 
major role in any discussion of East-West trade. (See table 5.1). In examining Soviet 
exports in the nineteen eighties (see figure 5.1), it is evident that the former USSR's 
energy exports (see line b in figure 5.1) have contributed significantly to its total exports, 
not only in value terms, but also in the overall development of the former Soviet Union's 
trade (see line 'a' which follows line 'b'). Moreover, the data suggests that the former 
Soviet Union has not been very successful. in developing the exports of manufactured 
goods or services (see line c). The over-reliance on energy exports appeared to have been 
recognised by the former USSR itself (see chapter 3, foreign trade reforms) and 
subsequently led the country to introduce foreign trade reforms in an effort to improve its 
export output of manufactured goods. 
East-West Trade in the nineteen nineties 
Economic forecasts made in 1989 by the Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung 
(DIW) and the United Nations as quoted in an article published by Business Eastern 
Europe(8), present two different views about the development of East-West trade in the 
nineteen nineties and are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
a) The DIW forecast 
Based on the fact that in the late nineteen eighties the former Soviet Union had been 
unable to meet some of its export orders, thereby earning itself a reputation for being 
unreliable among some Western importers, the DIW predicted limited expansion in East-
West trade. Consequently, countries which might have been willing to increase their 
imports from the former Soviet Union previously, might hesitate to do so in the future 
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because they fear they might not receive deliveries on time. This occasional inability on 
the part of the former Soviet Union to meet greater export orders was attributed to a lack 
of flexibility inherent in the economic system and industry of the former Soviet republics, 
which would require extensive restructuring and modernisation. On the basis of these 
findings, the DIW suggested that the former USSR would only be able to increase its 
export figures by selling more oil. This analysis of East-West trade is in many ways 
similar to assessments made by Wilczynski and Pisar over twenty years ago on the subject 
of the Soviet Union's export performance.(9) According to their findings in 1969 and 
1970 respectively, the Soviet Union had been unable to make sufficiently competitive 
components and manufactures to sell on Western markets. The only way the former 
Soviet republics could, therefore, improve their export performance in the long-term, 
according to the DIW, would be through the successful implementation of economic and 
trade reforms. 
b) The United Nations' forecast 
By contrast to the DIW, the United Nations has predicted a more positive outcome for 
East-West trade. Their predictions have been based on the assumptions that Western 
economies have been improving, and the former CM EA economies have been able to 
offer Western countries greater trading and investment opportunities as a result of the 
implementation of economic and foreign trade reforms. 
Whilst the United Nations' evaluation of East-West trade in the nineteen nineties appears 
to be more optimistic than the mw's, both sources, nevertheless, recognise the 
importance of economic and foreign trade reforms for improving the former CMEA 
countries' export performance. 
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To summarise, the findings in this section have shown that East-West trade in the nineteen 
eighties suffered because of: 
(i) a world-wide recession in the early nineteen eighties,l~~.cjat~d-iith a fall in !"l~Ip!ices' 
--- -".-;"-'-'- - ,-
~it 1979 and a weakened dollar; 
- -- - -. --
(ii) the implementation ofrestrictive import policies by the former CMEA countries which 
resulted in a decline in the production of goods for exporting, 
Consequently, faced with hard currency shortages and falling exports the former socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe began to promote industrial co-operation agreements with 
Western partners in an effort to gain access to newer technology, and thereby improve 
their export performance. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN EAST-WEST TRADE 
The desire to improve the technological level of the CMEA countries' output was already 
noted by researchers of East-West trade in the nineteen seventies, when it appeared that 
East European imports from the West were primarily capital intensive.(IO) For example, . 
Hill noted that machinery and transport equipment, and man.ufactured goods accounted for 
some 20-30% of Western exports to the CM EA region (chemicals, and foodstuffs 10%, 
mineral fuels only 1%). He also recorded that during most of the nineteen seventies 
purchases of these goods by the CMEA countries increased at rates approximately equal 
to or higher than total Western exports of these products.(ll) 
By comparison, Wienert and Slater calculated the increase in capital intensive goods 
during the nineteen seventies in value terms. Their estimates showed CMEA imports of 
investment goods to have been worth US $ 10 billion in 1970, SUS 31 billion in 1975'and 
US $ 50 billion in 1980, demonstrating a substantial increase in that decade.(l2) 
However, both authors noted that these increases were far less dramatic in real terms after 
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1975 than before because of inflationary prices which caused imports to rise more in 
value terms than in actual volume. 
Nevertheless, the export statistics of the late nineteen seventies (see table 5.1) suggest that 
the former CMEA countries were still unable to earn sufficient hard currency from the 
sale of goods on Western markets to meet their import requirements. (13) Moreover, East-
West trade suffered a further set-back following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which 
led to the United States imposing trade sanctions on some exports from the former USSR 
and tightening export controls through Cocom on technologically intensive exports from 
the West to former CMEA countries.(l4) Consequently, Western markets became less 
accessible to goods from the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, 
Cocom restrictions made it more difficult for the former CMEA countries to import goods 
embodying Western technology. This resulted in acute hard currency shortages for some 
Eastern European countries, namely Poland and Hungary, causing a fall in export outputs 
. for these countries at the beginning of the nineteen eighties. The former socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe were forced therefore, to seek closer trade relations and co-
operation with their CMEA partners (see chapter 4, section on Intra-CMEA trade). 
However, as the world economy began to recover from the recession in the mid-nineteen 
eighties, and East-West relations improved, the CM EA countries decided to look for ways 
of acquiring Western technology and know-how with the minimum hard currency 
expenditure. Consequently, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe sought once again 
to intensify industrial co-operation activities with Western partners in the latter half of the 
nineteen eighties(15). 
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INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERA nON 
Before examining the role of industrial co-operation, this section begins by defining the 
term and describing the various types of industrial co-operation as a way of clarifying 
these business arrangements, and explaining their relevance to joint ventures. The term 
used throughout this study to define industrial co-operation is the one defined by the 
United Nations in 1976, namely: 
" .. a contractual economic relationship between two or more enterprises of different 
nationalities, extending over a longer period, whereby a community of interests is 
established for the purpose of complementary activities relating to the supply of licences 
and equipment, development of new technologies, the exchange of information on and the 
use of those technologies, production and marketing with provision for the settlement in 
kind of whole or part of the obligations arising from co-operation activities."(Hi) 
The above definition describes several general types of industrial co-operation agreements, 
namely: 
- supply of licences 
- supply of equipment and/or plants 
- joint research and development 
- co-production and specialisation 
- joint ventures 
Moreover, the definition suggests that industrial co-operation is a business relationship 
requiring a longer commitment from the partners than for example a sales transaction (see 
figure 2.1). Emphasis is placed also on access to Western technology through the 
acquisition of licences or equipment, or joint research and development activities. In 
order to ensure good "use of those technologies", industrial co-operation agreements 
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provide not only access to technology, but also expertise in implementing it. Finally, 
payment "in kind of whole or part of the obligation" suggests that countertrade plays an 
important role in industrial co-operation contracts which grants flexible payment facilities 
to countries with restricted hard currency supplies. 
According to the 1976 United Nations' definition, therefore, the different forms of 
industrial co-operation agreements referred to above involve the acquisition and 
implementation of technology, enabling "a community of interests between parties" to be 
established. The various types of industrial co-operation identified in 1976 in the United 
Nations' report are, therefore, described below. 
Co-production and Specialisation 
Co-production and specialisation involve the reciprocal supply of goods and services as 
well as research and development in an area of the Western partner's specialisation which 
sometimes lead to co-operation in marketing. In this type of agreement the East European 
firm usually sells the jointly-produced goods in other markets within Eastern Europe 
whilst the Western partner is responsible for sales in Western markets. 
Supply of Licences 
This form of industrial co- operation involves the supply of licences and/or know-how and 
often includes payment for the licence with products manufactured under the acquired 
licence. Moreover, licences are sometimes supplied as part of other types of industrial co-
operation agreements, for example in the supply of plants or in joint venture contracts. 
Licensing agreements may involve patent licences with imports of certain capital goods, 
know-how licences, turnkey plants and facilities, technical assistance and trademark 
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licences. Most licensing agreements, however, include the transfer of know-how or 
technology, and grant the recipient of the licence the right to use the technology 
purchased. Furthermore, a licensing agreement often includes a commitment by the seller 
of the technology to assist in implementing the technology.(17) 
Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures are the most complex form of industrial co-operation agreements as they 
often include several and sometimes all types of industrial co-operation agreements 
outlined above. They also require a greater degree of investment and resourcing by the 
partners (see chapter 2 for discussion of these issues). Moreover, both parties are bound 
by a contractual partnership, to which the partners commit some of their assets (equity 
shareholding). Consequently, joint ventures, particularly those with equity shareholding, 
unlike other forms of industrial co-operation agreements commit the partners to operating 
jointly under one roof. 
The mam features which distinguish joint ventures from other types of industrial 
co-operations are therefore, 
- the joint management of the venture; 
- the profit and risk sharing according to an agreed formula; 
- their joint marketing, servicing and production activities.(18) 
In a joint venture, therefore, both parties have influence over the decision-making 
processes basic to the venture's economic success by managing the joint venture in 
accordance with the size of their shareholding.(19) A joint venture is, therefore, probably 
the most complex form of industrial co-operation agreement because it involves both 
parties in the running of the business and may include some, or even all of the various 
types of co-operation outlined above. (See chapter 2 for discussion of particular problems 
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related to the shared joint venture model.) 
Industrial co-operation agreements when compared with simple export transactions require, 
therefore, greater commitment from the partners as they have to spend time and resources 
setting up joint production, research and development and examining the marketing 
opportunities for the joint efforts. Moreover, whilst the Western partners have often to 
accept some form of countertrade settlement, which means having to wait longer for a 
return on their investment than they do with ordinary sales agreements, the East European 
partner becomes more greatly dependent on the Western organisation for technology and 
its implementation and has also to commit its limited hard currency supplies to the 
venture. (See chapter 2 for discussion of partner commitments in selling and acquiring 
technology.) 
In assessmg the role of industrial co-operation agreements In East-West trade, the 
subsequent paragraphs examine the value of industrial co-operation agreements in the past 
and the extent to which different countries have been engaged in this type of activity in 
the nineteen seventies and eighties. 
In 1976 Wilczynski estimated that the value of East-West industrial co-operation 
agreements was worth US $ 1 billion (including agreements with Yugoslavia), amounting 
to approximately 2% of total East-West trade at that time.(20) By 1981 a report published 
on East-West trade by United Nations noted that East-West industrial co-operation 
agreements amounted to 5 - 7% of the total volume of East-West trade, illustrating a 
general increase in this type of activity by the latter half of the nineteen seventies.(21) 
However, some countries, for example, Poland and Hungary and West Germany were 
even more actively engaged in industrial co-operation agreements which are discussed in 
subsequent paragraphs.(22) Nevertheless, although the number of agreements rose from 
180 to 1000 (an increase ofi456%) in the period from the mid-nineteen sixties to 1980, 
-_. 
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the contribution made to East-West trade by industrial agreements remained small 
overall.(23) 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the different OECD and CMEA countries' shares in the total 
number of industrial co-operation contracts by the end of 1984. Of the OECD countries, 
Germany had concluded the greatest number of industrial co-operation agreements (25.6% 
of all East-West industrial co-operation agreements), followed by Italy with 11.7%, and 
the United States with 11.6%. Other Western countries, including the United Kingdom 
had each signed less than 10% of the total contracts. 
The extent to which individual CMEA countries participated in East-West industrial co-
operation agreements by 1984 is illustrated in table 5.4. By 1984 Hungary had signed 
35.7% of the total contracts, followed by the Soviet Union with 29.8% and Poland with 
11.8% The remaining CM EA countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the former GDR and 
Romania) had each concluded less than 10% of the total industrial co-operation 
agreements. 
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Table 5.3 Industrial Co-operation Contracts, by Western Country (nine principal countries), 
Type of Contract and Industry (percentages) 
Coun'ry Type of contract Grand TOIaI of which: 
and industry TOIaI A-P A B C D E P 
Gennany 25.6 100 22.0 10.8 39.3 5.2 14.1 8.5 
haly 11.7 100 9.3 12.2 39.6 1.4 25.2 12.2 
United States 11.6 100 26.1 6.5 32.6 5.1 26.1 3.6 
France 9.7 100 14.6 20.7 38.8 0.9 17.2 7.8 
United Kingdom 7.3 100 24.1 9.2 28.7 3.4 31.0 3.4 
Austria 7.1 100 27.1 15.3 28.2 J.2 15.3 12.9 
Japan 5.7 100 16.2 26.5 22.0 11.8 23.5 
Sweden 5.2 100 14.5 9.7 50.0 22.6 3.2 
Switzerland 4.3 100 13.7 3.9 33.3 2.0 27.4 19.6 
Other Western countries 11.8 100 12.8 11.3 31.9 24.8 19.1 
TOIaI 100.0 
Legend: A: Licensing; B: Delivery of plant or equipment; C: Co·production and specialisation; 0: SulH:ontracting: E: Joint ventures; 
F: Joint tendering or joint projects. 
~: because of rounding. percentage shares may not add up to exactly 100. 
Source: Wienert. Slater (1986) p.337 
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Table 5.4 Countries' Shares in the Total Number of Industrial Co-operation Contracts. with Breakdown by Industry (percentages) 
Industry Total for Bulgaria Czechoslovakia 
seven countries 
Chemicab industry (2) lOO 2.2 3.3 
Metallurgy (3) lOO 3.8 
Trnnsport equipment 94) lOO 3.3 8.7 
Machine-tools (5) lOO 4.4 24.4 
Mechanical engineering (6) lOO 9.4 12.8 
(5) + (6) lOO 8.0 16.0 
Electronics (7) lOO 8.3 3.3 
Electrical equipment (8) lOO 4.4 14.7 
(I) + (8) lOO 6.2 9.4 
Food and agriculture (1) lOO 7.3 12.7 
Light industry (9) 100 10.2 9.1 
(I) + (9) lOO 9.1 10.5 
Other branches (l0) 100 1.9 3.8 
Total lOO 5.4 8.5 
Legend: 
1. Food and agriculture industry (including beverages); 
2. Chemicals industry including phannaceuticals); 
3. Metallurgy (including mining): 
4. Trnnsport equipment: includes aircraft. cars. lorries. trnctors (even for agriculture), 
rolling stock. earth moving equipment. diesel engines (even stationary); 
5. Mechanical engineering (all another non-electrical engineering); 
Note: Because of rounding, percentage shares may not add up to exactly 100. 
Source: Wienert. Slater (1986) p.338 
GDR Hungary Poland Romania USSR 
2.7 29.0 9.3 7.1 46.4 
3.8 17.0 22.6 7.5 45.3 
9.8 27.2 16.3 14.1 20.6 
6.7 31.1 4.4 28.9 
5.1 29.1 15.4 28.2 
5.6 29.6 12.3 28.4 
5.0 36.7 20.0 3.3 23.3 
60.3 7.3 1.5 11.8 
2.3 49.4 13.3 2.3 17.2 
1.8 47.3 7.3 1.8 21.8 
3.4 52.3 6.8 2.3 15.9 
2.8 50.3 7.0 2.1 18.2 
1.9 39.6 9.4 3.8 39.6 
4.0 35.7 11.8 4.7 29.8 
6. Mechanical engineering (all other non-electrical engineering); 
7. Electronics (computers and other office equipment. rndio and television sets, communication equipment): 
8. Electrical equipment (all other equipment including electric locomotives and household appliances); 
9. Light industry (textiles, footwear. rubber, glass, furniture. consumer goods); 
10. Other, such as construction, hotel management, tourism. etc. 
140 
Thus, 65.5% of all industrial co-operation contracts with OECD partners had been 
concluded by Hungary and the former Soviet Union alone. An earlier study, however, of 
218 inter-firm co-operation agreements carried out at Carleton University in 1975 showed 
that Hungary and Poland were the CMEA countries most actively engaged in inter-firm 
East-West industrial co-operation activities during the nineteen seventies.(24) However, 
Poland's participation in East-West industrial co-operation activities suffered a set-back 
because of its debt crisis in the early nineteen eighties which deterred many Western 
companies from investing or renewing industrial co-operation agreements with Polish 
firms which had run out at the end of the nineteen seventies.(25) 
THE RISE OF JOINT VENTURES 
Although Romania and Hungary had issued legislation in 1972 permitting foreign direct 
investment in the form of joint ventures, the other CMEA countries, and notably the 
Soviet Union, did not introduce joint venture provisions until the latter half of the nineteen 
eighties because of the ideological difficulty of reconciling the activities of mixed 
companies in a centrally planned economy. By the mid-nineteen eighties, however, 
having gained considerable experience of working with capitalist companies through 
industrial co-operation agreements and joint ventures in the West (see chapter 6), the other 
CMEA countries had become aware of the advantages which equity joint ventures based 
at home could offer.(26) These experiences together with the announcement by the 
former USSR and other former CMEA countries to undertake reforms (see chapters 3 and 
4) led to a wave of joint venture laws being published in the latter half of the nineteen 
eighties. The effect of reform announcements and the importance given to joint ventures 
in the policy pronouncements of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe seemed 
to kindle fresh interest from both sides in East-West trade.(27) This also led to inter-
governmental support through the signing of economic, scientific and technical co-
operation agreements at ministerial level which helped to promote co-operation at 
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enterprise or firm level.(28) 
According to research carried out by the United Nations (ECE 1988), many joint ventures 
which had been set up during 1986/87 had emerged from existing industrial co-operation 
agreements concluded in the nineteen seventies. The motives given by the partners for 
extending the industrial co-operation agreement to a joint venture were as follows: 
- to expand or diversify production activities (see case study Schwarzkopf, chapter 9); 
- to broaden the partners' marketing activities and include new market outlets (see case 
study Siemens, chapter 9); 
- to support joint manufacturing with joint research and development activities (see case 
study Waiters International, chapter 9); 
- to provide a formal structure and contract for the transfer and implementation of 
technology; 
- to overcome problems of payments (see case study APV, chapter 9).(29) 
The above cited reasons for extending the industrial-co-operation agreements underlined 
the partners' wish to broaden their activities as well as their willingness to take on more 
responsibility for their joint activities. 
Finally, the many legislative changes to joint ventures in the former socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe (see chapter 7) occurred in response to Western pressure, and demonstrate 
the importance given to joint venture activities by the former CMEA countries, 
Moreover, the dynamic growth in the number of joint ventures which has taken place 
from the end of 1988 onwards (which is discussed in detail in chapter 8) indicates the 
CMEA countries' successful promotion of joint ventures, particularly at the end of the 
decade. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that East-West trade expanded most 
rapidly during the nineteen seventies as a result of the CMEA countries' decision to 
promote foreign trade during a more relaxed period in East-West relations. In the early 
nineteen eighties, however, East-West trade suffered a set-back because of a world-wide 
recession, growing debt problems. experienced by some of the CMEA countries, a 
worsening of East-West relations and the faIl in oil prices which affected the USSR's 
trade in particular with the West. Consequently, in their efforts to resume East-West trade 
activities in the mid-nineteen eighties, the former CMEA countries began to further 
promote East-West industrial co-operation, and in particular joint ventures at home, with 
a view to reactivating their stagnating trade with the West, with a minimum hard currency 
expenditure. 
These joint venture activities of the former countries of Eastern Europe on their own 
territories in the latter half of the nineteen eighties is discussed in greater detail in part 
C of the thesis. The next chapter focusses on the experiences of socialist firms engaged 
in East-West inter-firm co-operation agreements in the West during the nineteen seventies; 
a period of considerable activity in East-West trade. These inter-firm activities enabled 
socialist countries to gain positive experience of working with capitalist firms in 
developed market economies, before introducing this type of industrial co-operation at 
home. 
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Chapter 5: Notes 
1. The most recently published statistics, available at the time of writing, which included 
the former Soviet Union, were obtained from, 
- United Nations Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, (Part One, 
1.1, 1.2), Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, 1990. According 
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Imports by Imports by Exports from Exports 
the SCEE the USSR the SCEE from the 
USSR 
1989 212.200 114.549 207.000 109.227 
2. Wienert H., Slater J., East-West Technology Transfer. The Trade and Economic 
Aspects, OECD, Paris, 1986, p.137. 
- Hill M.R., East-West Trade. Industrial Co-operation and Technology Transfer, Gower, 
Aldershot (UK), 1983, p.14. 
Proportion of Western export trade to socialist countries of Eastern Europe were noted as 
being 2% in 1952; 3.8% in 1970; 3.8% in 1979. See also chapter eight of thesis for 
discussion of East-West trade policies in the post-war era. 
3. United Nations, "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics", January 1980, Special Table B (World 
Trade of Market Economies. Index Numbers by Regions). This report presented the unit 
value (price Index in US $ for World Exports from Developed Economies) from 1960 -
78: 
1960 1965 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1975 1977 1978 
45 47 48 49 52 55 59 89 100 109 123 
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May. 1989. pp.145 - 146. 
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7. Wienert. Slater (1986), p.55. 
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10. Hill (1983), p.20. 
- Wienert. Slater (1986). p.65. 
11. Hill (1983), p.27. 
12. Wienert, Slater (1986), pp.200 - 205. 
- Hanson P., Trade and Technology in Soviet Western Relations, Macmillan. London. 
1981. p.l28. According to Hanson Soviet equipment investment from Western imports 
rose from around 2% in the mid-nineteen fifties to approximately 5.5% in the mid - to late 
nineteen seventies. 
13. Ibid. (1981), p.213. 
- Levcik F .• Stankowsky J., Industrial Co-operation between East and West, M.E. Sharpe 
Inc .• White Plains. New York. 1979. p.48. 
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15. United Nations, Conference for Trade and Development, "Ways and means to promote 
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systems", UNCTAD/STrrSC/8, Geneva, 5 August 1987, p.23. 
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trade-oriented growth" in United Nations, Conference for Trade and Development, 
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CHAPTER 6 
EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES IN THE WEST 
INTRODUCTION 
As already noted in chapter 5, the CMEA countries became increasingly interested in 
developing East-West trade during the nineteen seventies, including inter-firm activities 
in developed economies. Socialist countries' direct investments in joint ventures or 
wholly-owned subsidiaries in the West form, therefore, an important stage in the study 
and evolution of East-West joint ventures, as these investments have played a part in the 
former CMEA countries' foreign policy and provide, therefore, a comprehensive overview 
of socialist companies' activities outside the CMEA region. Moreover, in order to provide 
a more international perspective and comparison of socialist joint venture activities, this 
chapter examines the joint venture activities of Western firms in the developed economies 
in the nineteen seventies and eighties, thereby highlighting general trends in this type of 
inter-firm co-operation during the specified period. 
Whilst literature in the nineteen eighties on the subject of Comecon subsidiaries or mixed 
companies based in the West analysed the extent to which these companies could be 
defined as multinationals(l), this chapter begins by discussing briefly the size of 
shareholding preferred by the various socialist countries, the growth of CMEA joint 
ventures in the West, their activities and capitalization as well as their role in East-West 
trade. 
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SIZE OF EASTERN SHAREHOLDING 
Introduction 
Until 1990(2} no comprehensive data had been available giving details about the 
ownership pattern of Soviet and East European direct investments abroad. Hence, 
literature in the nineteen seventies and eighties on socialist direct investments in the 
developed economies made no distinction between wholly owned subsidiaries and mixed 
companies. Consequently, the author does not make any distinction between socialist 
joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries in the West either, and refers to Eastern 
direct investments in the West as joint ventures. 
Ownership structure of joint ventures 
According to data published in 1990, 51.9% of the listed East European and Soviet 
companies abroad are either wholly-owned or have a majority shareholding by the East 
European and Soviet partner. (See table 6. I.) The former Soviet Union and GDR showed 
a particular preference for wholly-owned subsidiaries. Romania and Hungary have 
established a substantial number of shared joint ventures overseas (55.2% and 23.9% 
respectively). Minority shareholding, however, outside ·the former CMEA area has been 
the least common (only 10.7% of socialist companies abroad have a minority 
shareholding). 
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Table 6.1 Ownership Structure of Listed Companies (in %) 
Bu ez GDR Hu Po Ro SU Total 
Eastern Equity 
100% 28.3 32.0 38.5 33.6 21.1 13.0 32.8 29.4 
Majority 15.1 12.0 17.9 17.2 30.1 10.3 34.4 22.5 
50-50 1.9 8.0 5.1 23.9 7.3 55.2 15.6 14.8 
Minority 9.4 5.4 15.4 12.7 17.1 6.9 5.5 10.7 
Western Equity 
unknown" 32.1 16.0 17.9 11.9 11.4 6.9 7.0 13.3 
Partner 
unknown** 13.2 26.7 5.1 0.75 13.0 6.9 4.7 9.3 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
" Cases where joint equilY with Western partner established. but exact split undetermined . 
•• Cases where not established if ownership is shared wilh a Western partner. 
Source: McMilJan (1990). p.22 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE WEST 
Introduction 
Although a few joint ventures existed before the Second World War, the socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe began foreign direct investments in the West mainly after 
1965. This coincided with the fonner Soviet Union's strategy in the late nineteen sixties 
which aimed to expand the sale of manufactured goods to OECD countries.(3) This 
strategy was especially welcomed by the smaller and more trade dependant countries in 
Eastern Europe such as Poland and Hungary. In the subsequent paragraphs, the growth 
of the number of socialist joint ventures in the West is examined. 
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Growth of joint ventures in the nineteen seventies and eighties 
i Fig~~' ~.1_ demonstrates that the former CMEA countries established the majority of joint 
ventures in the West in the nineteen seventies, although CMEA investments in the West 
declined considerably during the early to mid-nineteen eighties as a result of mounting 
debts and hard currency shortages experienced by the socialist countries which has been 
referred to in chapter 5 of the thesis. By the end of the nineteen eighties, however, the 
former CM EA countries showed renewed activity in joint ventures in the West, albeit on 
a smaller scale than during the nineteen seventies. 
According to the data collected by McMillan( 4) 500 companies had been set up outside 
the CMEA region by 1983. Their main function was to sell goods which had been 
imported from the home country. Approximately 200 of these companies were jointly 
owned with local Western partners.(4) As already mentioned above, between 1983 and 
1986 only eight new socialist companies were set up in DECD countries (4 by Hungary, 
2 by the Soviet Union, 1 by Bulgaria, 1 by Poland, 1 by Romania). Between 1987 and 
mid-1990, however, CMEA foreign direct investments rose from 808 to 900 companies, 
and of the 900, 625 are based in the West and 274 in the South. At the end of the 
nineteen eighties joint ventures investments outside the former CMEA region grew by 
1l.3%.(5) (See figure 6.1) Thus the flow of direct foreign investments by the former 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe seem to match the East-West trade activities in that 
same period. East-West trade increased considerably in the nineteen seventies, but 
stagnated in the nineteen eighties, although some signs of renewed trade activity occurred 
towards the end of the decade. (See table 5.2) 
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Figure 6.1 CMEA Direct Investment in the West: Periods of Growth'" 
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JOINT VENTURE ACfIVITIES 
Introduction 
This section examines the type of activities the socialist joint ventures have been engaged 
in outside the former CMEA area, their contribution in value terms to exports from 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to the West as well as the type of production 
joint ventures in the West. 
Activities 
A large proponion of socialist joint ventures in the West (63%) have been engaged in 
some form of trading or distribution activity, including product modification. (See table 
6.2.) The second major activity has been in the financial services sector (32% of total 
r-
companies), whilst only 4% and 1.2% of the socialist companies abroad have been 
engaged in manufacturing and resource extraction respectively. The high proponion of 
trading and distribution joint ventures, which is discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
paragraphs, suggests that these companies abro!ld enabled the former CMEA countries to 
expon goods produced at home, outside the CM EA area. In 1988, the United Nations(6) 
estimated that socialist joint ventures distributed between 15-30% of their total expons to 
the West and in some sectors, such as machinery and equipment, oil and oil products, as 
much as 30-80%. 
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Table 6.2 Distribution of Listed Companies by Activity' 
Bu Cz GDR Hu Po Ro SU Total 
Activity 
A.Representation 5 5 5 7 24 6 13 65 
Trading (T) 29 51 21 76 46 20 38 301 
T/distribution 3 5 8 9 11 38 
T /servicing 7 17 8 0 6 12 51 
T/product 
modification 0 0 0 0 11 13 
Total 45 78 35 91 106 28 85 468 
B. Financial 
Services 45 3 12 29 8 14 73 
Transport services 2 3 4 6 19 34 74 
Engineering/con-
struction services 4 2 7 4 0 2 20 
Technical services 0 0 0 2 2 0 9 13 
Business services 0 0 11 4 7 24 
Consumer services 3 2 11 7 0 7 31 
Total 18 11 11 49 65 10 73 237 
C.Fisheries 0 0 0 0 5 7 
Resource Extraction 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 1 0 0 2 1 0 5 9 
D. Manufacturing 5 3 0 16 2 2 29 
Total 5 3 0 16 2 1 2 29 
• For companies which engage in multiple activities. each activity is counted separately. 
Source: McMillan (1990), p.18 
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Export activities of socialist joint ventures 
The extent to which socialist joint ventures have been engaged in exporting goods abroad 
is illustrated by tables 6.3 and 6.4. The figures in table 6.3 show the relationship between 
the turnover of commercial companies and the annual value of exports, whilst the data in 
table 6.4 presents the goods distributed by Comecon marketing companies abroad 
according to their export product category. The relationship between the value of socialist 
joint ventures' total turnover and their exports for the period between 1986 and 1988 was 
considerably high, amounting to 62% overall (see table 6.3), although for some countries, 
notably Hungary it was considerably higher (I 09%) and for some, namely Romania, it 
was much lower (29%). The categories of products distributed up to the end of 1983 
were mainly machinery and equipment (35%), followed by other consumer goods (21 %). 
Technology, know-how and licences, by contrast accounted for only 0.8% of their total 
distribution (see table 6.4). 
Table 6.3 Estimated Value of Turnover of Listed Commercial Companies Related to Value of Exports to OEeD Countries 
(1986 - 88), in Millions of US Dollars. 
Country Estimated Total Annual Average Annual Value of Percentage of Turnover to 
Value of Turnover of Exports to DEeD Countries Export 
Commercial Companies 1986 - 88 (OEeD statistics) 
Bulgaria 301.9 750 40% 
Czechoslovakia 2,508.3 3,531 71% 
GDR 409.5 2,673 15% 
Hungary 3,972.8 3,654 109% 
Poland 2,987.0 5,006 60% 
Romania 1,217.2 4,191 29% 
Soviet Union 13,728.4 20,975 65% 
TOTAL 25,125.1 40,780 62% 
Source: McMillan (1990), p.21 
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Table 6.4 Distribution by export product category of 
marketing companies abroad. end-1983 (percentages)* 
Category Bu Cz GDR Hu Po Ro SU Total 
Machinery and 48.7 55.2 65.4 18.9 26.1 18.4 41.8 35.4 
equipment 
Raw and semi- 2.6 1.7 3.8 3.8 6.8 0 13.4 5.3 
processed 
materials 
Petroleum and 0 0 0 3.8 0 10.5 8.9 3.3 
products 
Pharmaceutical 5.1 3.5 3.8 12.7 4.5 21.1 4.5 7.6 
Textiles 2.6 0 0 10.1 3.4 0 0 3.0 
Agricultural 15.4 I.7 0 16.5 11.4 . 10.5 4.5 9.4 
goods and food 
products 
Other 7.7 27.6 19.2 30.4 20.5 7.9 19.4 21.0 
consumer 
goods 
Technology. 0 0 0 1.3 0 2.6 1.5 0.8 
know-how, 
licences 
Miscellaneous 17.9 10.3 7.7 2.5 27.3 29.0 6.0 14.2 
TOTALS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
• Distribution by principal product marketed of 395 companies. in both West and South. 
Source: McMillon (19870). p.79. 
Despite the low number of Comecon companies involved in the transfer of technology. 
there have. nevertheless. been successful cases of technology transfers from East to West 
as cited by Hill (7) in which he referred to Tungsram Manufacturers (Ireland). In this 
specific example. the joint venture was set up in Cork to manufacture electric light bulbs 
for the UK. Commonwealth. French and Belgian markets. Tungsram was responsible for 
providing the equipment and production technology and training the Irish labour force as 
well as maintaining a technical management role. The technology which was completely 
Hungarian was transferred to Ireland through the Tungsram company. Unfortunately. the 
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company had to cease operations in February 1984 owing to overcapacity and supply 
difficulties brought about mainly by a downturn in market demand and high running costs. 
Tungsram. nevertheless. remains an example of a large Hungarian manufacturer of 
electrical products. which had been successful in setting up a number of overseas 
manufacturing companies in the West using Hungarian technology.(8) 
Another example of a successful transfer of technology from East to West in the nineteen 
sixties. quoted by Hill(9). involved a licensing agreement between a Bulgarian enterprise 
and a British steel company. In this instance. the British steel company bought a 
Bulgarian licence for coating electrodes. used in electric furnaces for the production of 
steel. The set of machines used in the plant were built according to the Bulgarian 
licensor's specifications. and technical assistance was provided by the Bulgarians. This 
co-operation proved to be so successful that the company was able to coat some 85% of 
its total graphite electrodes used annually in the UK and 90% of those electrodes 
consumed in the Scandinavian market. Owing to its success in the European market. the 
British company went on to form a joint venture company in Canada to carry out trials 
for the US market. 
Nevertheless. although McMillan noted that 23 of the 51 joint ventures. which had been 
set up in the nineteen eighties involved the transfer of technology from Eastern bloc 
countries to the country abroad. his data revealed that only four of those joint ventures 
had been established in the West. The majority had. therefore. been established in the 
South. suggesting that socialist countries were able to transfer technology more 
successfully to developing countries than to the West.(IO) 
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PRODUCfION JOINT VENTURES IN THE WEST 
By the end of 1983, 5.8% of the total number of Comecon-owned companies were 
engaged in production activities in Western markets. (See table 6.5). Moreover, a 
comparison between the data in table 6.2 and table 6.5, suggests that there has not been 
any expansion in manufacturing activities since 1983, which has resulted in an overall 
decline in the ratio between manufacturing and other activities. By 1983, therefore, only 
3.9% of Comecon companies abroad were engaged in manufacturing activities, compared 
with 5.8% previously. 
An examination of the former CMEA countries' participation in manufacturing activities 
abroad (see table 6.2) shows Hungary to have established the greatest number of 
manufacturing joint ventures abroad. 10.1 % of Hungarian company activities have been 
in manufacturing compared with the average of 3.9% for all other CMEA countries. In 
1983 the former USSR was the second most active country engaged in manufacturing. 
However, more recently Bulgaria occupied second place. (cf. table 6.2 and 6.5). By 
contrast the former GDR was not engaged in any production ventures abroad. 
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Table 6.5 Major Comecon Investments in Manufacturing in the West·, end-1983 
COUN1RY AND COMPANY NAME PRODUCT 
BULGARIA 
Celef (Ftance) truck tires; foundry equipment 
Contech C. Conradty-Technika Coating (FRG) protective graphite coating 
Rheinische Maschinenfabrik & Eisengiesserei A. Roper foundry equipment, machine (ooh 
(FRG) 
Aelpirin Teomnta (Ireland)" leather materials 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Omnitcade (Canada) # mining equipment 
Semex (FRG)I# specialised truck and other transport equipment 
POLAND 
Tasmanian Alkaloids (Austrnlia) •• phannaceuticals 
Mecobel (Belgium) automatic measuring devices 
Unidal (Canada)·· 
SOVIET UNION 
Scaldia-Vo1ga (Belgium) automobiles 
Fexima (Finland) refrigerators 
Teboil (Finland) lubricants 
Actif-Auto (France) machinery & equipment 
Rusbois (France) wood products 
Slava (France) watches. clocks 
HUNGARY 
Aurora-Honig (Austria) foodstuffs 
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Metex (Austria) steel products 
Tungsram (Austria) lighting materials 
3-F (Denmark)" radio and television sets 
Op.ifaro (FRG) pharmaceuticals 
Romed (FRG) medical equipment 
Tuttlinger (FRG) medical equipment 
Hellenic Alloyed Steels (Greece)" metallurgical products 
Tungsram (Ireland) lighting materials 
Byggin-Ungem (Sweden) construction equipment 
Action Tungsram (US) lighting materials 
Medicor USA (US) medical equipment 
·Cumulative list. as of the end of 1983: includes assembly operations but not modification of imported product. 
.. No longer operative. or Comecon equity liquidated. 
1# companies engaged secondarily in manufacturing. 
~ McMilIan (1987a) 
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Although the former Comecon countries have established only a few production joint 
ventures in the West, they have been more actively engaged in production activities in the 
South because of the availability of raw materials.(ll) Other incentives for investing in 
the South included lower production costs and cheap local labour. With a shortage of 
labour sometimes occurring in the former CMEA countries in the nineteen seventies, 
developing countries were often seen as providing an alternative source of low-cost labour 
which was able to produce goods for the various home markets within Comecon.(l2) 
Nevertheless, although Comecon joint ventures established in the West, have in the main 
been concerned with exporting and importing products for the home markets, McMillan 
observed a tendency, albeit small, for these joint ventures to extend their activities into 
production. He attributed this to the sometimes inflexible and unreliable supply of 
finished goods from home for sale in the foreign market, the often inferior quality of 
products which had not been sufficiently adapted to the foreign market's requirements and 
the superiority of on-site production compared with supplying the market at arms-
length.(l3) 
These factors appear to have led Comecon companies In the West to seek ways of 
improving product performance in the foreign market. By extending the company's 
activities, therefore, into manufacturing, assembling or finishing the Comecon goods 
abroad, the joint ventures have had a dependable supply of goods of better quality, which 
has enabled them to meet the product standards of the foreign country. Consequently, 
these companies in the West have been able to compete more effectively in the local 
market compared with conventional export procedures. 
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Expansion into production activities, nevertheless, required the availability of sufficient 
hard currency from the company's profits for the purchase of assembly production sites, 
parts, licences or know-how. As the profit margins of Comecon countries in the West 
have been maintained at low levels)' ..,' - '" the joint ventures have had to either 
ensure sufficient income from its profits, or additional hard currency supply from home 
to finance the expansion. The economic situation in the nineteen eighties, however, meant 
that for many socialist joint ventures neither solutions have been very feasible as profit 
margins have been kept very low generally, and the countries of Eastern Europe have 
been suffering from shortages of hard currency.(l4) Consequently, socialist direct 
investments abroad stagnated in the mid-nineteen eighties with only small direct 
investment activities occurring at the end of the decade. (See figure 6.1). 
JOINT VENTURE CAPITALIZATION 
An examination of the amount of start up capital invested in companies abroad by the 
socialist countries (see table 6.6) illustrates that financial services companies received the 
largest amounts of the total startup capital (71 % or US $ 791,692 million). This suggests 
that companies outside the banking and financial services sector have been started with 
small amounts of capital, amounting on average to US $ 500, 000 (i.e. ranging from US 
$ 10,000 to US $ 10 million).(15) Moreover, owing to its greater hard currency reserves, 
the former Soviet Union was more strongly represented in the financial services sector 
abroad than any of the other East European countries. 
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Table 6.6 
ACTIVITY 
Commercial 
Financial 
TransJX>rt 
Other Services 
Extraction 
Manufacturing 
N.E.C.** 
TOTAL 
Estimated Value of Authorised Capital Invested in Listed Companies by Principal Activity· 
(in thousands of current dollars) 
BULGARIA CSSR GDR HUNGARY POLAND 
16.437 62.318 15.108 15.781 24.129 
11.384 12.067 21.855 37.777 64,494 
1.099 69 2.175 1.285 2.285 
107 53 107 4.064 283 
557 - - - -
9.570 3.585 
- 12.094 390 
815 6.259 251 1.923 7,427 
39.969 84.351 39,496 72.924 99.008 
·Excluding branches in the West established by Soviet and East European enterprises and other organisations . 
.. Not elsewhere classified because multi.activity companies. 
Source: McMillan (1990). p.20 
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ROMANIA SU TOTAL 
5.902 78.026 217.701 
47.961 596.154 791.692 
134 29.634 36.681 
-
4.224 8.838 
- 2.545 3.102 
341 6.925 32.905 
558 461 17.694 
54.896 717.969 1.108.613 
The aim of the financial joint ventures have been mainly to support Comecon's trade in 
the West, although these companies also developed particular operations within a broader 
range of banking services. The Moscow Narodny Bank (,The Bank for East-West Trade') 
for example specialised in attracting Western funds for the financing of East-West trade. 
By contrast the Eurobank acted as an intermediary between banks, ensuring that hard-
currency funds from other East European banks were placed in Western banking 
institutions in order to accrue interest. The activities of these Comecon companies have 
also extended to include participation in international financing operations which are not 
always directly related to East-West trade. However, expansion into these new banking 
activities has meant that Soviet banks abroad have also been subjected to greater risks 
(e.g., loan write-off}.(l6) 
In further support of their export promotion, the former Comecon countries also invested 
in land, sea and air transport operations, engaging directly in chartering or in operating 
their own equipment to transport cargoes between former socialist countries and cross-
trade transactions. Table 6.6 shows that the former USSR was the main investor in this 
sector, followed by Poland and Bulgaria. By investing in the transportation sector former 
Comecon countries were able to reduce hard currency payments to foreign agencies in 
commissions and fees.(17) 
To sum up, therefore, the majority of former Comecon mixed or wholly-owned companies 
in the West have been engaged in the service sector. The marketing and distribution 
companies tended to reflect the export structure of the individual companies, whereas the 
banking and transport companies had as one of their main functions, the task of 
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supporting the import and export oriented activities of the former CMEA countries abroad. 
JOINT VENTURE GROWTH BY WESTERN COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
In order to put the growth and development of Comecon mixed or wholly-owned 
companies in the West into a more international context, the growth and development of 
Western joint ventures in the European Community is examined in the following 
paragraphs. Taking the information compiled by the United Nation's document (18) on 
East-West joint ventures, it is possible to assess the development of joint ventures in the 
European Community during the crucial period of the nineteen seventies, when Comecon 
joint ventures abroad were increasing at their fastest rate. 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show the growth of joint ventures in terms of total and average number 
of companies participating in a joint venture as well as which firms have been established 
by firms at home (national), by firms within the European Community region(Community) 
and by frrms outside the European Community region (International). 
Although during the 1973 - 80 period, an annual increase was recorded, the most 
significant growth period was clearly between 1973 - 76, when not only the total number 
of joint ventures increased annually, but also the average number of firms participating 
in joint ventures. After 1976, however, the number of joint ventures declined. 
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The increase in joint ventures during the early part of this period has been attributed to 
the growing competition within the enlarged market of the Community (19), which caused 
more firms to seek mergers with compatible partners in an effort to maintain their market 
position and rationalize their marketing and distribution costs. As for the slowing-down 
in the number of joint ventures between 1979 and 1980 this has been attributed to the 
recession experienced by Western countries after the oil crisis in 1979 which had the 
effect of reducing company activities. 
Table 6.8 indicates that as firms began to recover from the recession in the early nineteen 
eighties, the number of joint ventures undertaken by Western firms grew correspondingly. 
A survey carried out by the United Nations(19) in 1983/84 showed joint venture partners 
to have been active in the industrial sector (numbers increased from 30 to 51). 
Commercial joint ventures, by contrast, were outnumbered three times. As the majority 
of the joint ventures established during this period were in technology-intensive sectors, 
led by electrical and electronic engineering (27%), followed by chemicals (16%), metal 
industries (14%) and mechanical engineering (13%), this section will confine its 
observations about joint ventures by Western firms to those in the industrial sector. 
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Table 6.7 Joint Ventures in the European Economic Community; National and International. 1973 - 1980 (wide sample) 
Year National number Average International number Average Total number Average 
of frrms of f!fm, of flnns 
1973 119 4.0 429 2.3 548 2.7 
, 
1974 151 3.8 401 2.8 552 2.9 
1975 237 4.9 313 3.4 550 4.0 
1976 213 3.7 362 3.0 575 3.3 
1977 194 3.8 288 3.0 482 3.3 
1978 162 3.3 278 2.5 440 2.8 
1979 216 3.7 223 2.8 439 3.3 
1980 191 3.4 175 2.7 366 3.0 
Source: United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe (1988). p.107 
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Table 6.8 
Period 
1982/1983 
1983/1984 
1984/85 
1985/86 
Joint Ventures in the European Economic Community; National. Community and International. 
June 1982 • May 1986 (Sample includes only 1000 largest EC frrms and is limited to industry) 
National Community International Total 
23 8 15 46 
32 11 26 69 
40 15 27 82 
34 20 27 81 
Source: United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe (1988). p.I07. 
169 
Table 6.9 Main motives for EC industrial joint ventures 1984/85 and 1985/86 
ACTIVITY 1984/85 1985/86 1984/85 
(Number) (Number) (% of total) 
Production 8 12 11.9 
Production and 5 7.5 
marketing 
Research and 10 10 14.9 
development 
Research and 3 6 4.5 
development 
and production . 
Rationalisation 14 10 20.8 
Specialisation 7 10.4 
Expansion 4 5 6.0 
Other 4 5 6.0 
Not specified 12 19 17.9 
TOTAL 67 69 100.0 
Source: United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe (1988). pp. 100. 
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The United Nations' report on East-West joint ventures (20) suggests that a large number 
of joint ventures in the European Community in the nineteen eighties were formed with 
American and Japanese partners, whose aim has been to ensure their market presence 
within the Community's internal market. European companies for their part, were intent 
on keeping pace with the latest American and Japanese technological developments by 
forming joint ventures with them. 
The main motives given by firms for entering into industrial joint ventures in the mid-
nineteen eighties are summarised in table 6.9. The figures show rationalisation to have 
been the principal motive, (20,8% of the joint venture partners gave this as their motive), 
followed by research and development (14.9%). 
COMPARISON BETWEEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND SOCIALIST JOINT 
VENTURE ACTIVITIES 
Introduction 
This section compares the data presented in the previous sections relating to growth and 
development of CMEA and Western joint ventures and their activities in developed 
economies. 
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Growth and Development 
Whilst a substantial increase in the number of joint ventures (or wholly-owned 
subsidiaries) was recorded in the nineteen seventies for both socialist and Western joint 
ventures outside the CMEA region, the economic problems in the nineteen eighties 
resulted in different patterns of growth for socialist and Western joint ventures. Owing 
to hard currency shortages among the CMEA countries, foreign direct investments were 
consequently curbed, whilst European Community companies having io face greater 
competition within the Single Market sought mergers and joint ventures as a solution to 
maintain or improve their market position. Consequently, Comecon joint venture 
activities declined, whilst European Community joint venture activities increased. 
Activities 
The majority of Comecon joint ventures acted as import and export agencies, often 
extending their activities into marketing and distribution, and occasionally into assembly 
and partial production. By contrast, Western joint ventures were active in the industrial 
sector, establishing joint ventures in an effort to rationalise their activities and acquire the 
latest technological developments in an ever increasing competitive and specialised 
market. Consequently, the motivation for establishing joint ventures by the former 
Comecon and Western countries within the developed economies were very different, and 
explains, therefore the reason for the greater degree of joint venture activity by Western 
firms in the European Community in the nineteen eighties. 
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EXPORT MARKETING ADVANTAGES OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE WEST 
Having established many joint ventures in the developed economies primarily as export 
and import agencies, the former CMEA countries were able to overcome traditional trade 
barriers such as quota restrictions, anti-dumping regulations and non-inclusion of the MFN 
(Most Favoured Nation) tariff agreement. Moreover, joint ventures enabled former CMEA 
enterprises to acquire on the spot market research and sound knowledge of market 
conditions, consumer behaviour and product standards which meant that they were better 
equipped to estimate the sales potential of their products in these markets and target their 
markets. (Compare discussion in chapter 2 of joint ventures as a tool in market 
penetration.) By establishing their presence in the local market, therefore, former socialist 
companies were not only able to avoid certain quotas and tariffs, but they were also able, 
with carefully adapted marketing and advertising strategies, to overcome Western 
consumer prejudices towards products from Eastern bloc countries. Other advantages 
gained, by having a local presence, included being able to acquire information about the 
most effective means of distribution and suppliers in the foreign market as well as: 
- access to partners' assets (capital, warehouse facilities, office premises, etc.); 
- local·staff, familiar with the language and market condition; 
- business contacts through partners; 
- adoption of the partner's trademark to assist in the marketing of East European products; 
- ability to extend into production or assembly activities. (21) 
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Despite these export marketing advantages, socialist countries' company activities outside 
the CMEA region as illustrated by figure 6.1, nevertheless, declined in the early to 
mid-nineteen eighties as a result of hard currency shortages. 
CONCLUSION 
The data in this chapter demonstrates that socialist companies (wholly-owned or mixed) 
in the West have on the whole been successful in exporting a significant proportion of the 
former CMEA countries' total exports outside the region. Few former socialist 
companies, however, were engaged in the transfer of technology from East to West. 
except for a few companies, two of which have been mentioned in this chapter. 
Companies of the former socialist countries engaged in joint venture activities in the West 
have, therefore, been export-oriented on the whole, whilst Western joint ventures in the 
European Community have been primarily concerned with increasing their efficiency 
through rationalisation and combined research and development. 
The experience gained by the former socialist countries from their joint venture activities 
in the West, however, enabled them to promote joint venture investments on their own 
territory and thereby to overcome hard currency shortages. The information in this 
chapter has served, therefore, as a useful introduction to the subsequent section of the 
thesis which examines the development and growth of East-West joint ventures in the 
East, and begins by discussing the legal provisions for joint ventures in the former CM EA 
area. 
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Country of Company Profit/ Profit/total Profit/ 
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POLAND FLT& 
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POLAND* Skorimpex 1.0 3.4 169.4 
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CHAPTER 7 
PROVISION FOR JOINT VENTURES IN COMECON 
INTRODUCTION 
As a consequence of the growing importance given to industrial co-operation agreements, 
and particularly joint ventures in East-West trade, this chapter compares the legislative 
provisions (see tables 7.1 - 7.7) for foreign direct investments in the CMEA area up until 
1990. Each Comecon country's legislative developments are examined individually, 
beginning with those countries with the greatest number of joint venture investments 
(former Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland), followed by those with smaller joint venture 
investments (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania). The former GDR's joint venture 
provisions, however, are discussed at the end of the chapter because of its special status 
before November 1989 and after unification in October 1990. The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to analyse the development of the various joint venture legislations in the 
CMEA area and to assess their role in attracting foreign direct investments. 
THE FORMER USSR 
Introduction 
Although at the end of 1990 the former Soviet Union had the largest joint venture 
investments with foreign partners in terms of foreign capital invested at the end of 1990 
(see table 8.3) compared with other former socialist countries, it was the last CMEA 
country, except for the GDR, to permit joint ventures on its territory in January 1987.(1) 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned in chapter 5 (see section on the 'Rise of Joint 
Ventures') joint ventures were not an entirely new phenomena in Soviet history. 
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Concessions with the participation of foreign capital had operated in the nineteen twenties 
(see chapter 3 for details), and although the economic and political conditions under which 
concessions had functioned had been quite different from those for joint ventures in the 
nineteen eighties, their objectives were similar in many ways. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the Soviet authorities had promoted concessions in the nineteen 
twenties in order to improve domestic production and increase output for the export 
market, thereby injecting new life into the economy, which had suffered severe disruptions 
as a consequence of the First World War and the 1917 Revolution and the subsequent 
Civil War. (2) Similarly, the economic reforms introduced by the former Soviet 
government in the latter half of the nineteen eighties, including provisions for joint 
ventures, were aimed at improving the economic output of the former USSR and 
increasing its export potential by enabling Soviet enterprises to gain access to Western 
know-how and technology.(3) (See chapter 3 - 'role of joint ventures'.) In both instances, 
joint ventures were seen as a tool for improving domestic production techniques and 
volumes of output. Despite 50 years having elapsed between the end of the concession 
period and the introduction of joint venture legislation, the former Soviet Union was, 
nevertheless, able to draw on its historical and theoretical knowledge of concessions as 
well as the recent joint venture experiences of other East European countries, notably 
Hungary, in an effort to promote joint ventures in the former USSR (see chapter 5, 'the 
rise of joint ventures',1p.141 - also note 28 in chapter 5). The first Soviet joint venture 
provision was, therefore, introduced in January 1987, and followed by several amendments 
in September 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1991. The subsequent sub-sections discuss the initial 
joint venture legislation in 1987 and the later amendments. 
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Joint Venture legislation, January 1987 
The first joint venture decree pennitted up to 49% foreign shareholding which enabled the 
Soviet authorities to maintain control over the joint venture by retaining Soviet majority 
shareholding. Moreover, the 1987 decree contained other measures which also aimed at 
maintaining control over the joint venture. The joint venture had, therefore, to employ 
mainly Soviet personnel, the Chainnan had to be a Soviet citizen, the joint venture could 
hire and fire staff only in accordance with Soviet law, the joint venture had to adhere to 
accounting procedures of the fonner USSR and finally the joint venture could only sell 
or buy in the Soviet market in roubles and through a foreign trade organisation.(4) 
Western companies responded to these restrictions with caution and misgivings, and only 
a few joint ventures (23 in total) had been registered by mid-1987. 
In an analysis of the joint venture provision, the legal partnership Bartletts de Reya(5) 
identified objections and uncertainties for Western investors, namely: 
(i) The application procedure for a joint venture was a time-consuming bureaucratic 
process (see table 7.1); 
(ii) Joint venture contributions were valued in roubles "according to contract, taking into 
account world market prices." (clause 12). The term "contract" prices and how world 
market prices were to be applied were vague, making it difficult for investors to evaluate 
accurately their investment; 
(iii) Soviet dominance in the boardroom (owing to the minimum Soviet shareholding of 
51 % and the fact that the Chainnan was a Soviet citizen) made joint venture investment 
an unattractive proposition for some Western companies concerned with maintaining the 
brand name of their products (see case studies Schwarzkopf and Adidas in chapter 9); 
(iv) The joint venture legislation did not make it. clear, whether interest on loan 
contributions by foreign partners had to be paid out of earnings from foreign currency 
exports before allocation of profits to the joint venture partners; 
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(v) Access to the USSR market was not guaranteed since the joint venture was to operate 
outside the Soviet state planning system, making material supply to the joint venture 
difficult; 
(vi) Clarification was needed regarding the power of the joint venture management to hire 
and fire its employees; 
(vii) No system of quality control was mentioned in the decree; 
(viii) Western partners wanted to be able to control the accounting methods and standards 
for the joint venture whereas the accounting rules were in accordance with Soviet 
regulations. Procedures for verification by Western accountants, and requirements for 
treatment in group accounts of Western or associated companies of profit and losses of 
joint ventures needed to be clarified; 
(ix) It was unclear whether tax reductions or exemptions were to be granted during the 
feasibility study or later whilst negotiations were taking place; or whether this was to be 
completely at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance; 
(x) The joint venture legislation did not state clearly which organisation was to be 
appointed for supervising the liquidation of the joint venture. 
The above mentioned concerns to Western investors and the low number of joint venture 
registrations were, however, acknowledged by the Soviet authorities, causing them to re-
examine their legal provisions for joint ventures. 
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Joint Venture Amendments since 1987 
Having noted the slow response to the January 1987 decree the then Deputy Chairman of 
the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, Ivan Ivanov 
declared in TASS, in January 1988, the USSR's intention to give the property of foreign 
investors the same status as Soviet property. Moreover the authorities provided guarantees 
of non-confiscation or expropriation of the property.(6) This statement in TASS together 
with the subsequent legislative amendments as summarised by Geron (see table 7.2) 
resulted in the present provisions for joint ventures (see table 7.3 for summary), which 
have attempted to provide greater assurances and incentives to Western investors. 
The amendments since 1987 as summarised in the tables 7.2 and 7.3 have, therefore, 
granted: 
- the foreign investors the possibility of owning majority shareholding as well as holding 
the position of Chairman; 
- better tax incentives, including longer tax holidays and lower taxation in certain sectors 
(e.g., manufacturing of consumer goods, medical equipment, see table 7.3 for others); 
- the right, subject to approval by the joint venture board of directors, to hire and fire joint 
venture personnel; 
- the right to decide on how the joint venture is to be audited; 
- the opportunity of repatriating hard currency profits, providing they were earned in hard 
currency in the first instance. 
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Table 7.2 Changes to Soviet Joint Venture Legislation in the Period 1987 - 1989 
,/lOR? 0/1 OR? ,2/10RR 311989 
PERMITIlNG a. with capitalist countries a. All-Urum Ministry and a. slate enterprises, asso-
AUTIlORITY USSR Council of Ministers agencies. Republican ciations and organisations -
Council of Ministers. with the consent of superior 
management body; co-operatives 
with pennil by Republic Council 
of Ministers. 
b. with socialist countries 
on the basis of inter-
PARTNER'S SHARE a. with capitalist countries - foreign shareholding up to 99% 
Soviet majority (51%) 
b. with socialist countries -
no' ';m;"d 
TRANSFER OF SHARES with pennit from USSR ministry or by partner's agreement to any third 
agency. or Republican Council of party. 
Ministers (priority to Soviet 
cartnerl, 
MANAGEMENT Chainnan of me board or general Chairman or general director may be 
d;~cto, - mu"'" Sov; ... r, ' 
PERSONNEL Majority Soviet 
HIRE/FIRE According to Soviet law. According to Joint venture 
~~~~~:sTION OF According to Soviet standards Ne( limited 
TAXATION AND a. 30% domestic and 20% on a. 10% and 20% (=28%) in Far East 
REPATRIATION OF repatriation (=44%). 
PROFITS b.2 year tax exemption from start of b.2 year tax exemplion from first 
operation. _ profits b. tyear tax exe~on in Far East 
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T.b!e 7.2 (cOIlld.) 1/1987 9/1987 12/1988 3/1989 
INVESlMENT in roubles in any currency 
V " "A TI"'" 
DOMESTIC CREDITS IN up to 4 years up 10 8 years 
HARD CURRENCY FOR 
EXPORTING 
INDUSTRIES 
DOMESTIC SALES AND a. in roubles a. any currency 
PURCHASES 
h. through Soviet Foreign Trade h. not limited to Foreign Trade 
AUDIT According 10 Soviet practice and by Partners free to decide on how the 
Soviet IIgencv_ 'oint venture is audited. 
EXPORT OF GOODS Allowed Special pennit required. 
OTHER THAN JOINT 
VENTURE'S OWN 
PRODUCT AND IMPORT 
OF GOODS OTHER 
THAN FOR JOINT 
VENTURES OWN NEEDS 
Sources: "Mekhanizm vneshne-ekoncmicheskoi deyatel 'nosti: soomik dokumentov" (Isdatel 'stvo Pravda, Moscow. 1988); Ekonomicheskaya ga:zeta. No. 51. December 1988 and No. 13, March 1989 in 
G.ron 1989. pp. 9 - I!. 
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According to Geron the September 1987 and 1988 amendments (see table 7.2) introduced 
more favourable joint venture tenns by allowing greater operational flexibility. The latter 
amendment in 1989. however. re-introduced some restrictive regulations which limited 
joint ventures to exporting their own products only and importing only those goods 
required for the joint venture operations. Consequently joint ventures were prohibited from 
purchasing Soviet goods with rouble earnings for sale abroad in hard currency which 
could have been used by foreign partners to transfer their profit share.(7) (See chapter 
10 where a number of Anglo-Soviet joint venture companies interviewed mentioned this 
as a drawback.) 
Nevertheless. the positive response by Western businessmen to the earlier joint venture 
amendments resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of joint ventures (cf. table 8.2 
where joint venture registrations increased from 23 in January 1988 to 700 in June 1988 
and figures below). This correlation between the change in legislation and the number 
of joint ventures registered is demonstrated by the following figures: 
Joint Venture Amendments 
September 1987 
end of 1988 
first quarter of 1989 
September 1989 
January 1990 
No. of joint ventures 
23 
191 
400+ 
900 
1.247 (8) 
Although these figures showed an apparently positive response by Western investors. only 
few joint ventures had actually begun operations (only 180 of the 900 registered joint 
ventures had begun operations by October 1989). and the startup capital for many joint 
ventures was quite low (cf. table 8.3).(9) The indication was. therefore. that Western 
investors were still not willing to risk large sums of capital in the Soviet market and that 
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joint ventures were slow to become operational because of long bureaucratic procedures. 
Table 7 3 SummaI)' of Soviet Joint Venture Provisions 1990 
JV, since 1987 
Amendments Sop<. 1987. 1988. 1989. (1991) 
Legal Conn Limited liability and joint stock companies equity ratio. Majority shareholding 
by foreign partner possible. including up to 99% foreign ownership. 
Scope of Adivities and Foreign Service and production. preference given 10: export-oriented jvs. and jvs 
Trade Rights manufacturing conswner goods, medical equipment and medicaments. science-
intensive products of macroeconomic importance. and jvs located in Far Eastern 
ECOOOOlic Area (Art. 32. decree by Council of Ministers. 2.12,88). Foreign 
Trade Rights granted to aU export-import companies. 
Management The chllinnan of the board of directors has no longer to be a Soviet citizen. Jv 
activity decided by the lx!ard on the basis of unanimity decisions. Hire and fire 
of staff decided by the joint venture. 
Capital Contributions Limited liability: min. 500.000 roubles. Joint stock: min. 5000.000 roubles. 
Shares having nominal value of min. I,OCK) roubles. governed by the charter. 
Foreign partners' min. capital contribution to the jv is 100,000 roubles. 
Financing Operations AccoWlt may be held in foreign currency and in roubles at the State Bank's 
foreign trade bank. Credits obtainable from these banks or from foreign banks. 
Accounting Principles Soviet regulations apply. Reserve fund built up from transfer of profits. 
Depreciation deductions as per Soviet state enterprises (Le., from profits). 
From 1991: provision for losses to be carried forward for 2 years. Changes in 
accounting procedures foreseen. 
Taxation Tax incentives: tax holidays for a "definite period" (Art. 32. decree 2.12.88) to 
jvs manufacturing oonswner goods. medical equipment and medicaments. 
science-intensive products of macroeconomic importance. Also jvs in the Far 
Eastern Region obtain tax holiday in first 3 years. Goods imported for jv 
pnxluction "may be subject to a min. tax or may be duty-free" (Art. 31. decree 
2.12.88). From 1991: issue of a list of approved deductible expenditure items: 
20% withholding tax to be applied to both parties' dividends. 
Transfer of Profits and Transfer of profits guaranteed. provided they have been earned in hard currency. 
Repatriation of Capital Art. 38. (decree 2.12.88) planed for partial convertibility of rouble. From 1991: 
establishment of an order of claims in the case of the liquidation of the jv. 
Sources: 
United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe (8 February, 1989). 
Department of Tntde and Industry (May 1990). 
Baker and McKenzie (April 1990). pp. 2 - 12. 
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Further amendments introduced in 1991 included more tax deductible expenditure items, 
the establishment of an order of claims in the case of liquidation of the joint venture, 
provision for losses to be carried forward for two years, and changes in taxation and 
accounting as well as the opportunity for Western companies to buy shares in Soviet joint 
stock companies.(10) These legislative changes intended to grant greater investment 
protection to the foreign investor and encourage Western companies to invest greater 
amounts of capital into the Soviet economy. 
HUNGARY 
Introduction 
Hungary was the second former CMEA country (after Romania) to issue legislation in 
1972, permitting the establishment of joint ventures on its territory. (1 I) Western response, 
however, to this joint venture legislation was very slow. The first joint venture was set 
up in 1973, followed by the second in 1974. The apparent lack of interest on the part of 
foreign investors may be attributed to the fact that decree no.28/1972 restricted joint 
venture operations to tourism and the services sector. Moreover, the foreign partner was 
required to contribute new technologies to help boost the joint venture's export activities 
and was limited to a maximum 49% shareholding. Consequently, in an effort to attract 
greater foreign investments, the Hungarian authorities introduced various amendments in 
1977, 1982, 1985 and lastly in 1988 which broadened the scope of joint venture activities 
to include production and banking and provided greater investment protection, tax 
incentives and easier procedures for registering the joint venture. (See table 7.4).(12) 
Although there have been several amendments since 1972, the subsequent paragraphs 
examine the most significant ones which occurred in 1985 and 1988. 
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Joint venture amendments since 1985 
Having already extended the scope of joint venture activities In 1977 to include 
production, the 1985 amendments introduced tax holidays and incentives to foreign 
investors (particulary in the field of hotels and production) and guaranteed profit transfers 
through the Bank of Hungary in order to promote joint ventures to foreign investors.(13) 
In 1988 legislation was introduced which granted extensions to tax holidays, more liberal 
rules regarding profit transfers (see table 7.4) and the possibility for foreign parties to set 
up companies with 100% shareholding as well as the opportunity of buying shares in 
Hungarian owned enterprises. These latest measures were once again introduced to 
encourage rapid growth of foreign investments in Hungary.(14) 
The latter amendments in the nineteen eighties as well as the flexible management 
structure and auditing rules resulted in the number of joint ventures increasing 
considerably. Consequently, from 1986 to the beginning of 1988 joint ventures increased 
from 50 to 102. The 1988 amendments which permitted 100% foreign shareholding 
produced an even better response. By mid-June 1989 the number of joint ventures rose 
to 420, by October 1989 to 600 and by the end of 1990 the United Nations ECE database 
had recorded over 5000 joint venture registrations. (See table 8.3)(15) 
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Table 7.4 Swnmary of Hungarian Joint Venture Provisions: 1990 
JVs since 1972 
Amendments 1977,1982,1985,1988 
Legal fonn Limited liability company. company limited by equity ratio shares. un1imited 
liability partnership, joint enterprise. deposit association. 
1982 jvs in custom-free zooes. 
1988 majority foreign ownership. 
1988100% foreign ownership. 
Scope of Activities and 1972 service sector only. 
Foreign Trade Rights 1977 onwards all branches of the ecooomy. 
1985 special tax incentives 10 aUrnct investment in production and hotels. 
Foreign trade licence granted by Ministry of Finance (application within 30 
days). 
Management Founders of all 4 forms of jv companies are assured similar management rights. 
No minimum Hungarian representalion. no special post for Hungarian natiooal. 
Capital Cootributioos Cash or in kind. Mu~ have 30% of equity capital in cash. 
Financing Operatioos Credit regulations same as for Hungarian companies. National Bank of Hungary 
approves conditions of credits from foreign shareholder. Jv in custom-free 
zones can draw credits everywhere. 
Accounting Principles Agreed by parties and regulated in the law. Jv specific depreciatioo rates. 
Hungarian law requires jv to set up risk fund (15% of annual profit). Social 
insurance cootribulions same as Hungarian finns. Employers' Sharing Fund: 
15% of annual profits. 
Taxation 1985: 40% lax on profits. Reduced taxation for jvs in production and hotels 
20% first 5 years, 30% in 6th year). Preferential field (e.g, electronics. 
pharmaceuticals. first 5 years tax free. in 6I:h year 20%). 
1988: Hungarian government can grnnt even longer tax holidays. 
Double taxation agreement in force since 1976. 
Trnnsfer of profits and Any hard currency earnings of the foreign partner can be repatriated through 
repatriation of capital the National Bank of Hungary. Upon jv ceasing operation. foreign partner's 
invested share repatriated through National bank of Hungary. 
~: 
United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe(4 July. 1986). 
Revesz F. (1986). 
Hungarian Ministry of Finance (I988). 
Baker and Mckenzie (April 1990) p.lO. 
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Joint Venture Provisions in the nineteen nineties 
Further amendments announced for the nineteen nineties by the Chairman of the Drafting 
Committee of the Hungarian Foreign Investment Law, Dr. Ferenc Madl, intend to provide 
a more liberal foreign exchange system. Companies should, therefore, be able to keep and 
use their foreign exchange earnings until such a time as convertibility is reached, and joint 
ventures should be granted automatic foreign trade authorisation with respect to 
convertible currency markets.(16) The aim, therefore, is to allow greater flexibility in 
foreign trade and to allow joint ventures, or wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, the right 
eventually to conduct foreign trade without state intervention through foreign trade 
organisations. 
In analysing the development of Hungary's joint venture legislation, the following 
observations can be made. Hungary was the first CM EA country in 1985 to introduce tax 
incentives and the possibility, albeit still limited, to transfer profits abroad as well as 
provide investment guarantees to foreign investors. The introduction of these measures 
resulted in the number of joint ventures increasing substantially. Finally, as with so many 
of its reform efforts, Hungary's successful joint venture amendments appeared to provide 
the example for other CMEA countries to follow (e.g. see table 7.3 - the Soviet Union 
introduced greater tax benefits and majority shareholding). 
POLAND 
Introduction 
Although foreign capital investments have been permitted in Poland since 1976 in the 
form of Polonian companies, legislation for joint ventures with foreign partners of non-
Polish origin was not introduced until 1986. Moreover, the 1986 provisions resembled 
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the Hungarian model rather than the legislation for Polonian companies. Amendments to 
the Polish joint venture provisions followed in 1988 and 1989 in an effort to attract more 
foreign investments. This resulted in the number of joint venture companies (excluding 
Polonian companies) increasing at the following rate: 
Date 
beginning of 1988 
June 1989 
October 1989 
June 1990 
January 1991 
Number of joint ventures 
13 
190 
400 
1,231(17) 
2,480 (see table 8.2) 
As the Polish authorities had gained some experience of foreign direct investments with 
; Polonian companies, the legislation for Polonian companies is examined in the 
subsequent paragraphs before discussing its joint venture laws. 
Polonian Companies 
On the 6th February 1976 the Polish authorities passed legislation permitting Polish 
emigres to make direct investments in the Polish economy (both corporate and individual). 
The aim of this legislation, besides improving cultural relations between Poles living 
abroad and the homeland, was to attract foreign capital.(18) Polonian activities were 
limited in the first instance to handicrafts, hotels, restaurants and other services (cf. 
Hungarian decree 28 in 1972) and required at least half of the foreign capital contribution 
to be in cash.(19) Amendments to the Polonian law followed in 1979 and 1982. The 
former permitted joint ventures to be set up between small Polish state or co-operative 
enterprises and Polish emigres.(20) In practice, however, no such joint ventures were 
established until the 1986 legislation had been passed. As part of the 1982 economic 
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reforms, a law was introduced on 6th July 1982, extending foreign company activities into 
the following areas: production, exporting of manufactured goods and importing of goods 
for use on the domestic market The 1982 legislation, nevertheless, continued to restrict 
foreign capital participation to small businesses, and required a minimum capital 
investment of 4 million zlotys to be paid by Polish citizens participating in the venture. 
Initially 50% tax was imposed on net profits and foreign partners were only permitted to 
transfer 50% of export earnings after imports had been paid for (providing the total 
transferred did not exceed 50% of the annual income after tax). Shortly afterwards, 
however, new tax regulations were introduced in July 1983 affecting Polonian companies 
only. Under the new tax legislation Polonian firms were required to pay 85% on their 
revenue and permitted to transfer only 25% of their export earnings. In 1985 the 
authorities also required the foreign investor to supply a minimum of $50,000 startup 
capital. 
According to the then head of Interpolcom (Polish Chamber of Commerce), whose views 
were recorded by the author during a research visit to Warsaw in June 1987, high tax 
penalties and severe restrictions on profit transfers were imposed on the foreign partners 
of Polonians because they had made very low capital investments and were making large 
profits at the expense of the Polish economy. By imposing these restrictions and 
penalties, the authorities were ensuring that some re-investment in the Polish economy 
was taking place. The viewpoint of Polonian companies was, however, that they were 
being severely penalised by the Polish authorities for their successes.(21) 
As a result of their experiences with Polonian companies, the Polish authorities preferred 
to issue a separate joint venture legislation in 1986 which was not intended as an 
amendment to the provision for Polonian companies. By separating joint venture 
legislation from the Polonian regUlations, the authorities wanted to attract foreign investors 
other than Polish emigres and establish new objectives which were to improve hard 
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currency earnings and increase exports through foreign know-how and technology, and 
capital investment.(22) 
Table 7.S Swnmary of Legal Provisions for Polish Joint Ventures: 1990 
IVs since 1986 
Amendments 1988 and 1989 
Legal fonn Based 00 1934 Commercial Code: limited and equity ratio slock companies. 
100% foreign ownership permitted. Subsidiaries not covered by jv legislation. 
Majority shareholding. 
Scope of Activities and All service and production. except any activity which would "endanger the 
Foreign Trade Rights slate's economic interest", harm the natural environment or endanger the 
stalc's security or defence. No foreign exchange permit required. 
Management Jv paJ1ners decide on organisation. Jv must have supervisory council: I 
member elected by workers of jv. 
Capital Contributioos In cash. including Polish currency obtained from the sale of foreign 
currency to a foreign exchange bank. or in kind, provided the property is 
transferred from abroad or purchased in zlotys obtained from lhe sale of 
foreign currency to a foreign exchange bank, or in Polish currency 
obtained from other sources, ego state obligations from foreign credits. 
Financing Operations Hard currency may be bought at any foreign exchange bank (no pennit 
required). Jv can purchase in hard currencies surplus of expol1 proceeds 
over import outlays obtained in previous fiscal year. Purchases of foreign 
currency up to 15% of remaining amount of profit for the previous fiscal 
year. Accounts held in foreign exchange banks in zloty and hard currency. 
Any accounts ill foreign banks require foreign exchange pennits. 
Accounting principles In lhe process of change. 
Taxation Three year tax holiday in certain sectors (detemlined by Ministry of Finance) 
can be extended by a further 3 years. COI'JXlrate income tax 40% tax de· 
ductible are investment outlays, donations for "socially useful purposes", export 
activities. 
Transfer of Profits and Repatriatim of profits is possible. Zloty profits are placed with Polish 
Repatriation of Capital banks and converted into hard currency al time of repatriation. 
Sources: 
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (4 July 1986). 
Baker and McKenzie (April 1990), pp. 2 . 12. 
Interpolccm (23 December 1988). 
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The 1986 joint venture provision 
The 1986 joint venture provision, like those published by other CMEA countries, limited 
foreign shareholding to 49% and gave no clear assurances for profit transfers. 
Consequently, only 6 joint ventures had been registered by 1987. Owing to this poor 
response, Poland followed the example of Hungary and introduced amendments in 1988 
and 1989 which permitted 100% foreign ownership, granted greater tax incentives and tax 
holidays, and improved profit transfer guarantees (see table 7.5). The effect of these 
amendments was similar to that experienced in Hungary and the Soviet Union. The 
number of joint ventures registered consequently rose from 6 joint ventures in 1987 to 
2480 at the end of 1990 (see table 8.2). 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Introduction 
Czechoslovakia first published joint venture rules in 1986 which were based on existing 
Czechoslovak company laws.(23) Joint venture activities were limited to industrial 
production only. Other restrictions included specific guidelines on financial and auditing 
operations, and management control by the Czechoslovak partner through majority 
shareholding. Moreover, no clear guidelines were published regarding the transfer of 
profits and application procedures were very long and bureaucratic requiring approval to 
be granted by the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and The State 
Bank.(24) 
By 1988 a new law was presented to the Czechoslovak parliament which came into effect 
in January 1989, granting tax concessions to investors as well as extending the scope of 
joint venture activities and permitting more flexible rules on the financial management of 
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the joint venture (see table 7.6). Despite these amendments, however, inflexible and strict 
rules continued to be applied to the management of the joint venture, requiring the foreign 
partner to participate in the management of production, sales and other activities. Finally, 
although some tax concessions were made, a 50% tax on gross profits was maintained 
which was still considered to be high by foreign investors. Whilst, therefore, the more 
favourable tax regulations, Czechoslovakia's stable economy and small debt repayments 
should have attracted foreign investors, the remaining inflexibilities and reservations about 
adequate provisions for the transfer of profits abroad and the lack of investment protection 
guarantees within the joint venture legislation caused the actual number of joint venture 
investments to remain small (see table 8.2: 7 in January 1988; 35 by June 1989). 
Joint Ventures in the nineteen nineties 
Following the political changes in 1989 in Czechoslovakia, joint venture amendments 
were introduced in 1990 which granted a reduction of the 50% profit tax, a two year tax 
holiday for certain joint venture activities (see 'taxation' in table 7.6) and majority and 
even 100% foreign shareholding. Moreover, proposals for hard currency auctions, 
enabling foreign investors to transfer joint venture profits abroad, albeit to a limited 
extent, were published.(25) 
These latter amendments as well as the improved political and economic climate in 
Czechoslovakia have had a positive effect on Western investments. According to table 
8.2 joint venture numbers rose from 120 in mid-June 1990 to 1600 by the end of that 
same year. 
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Table 7.6 Swnmary of the Legal Provisions for Czechoslovak Joint Ventures: 1990 
JVs since 1986 
Amendments 1988 and 1990 
Legal fonn Company limited by shares (to be replaced by equity ratio new law 00 joint 
stock companies). Equity associations. Czechoslovak physical persons to be 
allowed to set up jvs. Majority shareholding possible, including 100% 
ownership. 
Scope of Activities and Under 1988 foreign trade licence required. Activities in most sectors, 
Foreign Trade Rights except defence and areas relating to national security. 
Management Jv cootract to specify participation of partners in the management of 
production. sales and other activities. 
Capital Cootrihutions Cash or in kind. 
Financing Operations 1988: jvs not subject to Foreign Currency Plan. AccoWlts in foreign currency 
may be held at Czechoslovak or foreign bank. Credits can be obtained at 
Czechoslovak bank. or at foreign bank. provided Czechoslovak State Bank has 
granted pennission. 
Accounting Principles Financial management to be decided by jv in accord with the principles of 
Czechoslovak Jaw. 
Taxation 20% tax on earnings up to CKS 200,(X)() and 40% thereafter. Wages tax of 50% 
of total wages. 25% tax on dividends. Proposals for tax concessions: 50% tax 00 
gross profits to be reduced. tax holiday for the first 2 years. tax 
differentials. depending 00 the sector of the economy. 
Transfer of Profits and Repatriation of profits only possible if the jv has sufficient foreign 
Repatriation of Capital currency reserves. 30% of foreign currency proceeds have to be given to the 
State. Possible changes: profits to be made transferable through hard 
currency auctions. 
Sources: 
Kle;n (1989). 
Department of Trade and Industry (May 1990). 
Baker and McKenzie (April 1990) pp.2 - 12 
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BULGARIA 
Introduction 
Although Bulgaria introduced joint venture legislation in 1980, no amendments were made 
until 1989. On the whole, the 1980 joint venture law appeared to have been more flexible 
than for example the fIrst Czechoslovak or Polish laws, in that it permitted foreign 
majority shareholding, allowed joint ventures to engage in a wide scope of activities, and 
granted the joint venture the freedom to decide its management structure. It also offered 
reduced taxation at the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.(26) In practice, 
however, not many joint ventures were established - by the beginning of 1988, eight 
years after the introduction of the joint venture provision only 15 joint ventures had been 
registered.(27) Problems reported back by Western companies included interference from 
the authorities which made it difficult to control joint venture operations, and the slow and 
sometimes uncompromising decision-making process as a result of the unanimity clause 
which had to be applied to board decisions.(28) 
Joint Venture Amendments in 1989 
Although amendments in 1989 (see table 7.7) brought about improvements such as 100% 
foreign shareholding, tax holidays and exemptions, profit transfer through foreign currency 
auctions and more flexible rules regarding the management of the joint venture, joint 
venture i~vestments, nevertheless remained relatively small. According to table 8.2 the 
number of joint ventures rose from 25 in June 1989 to 140 by the end of 1990. Reasons 
for the relatively poor response to Bulgaria's latest joint venture provisions appeared, 
therefore, to be due to its poor economic situation, discussed in chapter 4, rather than its 
joint venture legislation. 
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Table 7.7 SWllmary of Legal Provisions for Bulgarian Joint Ventures: 1990 
JVI since 1980 
Amendmentl 1989 
Legal form Company of limited liability and joint stock equity ratio company. Majority 
foreign shareholding and 100% foreign ownership poSlible. but at least half 
of the staff mUlt be Bulgarian. 
Scope of Adivitiel and Production and services. Jv cootract pennits foreign trade activities. 
Foreign Trade Rights 
Management Detaib lpecified in joint venture contract. 
Capital Contributionl In C8lh or in kind. 
Financing Operationl Accounll in local currency and foreign currency. Credill granted by Bulgarian 
and foreign banks. 
Accounting Principlel Procedures for balance sheet and distribution of profits and losses defined in 
jv contract. Art. 115 and 116 of 1989 decree specify procedure for submission 
of books to statc authorities. 
Taxation Tax holiday for the first 5 years for activity in the free trade zones, 20% 
thereafter. Tax holiday for the first 5 years for jvs in high technology 
sectors (specified by the Council of Ministers). thereafter 30%. 15% tax on 
dividends. shares, interests. royalties, fees for technical services and rents 
in Bulgaria for foreign pcrsoos. Tax: exemption given to: import of raw and 
prime materials and equipment intended for production of export goods. 
dividends received if used to buy Bulgarian shares and bonds. and part of the 
profit given to Bulgarian cultural. research and educational institutions. 
restoration of historical monumentl in Bulgaria. and funds for relief to 
victims of natural disasters. 
Transfer of profits and Art. 120: hard currency profits may be transferred; also foreign currency 
Repatriation of Capital part of the repatriation liquidation quota. Exchange of currency is to be carried 
out through the Bulgarian National Bank. 
Sources: 
United Nationl. Economic Commission for Europe (4 July. 1986). 
Department of Trade and Industry (May 1990). 
State Council of the People'l Republic of Bulgaria. Decree 56 (9 January 1989). 
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ROMANIA 
Introduction 
Although Romania was the first CMEA country to publish joint venture provision in 1971, 
with amendments in 1972 and 1975 to rules on taxation of profits and the participation 
of Romanian economic units, no major amendments were made until 1990. Nevertheless, 
the initial joint venture legislation appeared to offer quite favourable terms permitting a 
wide range of activities, flexible sales and auditing rules and few restrictions on foreign 
capital contributions. Despite these apparently favourable terms Western investors, as in 
Bulgaria, found the unanimity vote at board meetings and the fact that the chairman of 
the board had to be a Romanian national very obstructive. (For details of joint venture 
dissolution owing to management restrictions see chapter 8.)(29) Moreover, the long and 
bureaucratic procedure for establishing a joint venture described in table 7.8 illustrates the 
three phases involved in the joint venture application before Romanian authorities granted 
joint venture approval.(30) These lengthy and rigorous negotiations were indicative of a 
tightly centralised system of economic management which inhibited flexible operations, 
and consequently rendered joint venture investments an unattractive proposition for 
Western investors.(31) 
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11 
III 
Table 7.8 
Foreig n 
Partner 
- -- - - - --
Application Procedure for 
Joint Ventures in Romania 
1 
nClotiations Romanian 
Partner 
- - - - - --
- - - - --
authorisation 
,iYeD by I FeaSl llIty ~tud;1 • 
for Joint Ventur negotiation. 
Planning 
Corn m is siol1 
(Ministry 0 
Finance 
Ministry of 
FT) 
-------------------
------- - -
New vers ion legal 
of documents advice 
approved by 
Council 
Min is t ry 
FI' of 
of 
Ministers 
approved by J 
I State Co uncil 
Decree autbori,inl 
Ihe Hnin! up or 
• join! venfure 
Source: Monkicwicz J. and Lebkowlki M. (1987), p97 
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Joint Venture Amendments in 1990 
Until mid-1990, therefore, Romania had the lowest number of joint venture investments 
. of all the former CMEA countries discussed in this chapter. Prior to the latest 
amendments in 1990, Romania had only five joint ventures remaining in operation, after 
four of the original nine joint ventures, established in the nineteen seventies and nineteen 
eighties, had ceased operations. (See chapter 8 for details of joint venture failures in 
Romania).(32) However, after the Romanian revolution and overthrow of Ceauscescu in 
1989, joint venture amendments were made in March 1990 (see table 7.9), the number of 
joint ventures increased from 5 in July 1990 to 1502 by the beginning of January 1991 
(see table 8.2). Improvements to the joint venture legislation included the possibility of 
100% foreign ownership, tax incentives and tax holidays, improved conditions for profits 
transfer, including the possibility for foreign investors to buy goods on the local market 
with local currency, for sale abroad in hard currency and simplification of the joint 
venture approval procedure.(33) Despite these improvements and the dynamic increase 
, 
in the number of joint ventures, however, the amount of foreign capital invested remained 
relatively low at the end of 1990 (US$ 128.7 million - cf. table 8.3), demonstrating a 
reluctance on the part of foreigners to invest large amounts of capital in the Romanian 
economy owing to their concern over Romania's potential for economic development.(34) 
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Table 7.9 Summary of Legal Provisions for Romanian Joint Venlures: 1990 
JVs since 1911 
Amendments 1990 
Legal fonn Joint stock companies or limited liability equity ratio companies. 
Majority shareholding and 100% foreign ownership is allowed subject 
to approval of the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Trade. 
Scope of Activities and Jv activities in most areas of the economy, except defence and drugs. 
Foreign Trade Rights Jv can export directly or through Foreign Trade Organisacion. 
Management 1 - 2 delegates from the Ministry of Finance are on the jv's body 
controlling its accounting activities. Unanimous decisions by jv 
partners: Romanian president and workers'represenlatives on Board of 
Directors. 
Capital Conlributioos Cash and/or goods in kind. 
Financing Operatioos Foreign currency credits from Romanian or foreign banks. All 
financial operations must go through Romanian Foreign Trade Bank. 
Jv can pay for jv sourced within Romania in 'Iei'. Employees can be 
paid in whatever currency agreed upon by jv. 
AccoWlting principles No provisions. Jv contract sets out principles. 
Taxation 50% reduction on profits reinvested for 5 yrs. First 2 yrs. tax holiday, 
with tax reductioos possible for Ihe following 3 yrs. Exact tax rates 
have nm yet been worked OUI. 
Transfer of profits and 8 % of the annuallei profits due 10 the foreign partner can be 
Repatriation of Capital transferred abroad in hard currency. Repatrialion of all hard currency 
of invested profils to be allowed in the near future. All transactions to 
go through Romanian Foreign Trade Bank. 
Sources: Romanian Minist!)' of Trade (decree 96/14, Appendix 10.1. 14 March 1990.) 
Department of Trade and Industry. (File 14,05.90). 
Business Eastern Europe (April 2, 1990.) 
United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (4 Ju1y 1986) 
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THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
Introduction 
Following the opening of the Berlin waIl, the Council of Ministers of the German 
Democratic Republic passed its first joint venture legislation on the 25th January, 1990 
which was soon superceded, however, by the first state treaty on German economic and 
monetary union on 1 July 1990. Despite being in existence for only six months, a total 
of 1,970 joint ventures (of which 95% were with West German partners) were registered 
during that short period.(35) In the following paragraphs the GDR's special status in 
East-West trade prior to January 1990 and its bearing on the development of joint 
ventures is discussed. This is followed subsequently by an outline of the GDR's short-
lived joint venture provisions of 1990. 
Joint Venture Provisions in the GDR before 1990 
As a result of the division of Germany after the Second World War a special relationship 
developed between the two Germanies on many levels, including trade. Consequently, 
the GDR was granted favourable hard currency credit terms, including the 'Swing' (an 
interest free credit facility) by the West German government which sheltered the GDR 
from the severe hard currency shortages experienced by other CMEA countries, notably 
in the nineteen seventies. Moreover, under the regulations governing Intra-German Trade 
and the special provisions granted under the Treaty of Rome, goods could be moved 
between the two Germanies entirely customs free.(36) These favourable credit facilities 
and trade terms led the GDR to seek fewer industrial co-operation agreements than other 
East European countries.(37) Moreover, the GDR did not permit any East-West joint 
ventures on its territory before 1990 because this might oblige it to accept 
German/German joint ventures, which would have been politically unacceptable under the 
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Honecker regime.(38) 
The 1990 Joint Venture Legislation 
The 1990 joint venture legislation (see table 7.10) resembled the initial joint venture 
provisions by other CMEA countries in the nineteen eighties, permitting only 49% 
maximum foreign shareholding (although exceptions could be granted to a joint venture 
in the form of an Aktiengesellschaft or public co-operations) which ensured East German 
control over small and medium-sized companies or larger capital investments by public 
companies. Moreover, joint ventures were to operate outside the economic plan, making 
it difficult for them to obtain supplies in the GDR market. Except for a tax holiday in the 
first two years, taxes and contribution to the reserve fund which were in accordance with 
regulations for GDR companies, left only very small profit margins. On the positive side, 
however, the system for repatriating profits was quite favourable as the exchange rate was 
set at 1: 1 for the East German Mark to the Deutschmark. In reverse, however, when 
exchanging Deutschmarks for cash inputs into the GDR market, the exchange rate worked 
to the foreign partner's disadvantage, thereby affecting the foreign partners' profit 
transfers. As for the length of time involved in obtaining approval for a joint venture, this 
took approximately three months as a general rule which was an acceptable time-scale for 
Western parties. 
A major disincentive, however, for Western partners were the regulations governing 
workers rights in a joint venture enterprise. Besides requiring the consent of the labour 
union for the approval of a joint venture, the existing labour and social security laws of 
the GDR were applicable in matters of employment and social security benefits; workers 
had the right of co-determination (Mitbestimmung), and the management was required to 
provide "social measures" in respect to workers' employment.(39) 
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Table 7.10 Summary of Legal Provisions of GDR joint ventures 
JV! since 1990 
Amendments Jv law phased out by economic and monetary union 
on I July 1990. 
Legal fonn GmbH (limited liability), AG (joint stock), general or limited 
partnership. Minimum foreign shareholding 20%, maximum 49%. Up 
10 3 mooths for approval of application by Slate Economic Committee 
or County Council (small jvs only). 
Scq>e of Activities and Dependent 00 ecooomic and regimal interest. but particularly 
Foreign Trade Rights high scientific-technical jvs, or providing modem high quality 
goods and services. effective envirmmental protectioo. Automatic 
foreign trade rights. 
Management Contract specifies partners' role in management. GmbH required one 
of the managing directors 10 be GDR citizen. AG: number of members 
on the Board dependent on shareholding. Transfer of jv interest had 
to be approved by all participants and GDR had right of first 
refusal. 
Capital Contribution Cash or in kind. Minimum capital stock of a GmbH 150,000 GDR Marks 
(approx. OM 50,000); of an AG 750.000 GDR Marks (approx. OM 250,000). 
No minimum capital required for partnerships. Foreign partners' 
share paid in hard currency. 
Financing Operations Accounts in hard currency possible with the GDR State Bank or with 
foreign banks. Credits for AG jvs granted in hard currency from GDR banks or 
foreign banks. No such credit arrangements for GmbHs. Employees paid in 
GDR marks. 
Accounting Principles Bookkeeping and accounts according to GDR rules. Balance sheet given in 
GDR marks and accompanied by a reconciliation of hard currency transactions. 
Tax holidays granted on1y by discretion of State Ecooomic Committee. Capital 
reserve fund sourced from income (10% of capital stock), and cultural. social 
and bonus fund financed from pre-tax income. GDR tax laws applied. 
Taxation Combined effect of tax laws: a rale of 98.5%1 
Transfer of Profits and Up to 50% of hard currency profits had to be offered for sale to the Stale. Any 
Repatriatioo of Capital residual hard currency income freely transferrable abroad. Exchange of GDR 
mark profits possible upon consent by State Economic Committee (applicable 10 
jvs in economic priority areas). 
Sources. 
SchlOsser (February 1990). 
Baker and McKenzie (April 1990). pp. 4 - 7. 
Schmidl and Wegen (Man: 1990). 
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Despite these disincentives for Western investors, the response to the GDR provisions was 
very positive, albeit mainly from West German companies. This was mainly due to the 
convertibility of the GDR currency and the ease with which profits could be transferred. 
As mentioned earlier, however, the joint venture law was barely published, before it was 
superceded by West German laws on foreign investment. As for those joint ventures 
established before economic and monetary union on I July 1990, they were transformed 
into West German forms with the help of special "adjustment" regulations. 
Future investors in the former GDR may choose henceforth from a variety of firm 
activities, including majority shareholding in a joint venture, the setting up of a 
subsidiary or branch, representations (no commercial activities pennitted), or short term 
business establishments which may operate for a limited duration.(40) 
CONCLUSION 
The data presented in this chapter demonstrates that all the CM EA countries became 
committed after 1985 to providing a legal framework for joint ventures in the East with 
Western partners. In all cases, however, the initial joint venture provisions were 
restrictive for the foreign investor either because of limits on foreign shareholding, sphere 
of activities or slow bureaucratic application procedures. Moreover, some Western 
partners complained about interference from state authorities and lack of tax incentives 
and profit transfer guarantees. Consequently joint venture numbers remained small until 
amendments were first introduced by Hungary which granted majority foreign 
shareholding, taxation incentives and guarantees for profit transfers and investments. This 
resulted in a rapid rise in joint venture investments. The positive response to Hungary's 
amendments encouraged other East European countries to introduce similar changes to 
their joint venture provisions in an effort to attract Western joint venture investments. 
Consequently, the number of joint ventures ha~e risen in these countries also, highlighting 
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the importance of flexible joint venture laws, tax incentives and speedy application 
procedures in attracting foreign direct investments. The positive effect of the joint venture 
provisions on foreign direct investments at the end of the nineteen eighties is discussed 
in greater detail in chapter 8 of the thesis which traces the rise in joint venture numbers 
and foreign capital investments. 
Nevertheless, although the former CM EA countries have made great progress in their legal 
provisions for foreign investors, there are still major concerns for foreign investors. These 
include the non-convertibility of their currencies and the system for transferring profits 
which have already been discussed in chapter 3 and 4 of the thesis. 
In conclusion, it seems, that the legal framework of joint ventures in the former CMEA 
countries has undergone considerable modifications, especially towards the end of the 
decade. The greatest change to the joint venture legislation in the former socialist 
countries has been the increase in the size of foreign shareholding permitted. Most 
countries have introduced legislation allowing up to 100% foreign sharholding. The 
political and economic changes which have accompanied these modification, however, 
have had the effect of liberalising foreign trade activities within the former Comecon 
countries. The combination, therefore, of flexible legislation, investment guarantees and 
a stable operational environment, seemed to have encouraged foreign companies to 
establish joint ventures in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
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CHAPTER 8 
JOINT VENTURES IN THE EAST: A LITERATURE SURVEY 
Having noted in ' chapter five the trend among the former CMEA countries to promote 
industrial co-operation as a way of overcoming longer term hard currency and debt 
problems, this chapter examines the development of Western joint venture investments in 
the former CMEA area from 1972, when Romania first permitted direct foreign 
investment on its territory, to 1990. The study begins by analysing the growth in the 
number of joint ventures registrations and startup capital as well as presenting the 
available data on joint venture activities and the extent of individual Western countries' 
participation in East-West joint ventures. This is followed by a discussion of Western 
trade policies towards Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union before and after 1989; 
and the possible effect of these policies on the participation of individual Western 
countries in East-West trade. Much of the statistical information presented in this chapter 
has been obtained from sources published by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe(l) which have been complemented by data obtained from government publi-
cations and the trade press. 
JOINT VENTURE GROWTH 
Numbers 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate the growth in the number of joint ventures in the various 
CM EA countries between 1972 - 1987 (the period of slow growth) and 1988 - 1990 
(period of accelerated growth). 
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Table 8.1 shows limited Western investment in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in the 
nineteen seventies (only 19 joint ventures by 1980). By the early nineteen eighties, 
however, as a result of a worldwide recession, hard currency shortages and debt 
repayment problems, the former CMEA countries began to promote Western joint venture 
investments during the fIrst half of that decade .. 
Table 8.1 Estimated Growth and Geographic Distribution of East-West Joint Ventures in European CMEA Countries, 
1972 • 1987. 
Year Bulgaria Cech. Hungary Poland Romania USSR Accumulative 
Totals 
1972 
1973 3 4 
1974 2 7 
1975 9 
1976 2 11 
1977 12 
1978 12 
1979 13 
1980 14 
1981 4 19 
1982 3 23 
1983 10 34 
1984 4 8 46 
1985 14 61 
1986 16 77 
1987 7 2 50 13 19 168 
TOTALS 15 2 111 13 9' 19 168 
Sources: Compiled from McMillan (1986) pp.2OO· 275 and United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe (1988). 
~ 
*Four of these joint ventures have ceased operations. 
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Consequently, the number of joint ventures increased from 19 to 77 joint ventures by 
1986 (60 of which were based in Hungary). Following Hungary's joint venture 
amendments in 1985 granting Western companies more favourable investment terms, and 
the introduction of joint venture legislation in Poland (1986) and the former USSR (1987) 
the number of joint ventures more than doubled between 1986 and 1987, rising from 77 
to 168 (see table 8.1). Moreover .. table 8.2 shows that joint ventures have continued to 
increase sharply between 1988 and the beginning of 1991. During the earlier part of that 
period (January 1988 to June 1989), the number of joint ventures rose mainly due to 
foreign equity investments in the former Soviet Union, Hungary and to some extent 
Poland, which experienced average monthly increases of 135, 19 and 10 joint ventures 
respectively. The more dynamic increase in the number of joint ventures in the former 
Comecon area, however, occurred from the third quarter of 1990 onwards when the 
average monthly increase in the number of joint ventures was 1,114 joint ventures. By 
mid-1990, following the political changes of 1989, all former European CMEA countries, 
except Bulgaria were recording a large increase in the number of joint venture 
registrations. The relatively slow increase in the number of joint venture registrations in 
Bulgaria, even after 1989, may be explained by the political and economic hardships still 
experienced in 1990 and the breakup of intra-CMEA trade. (See chapter 4 for discussion 
of Bulgaria's post-1989 problems, p.l04). By the beginning of 1991, therefore, the total 
number of joint venture registrations had reached 13,722, an increase of 8216% since the 
beginning of 1988. 
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Table 8.2 Foreign Investment Registrations in CMEA Countries (in number of registrauons and average monthly increase between dates) 
COUNTRY 1.01.88 1.06.89 1.10.89 1.03.90 1.07.90 1.10.90 1.01.91 
Soviet Union 23 700 1000 1400 1754 2051 3000 
Average monthly 
39 75 80 86 99 316 mcrease 
Hungary 102 420 600 1200 1600 3300 5000 
Average monthly 
19 45 120 100 567 567 mcrease 
Poland 13 190 551 1000 1550 1950 2480 
Average monthly 
10 90 90 138 133 177 mcrease 
Czechoslovakia 7 35 50 60 120 500 1600 
Average monthly 
2 4 2 15 127 367 mcrease 
Bulgaria 15 25 25 30 54 70 140 
Average monthly 
0.6 0 1 6 5 23 mcrease 
Romania 5 5 5 5 5 570 1502 
Average monthly 
0 0 0 0 188 311 mcrease 
Total no. of jv 165 1,375 2,231 3,695 5,083 8,441 13,722 
Average monthly 
71 214 293 347 1,119 1.760 Increase 
Sources: United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe tno. 2, July,1989J p.6. United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (no. 3 November 1989) p.3 and United Nations. Economic ommlssion for urope (database 1.01.91). 
218 
Table 8.3 Foreign Capital Invested in Joint Ventures in the Fonner CMEA Countries 
(in million US dollars) 
COUNTRY 15.10.89 1.03.90 1.07.90 1.10.90 1.01.91 Average foreign 
capital per jv* 
Soviet Union 1845.6 2362.0 2921.0 3208.0 4615.0 1.5 
Hungary 360.0 670.0 875.0 1020.0 1200.0 0.2 
Poland 80.0 110.8 186.5 290.0 306.0 0.16 
Czechoslovakia 85.0 98.2 152.0 340.0 850.0 0.5 
Bulgaria 74.1 0.5 
Romania 66.0 128.7 0.09 
TOTAL 2370.6 3241.0 4134.5 4824.0 7263.8 0.53 
NOTE: Values in national currencies converted in US dollars at current official exchange rates. 
*averages calculated with the help of joint venture numbers in table 8.2 
Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe DATABASE on Joint Ventures, (issued in February 1991). 
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Capitalisation 
Even until the late nineteen eighties there was still a lack of data available giving precise 
details about foreign capital invested in joint ventures, although in 1988 the United 
Nations "guesstimated" that approximately US $ 400 - 500 million foreign capital had 
been invested in East-West joint ventures in the CM EA area.(3) Since the rapid increase 
in the number of joint ventures, however, a databank has been set up by the United 
Nations which by the beginning of 1991 had recorded US $ 7263.8 million foreign capital 
investments in joint ventures, amounting to an average of US $ 520,000 foreign capital 
invested per joint venture.(See table 8.3) The average foreign capital participation in the 
individual East European countries, however, vary. In the former Soviet Union the 
average foreign capital participation has been the highest (US $ 1.5 million) and lowest 
in Romania (US $ 90,000). This relatively low capitalisation in Eastern Europe has been 
attributed to Western companies' reluctance to invest large amounts of capital, before 
being able to ensure a safe return on their capital, and the high proportion of service joint 
ventures (especially in Hungary and Poland) in relation to manufacturing joint ventures 
which have tended to require fewer costly capital goods investments.(4) 
JOINT VENTURES BY INDUSTRY AND ACTIVITY 
This section alms to discuss joint venture activities in the individual East European 
countries according to their activities. Despite gaps in the available data, the different 
sample sizes and dates of publication, the author has, nevertheless, been able to make 
certain observations about their activities. In the subsequent paragraphs the data is 
examined country by country, beginning with the former USSR, for which the most recent 
data has been available, followed by Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. 
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Soviet Union 
Table 8.4 gives a breakdown of joint ventures according to industry, Soviet and foreign 
capital participation. The data is based on a sample of 2050 joint ventures, published by 
the United Nations on 1st January 1991. According to the data, 50.2% (1029 joint 
ventures) have been engaged in manufacturing activities, followed by business activities 
(13% or 268 joint ventures), hotel and restaurants (6.4% or 138 joint ventures) and 
computer and related activities (5.7% or 117 joint ventures). Only few joint ventures have 
been established in mining and quarrying (7 joint ventures) or real estate (6 joint ventures) 
and finance (5 joint ventures). The highest foreign capital contributions, however, have 
been received by the financial intermediation sector (US $ 23.3 million per joint venture), 
whilst joint ventures in the hotel and restaurant sector have received only an average of 
US $ 200,000 per joint venture, followed by an average of US $300,000 per joint venture 
in education and an average of US $ 400,000 per joint venture in other business activities. 
By comparison, the average foreign capital investments in manufacturing joint ventures 
is higher (US $ 1.9 million). 
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Table 8.4 Foreign Investment Projects in the USSR, by Industry 
Statutory Capital 
ISIC Industry TOTAL FOR 
rev.3 mn SU mnSU 
code roubles roubles 
A Agriculture. 54.3 24.6 
~~r~~' 
B Fishin. ~? R 24.4 
C Minin~, 17.4 8.5 
D 3249.1 1215.9 
41 ~~rification 7.6 3.8 
wa'er 
F 166.0 80.0 
G Wholesale and 202.4 107.8 
re"; I trade 
H Hotels and 366.7 152.6 
I Transport. 85.8 39.2 
storage, 
J Financial 129.7 74.6 
. . 
70 Rp,1 p""p 17.4 R71~ 
71 Renting of machinery 19.7 9.5 
and 
72 Computer and 103.3 48.3 
rel.'~d ac';v;';es 
73 Research and 35.4 8.7 
dev 
74 Other business 164.8 73.0 
ac,;v;,;es 
M n.o 5.4 
N Health and social work 116.1 49.1 
90 S~wage and refuse 15.5 7.7 
92 Cultural and 88.7 40.7 
activities 
93 Other 2.2 1.0 
Other !) 47.1 16.4 
TOTAL 4948.9 2009.7 
.. AFe} = Average Foretgn Investment Capital per JOlOl venture 
1) Including activities not classified among industries 
E J G N 
mn US 
dollars 
41.4 
39.6 
15.1 
1930.6 
6.0 
110.2 
164.4 
244.8 
48.9 
117.7 
R?~ 
15.1 
70.2 
14.2 
116.1 
&.5 
79.4 
12.4 
64.4 
!.7 
47 .. 6 
3151.6 
Source: United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe (Feb. 1991).p.19 
Note: as on 1 January, 1991. Figures may not add la totals because of rounding. 
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No. of AFCI 
joint per jv* 
ventures L~~) 
26 1.6 
10 4.0 
7 2.2 
1029 1.9 
3 2.0 
94 1.2 
68 2.4 
138 0.2 
64 0.8 
5 23.5 
~ 17 
25 0.6 
117 0.6 
11 1.3 
268 0.4 
27 0.3 
46 1.7 
11 1.2 
85 0.8 
5 0.3 
to 4.3 
2050 1.5 
I _______ _ 
i Other data (see table 8.5) which is more detailed in terms of the sector suggest that the 
greatest number of manufacturing joint ventures are in machinery and computer industries 
}
(111 and 110 joint ventures respectively). By contrast very few are active in basic metals, 
p1achine tools (5 joint ventures each), coke, refined petroleum nuclear fuel, agriculture and 
{ .. 
. J forestry- mach:nery or textile machinery (4 joint ventures each) . 
• 
'-- -~- ---- ~-------- -- ------ ----_._-----
The largest foreign capital contributions, however, have been made to manufacturing joint 
ventures in the chemical industry (US $ 253.6 million) and electrical equipment industry 
(US $ 220.4 million), with an average foreign capital contribution per joint venture of 
US $ 3.9 million and US $ 10.5 in respective manufacturing industries. (See table 8.5) 
Manufacturing joint ventures account, therefore, for 61.3% of total foreign joint venture 
capitalisation in the former Soviet Union, whilst non-manufacturing joint ventures, mainly 
in services have received 38.7% of foreign capital investments. (See table 8.4) 
This recent sample confirms that foreign companies have invested predominantly in 
manufacturing joint ventures in the former USSR. These tend to be more capital intensive 
than the service sector (except for the financial sector), and account, therefore, for the 
higher average foreign capitalisation in the former Soviet Union. 
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Manufacturing Foreign Invesbnent Projects in the former USSR. by branch 
STATUTORY CAPITAL 
Table 8.5 
TOTAl 
ISIC INDUSTRY mnSU mnSU mnUS Number AFIC 
~;,~" roubles roubles doll"" per • 
,~ Fnnn ?~" 7R ~ '71~ 7R ,~ 
,~ n~n n~n o~n n n 
17 T. "'. '" ~ 71~ ,A , ? 
'R ill. .nnarel R70 ,'Lo "'~~ 7" 07 
,a I .,h ,« ? 11 ~ 
"''' " 
? , 
20 Wood & wood 137.6 58.5 93.5 60 1.6 
21 Paper. paper 52.5 24.2 38.6 10 3.9 
22 Pl!bl~shing, 69.2 26.7 42.9 51 0.8 
23 Coke.refined 76.7 30.2 33.5 4 8.4 
~~'~~ru~~, 
24 <?r~~i~~~s. 364.9 159.0 253.6 65 3.9 
,,,, R",;r 1701 7" 1 "oR ,Q ~1 
242 ?Jh~~ .~~~micals. 176.0 80.7 127.2 35 3.6 
,,,,, Uh 100 ,~ 0 717 0 ,~ 
2424 106~6 "07 7< 0 J? 6.4 
O,h 1\ '0< 10 ~7 11 n< 
2~ 1> .. h nl. lAon <47 ,run 29 1< 
7< N, _ 140< ~n~ 070 ,< , 7 
?7 Ra<;c mc'al, 464 17~ 2R~7 , ,7 
2R M, ., '<71 
'" 1 «, 2. 2.9 
29 ~~~neZ'w~~~ment 330.4 111.9 178.4 111 1.6 
291 Gen~al purpose 101.2 27.6 45.8 26 1.7 
292 Special PU~~h;rh' 191.7 69.5 108.9 64 1.7 
2921 Agriculture and 
fo~e<t'" . 13.9 
2.6 4.3 4 1.1 
70?? ,I. .70 
"" '" 
?1 7< 
2925 Food .processing 19.2 7.1 11.4 5 2.3 
2026 Text;!e 241 6~' ,n7 4 2~7 
Oth . 1\ 17 , , 7 716 ?1 , t 
30 Office equipment and 191.2 83.2 133.7 110 1.2 
computers 
• 
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Table 8 5 (continued) Manufacturing Foreign Investment Projects in the former USSR by branch 
II J2R.J 127.7 220.4 
32 Co~munica~~~hi('h' 155.6 63.7 90.7 
l'10 l'; L'; ?l 
"?O TV ,~; "1 '01 lA, 
l?lO TV TRrl;n 24 OR 1 ? 
n,h . n R77 '1 & "7 
II .. 1401 ~L& 97 ~ 
J4 Mntm &O? 1O? lQ.1 
35 Olh~r transport 21.5 4.1 6.1 
36 Furniture and, N " r 174.4 56.4 91.1 
l7 171 90 147 
n,l ?\ RR& &11 ., R 
TOTAL l?&Q 1 ""9 1930.6 
* Average Foreign Investment Capital per joint venture 
1) Including activities not classified in specific manufacturing ISIC group 
2) Including activities not classified among manufacluring 
Note: as on 1 January. 1991. Figures may nol add to totals because of rounding. 
Source: United Nations. (February 1991). p.21 
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21 
51 
, 
R 
7 
'1 
71 
17 
12 
72 
14 
'n 
10?9 
10'; 
1.8 
0, 
&, 
0' 
7' 
1 & 
LI 
0.5 
J.3 
1 1 
1 , 
1.9 
Hungary 
The data analysed in this section is based on a sample size of 178 joint ventures collected 
in the first quarter of 1989 when there were less than 420 joint ventures registered in 
Hungary. In this sample, 60% (or 108 joint ventures) were engaged in manufacturing and 
40% in non-manufacturing activities. 
Compared with Soviet joint ventures operating in the manufacturing sector, Hungarian 
manufacturing joint ventures have relatively low levels of capitalisation, constituting 35% 
of the sample's total capitalisation or US $ 92.2 million (see table 8.6). However, joint 
ventures engaged in financial services, hotels and restaurants, although fewer in number 
have received 48% or US $ 126.4 million foreign capital investment (see table 8.6). 
Average capitalisation for non-manufacturing joint ventures in this sample is, therefore, 
US $ 2.4 million. 
To conclude, it appears from this sample that Hungarian service joint ventures, especially 
in the hotel and restaurant industry, have received higher average foreign direct 
investments than manufacturing joint ventures. This is the reverse situation to that 
experienced in the former Soviet Union, where manufacturing joint ventures have received 
on average higher amounts of foreign capital than service joint ventures. 
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Table 86 Manufacturing and Service Joint Ventures in Hungary 
INDUSTRY US$ (MN) NUMBER % of AFIC' 
OF Jv. foreign 
caoitaI 
USS (MN) 
TOTAL 263.4 ~78 tOOo/" 1.5 
. of which: 9? ? tOR 1,0% 09 
Food tt, to 41% t? 
91 4 1.'% ?1 
.oo".i 4~ 7 17% 07 
J,. .. h~ 04 , O?% O? 
Wood .od wood 79 7 10% tI 
P.OP' .nd n.ne, t? 1 0,% 04 
.nd nrint;n. 17 ~ O~% 01 
Rt t? 1t% 07 
Rnhhe, .nd ni,";e, OR 1 0.1% 01 
Nnn_ tO.1 7 1.9% U 
R,,;e met.i, 0.2 2 O.t% Ot 
Me,.1 1.1 R 1.1% 04 
,nd I NEe. 5.5 n ?I'l! 04 
Office .nd ~.5 1 2.5% ?? 
LI 4 0.4% 01 
8.8 5 3.3% 1.7 
.. 5.3 3 2.2% 1.8 
Motor vehicles 0.5 I 0.25 0.5 
Other 1.6 I 0.6% 1.6 
1.7 4 0.3% 0.4 
1.9 3 0.7% 0.6 
. of which: 171 ? 70 65.3% 2.4 
Finance 79.0 ---- 30.0% -----
Hotels and 47.4 ---- 18.0% -----
Trade 10.5 ---- 4.0% -----
Heal,h 10.5 ---- 4.0% -----
and 7.9 ---- 1.0% -----
Other 15.8 ---- 6.0% -----
• Average Foreign Capital Investment per joint venture 
Sources: Composed by the author from data obtained from United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (no. 2, 
July 1989). pp 10 - 11. . 
Note: Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 
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Poland 
The data in this section is based on a sample size of 182 joint ventures compiled by the 
United Nations in 1989, and can be compared with the Hungarian sample because of its 
similar size and the fact that the data was published in the same year. According to the 
data in table 8.7 the majority of Polish joint ventures are operational in manufacturing 
(119 joint ventures) and have received the largest foreign capitalisation (US $ 20.6 
million). Capitalisation of Polish manufacturing joint ventures is considerably smaller 
than Hungarian manufacturing joint ventures (cf. US $ 263.4 million for 108 Hungarian 
joint ventures and US $ 20.6 million for 119 Polish joint ventures). The average foreign 
capitalisation for manufacturing joint ventures in Poland is US $ 200,000 compared with 
US $ 900,000 in Hungary. Moreover, whilst non-manufacturing joint ventures in Hungary 
received US $ 171.2 million (or 65% of total foreign capitalisation), Poland's non-
manufacturing joint ventures have received US $ 7.4 million (or 27% of the sample's total 
foreign capitalisation). The Polish joint ventures in this sample are predominantly active 
in the manufacturing sector (65%) and have attracted seventy-three per cent of the 
sample's total capitalisation. 
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Table 8.7 Foreign Investments in Poland. by Sector of Economic Activity 
STATUTORY CAPITAL 
ISIC SECTOR Total FOR El G N Number of • 
CODE mn PlZ mn PlZ mn US$ jvs AFCI 
Rev.3 
A Agriculture, hunting and 1421.2 821.1 1.3 4 0.3 
forestry 
B Fishing 169.0 72.6 0.1 2 0.05 
C Mining and quarrying 75.0 75.0 0.1 1 0.1 
D Manufacturing 25155.6 10358.0 20.6 119 0.2 
41 Purification of water 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 
F Construction 479.0 251.2 0.5 5 0.1 
G Wholesa1e and retail 1238.4 762.3 1.4 14 0.1 
trade 
H Hotels and restaurants 2657.2 1107.3 0.4 13 0.03 
• 
I Transp:>rt. storage and 325.4 187.0 ---- 7 ----
communication 
J Financial intennediation 50.0 25.0 ---- I -----
71 Renting of machinery 0.0 0.0 ----- 0 -----
and equipment 
72 Computer and related 114.5 75.3 0.2 3 0.07 
activities 
73 Research and 32.4 9.7 0.0 1 0 
development 
74 Other business activities 306.0 237.0 0.4 6 0.07 
M Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 
N Health and social work 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 
90 Sewage and refuse 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 
disposal 
92 Cultural and sporting 570.8 280.8 0.6 5 0.1 
activities 
Other 31.5 25.2 0.0 1 0 
TOTAL 32626.0 14287.4 28.0 182 0.2 
*Average Foreign Investment Capital 
Note: On I June. 1989. Figures may not add 10 totals because of rounding. 
Source: United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe (January 1991 database) 
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Bulgaria 
Infonnation about Bulgaria's joint venture activities is based on the data received about 
seventy joint ventures by Business Eastern Europe at the end of 1990.(6) According to 
the data (see table 8.8) Bulgarian joint ventures are mainly operational in machine 
building (21%), electronics (21%), followed by food and agriculture (10%), light industry 
(10%), chemicals (7%), consulting (5%), tourism (4%), construction (3%), and others 
(19%). Although the total number of joint ventures is relatively low compared to other 
East European countries (see table 8.1), foreign capitalisation is on average higher than 
capitalisation in Poland (compare US $ 500,000 average capitalisation in Bulgarian sample 
with US $ 160,000 in Poland and US $ 200,000 in Hungary in table 8.3). The 
comparatively sound level of foreign equity contributions is probably due, however to 
Bulgaria's 1989 joint venture decree which discriminates against joint ventures with 
shareholding of less than 49% and less than US $ 100,000 foreign capitalisation, whilst 
joint ventures with at least 49% foreign shareholding and statutory capital in excess of 
US $ 100,000 are granted a 30% rate on profit tax.(7) Although these restrictions have 
ensured a basic level of foreign capitalisation, they may have had the effect of keeping 
the number of joint ventures lower than in other Eastern European countries which do not 
have these restrictions. 
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Table 8.8 Joint Ventures in Bulgaria, by Economic Activity 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY NO OF JVS 
Machine building 15 
Electronics 15 
Food and Agriculture 7 
Light industry 7 
Chemicals 5 
Consulting 3 
Tourism 3 
Construction 2 
Others 19 
TOTAL 70 
Source: Business Eastern Europe (21 January 1991) p.19. 
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Romania 
Of the 1679 Romanian joint ventures recorded by April 1991. 1443 (or 85.9% of them) 
have been registered in foreign trade and services.(8) The remaining 14.1 % (or 236 joint 
ventures) are registered for activities in manufacturing. food processing. electronics and 
construction (see table 8.9). The very low proportion of joint ventures in manufacturing 
explains the small average foreign capitalisation of US $ 90.000 per joint venture (see 
table 8.3) as services and trade activities usually require less investment of capital goods. 
Table 8.9 Joint Ventures in Romania. by Economic Activity 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY NO.OFJVS FOREIGN 
CAPITAL 
Foreign trade and service 1443 -----
Manufacturing. food processing. 236 -----
electronics and construction 
TOTAL 1679 US$ 150 
(average 
per jv 
$0.09) 
Source: Business Eastern Europe (3 June 1991) p.173 
Czechoslovakia 
The data available on the activities of 52 Czechoslovak joint ventures has been obtained 
from Business Eastern Europe (26 June 1989 and 23 June 1990) and summarised in table 
8.10 below.(8) The majority of joint ventures (37 joint ventures) are engaged in non-
manufacturing activities. Manufacturing joint ventures. nevertheless. have attracted an 
equal number of joint ventures as the hotel and tourist industry (15 joint ventures each). 
the two largest sectors in the sample (see table 8.10). Although few details were available 
about Czechoslovak joint ventures at the time of writing. it is clear from table 8.3 that the 
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average foreign statutory capital per joint venture has been US $ 500,000. This 
comparatively sound level of capitalisation (compared with Romania and Poland's low 
capitalisation) may be explained by the relatively high proportion of joint ventures in 
manufacturing and hotel construction which usually require substantial capital investments 
compared with service industries (cf. Poland and Soviet Union). 
Table 8.10 Joint Ventures in Czechoslovakia, by Activity 
ACTIVITY NO.OFJVS 
Protection of environment 3 
Business services 6 
Hotel and tourism (incl. construction of hotels) 15 
Television and motion pictures 1 
Agricultural activities 4 
Research and development 3 
Services 5 
Manufacturing 15 
TOTAL 52 
Source: Business Eastern Europe (26 June 1989), p. 205, and Business Eastern Europe 
(23 June 1990), p.212. 
Despite the lack of compatible data for a conclusive comparison between the former 
CMEA countries, the data presented in the previous paragraphs permit the following 
observations to be made: 
a) The Soviet Union's manufacturing joint ventures have attracted the largest foreign 
statutory capital than any other country. The average foreign capitalisation of a 
manufacturing joint venture in the Soviet Union is double that of a manufacturing joint 
venture in Hungary (and 9.5 x more than in Poland). 
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b) Over 60% of the joint venture samples in the former Soviet Union, Hungary and 
Poland have been active in manufacturing, whilst in Czechoslovakia and Romania service 
joint ventures have predominated. Although the data on joint ventures in Bulgaria does 
not categorise them into manufacturing and non-manufacturing activities, the levels of 
capitalisation and the fact that a number of joint ventures are engaged in machine building 
and electronics suggest that a good proportion of them are likely to be in manufacturing. 
c) Poland's general low level of capitalisation (even in manufacturing joint ventures) 
suggests that Western companies have been reluctant to invest larger sums of money in 
the Polish economy because of its debt repayment problems. 
d) Despite the large number of joint ventures in Romania foreign capital investment has 
been low. This is attributed to the fact that large numbers of joint ventures have been 
engaged in trade and service activities. As explained earlier on in the chapter, service 
joint ventures normally have lower capital requirements than manufacturing joint ventures. 
Moreover, the unstable political and economic situation in the 'first half of 1990 acted as 
a disincentive to potential foreign investors. (See chapter 4, section 'Foreign Investment'.) 
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WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN JOINT VENTURES 
Introduction 
This section examines the participation of OECD countries. and in particular the 
participation of the G-7 countries (the United States. Germany. United Kingdom. France. 
Italy. Canada and Japan) in joint ventures based in Eastern Europe. Their level of 
investment is assessed by the number of joint ventures they are engaged in and the 
amount of capital they have invested in each of the former CM EA countries in Europe. 
Soviet Union 
Table 8.11 shows that the G-7 countries have founded nearly half of the total number of 
joint ventures (926 joint ventures or 45.2% of total numbers) and contributed nearly half 
of the total foreign capital (US $ 14.26.8 or 45.2%) in Soviet joint ventures. The 
following individual OECD countries have established the greatest number of Soviet joint 
ventures: 
Germany 
United States 
Finland 
281 joint ventures 
247 joint ventures 
183 joint ventures 
The largest foreign capital investments. however at the end of 1990 had been made by the 
United States (US $ 360.1- million or 11.3% of total foreign capital investments in joint 
ventures). followed closely by Finland with US $ 356.9 million (l1.3% of total foreign 
capital). Germany with US $ 346.1 million (10.9% of total foreign capital) and Italy with 
US $ 289.8 million (9.2% of total capital). 
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Hungary 
The United Nations' sample of joint ventures in 1989 (178 joint ventures) suggests that 
Austria established the greatest number of joint ventures (49 joint ventures) in Hungary, 
followed by Western Germany (37 joint ventures), Switzerland (18 joint ventures), the 
United States (11 joint ventures), Sweden (10 joint ventures) and the Netherlands (8 joint 
ventures). The largest foreign capital investment, however, was made by the Republic 
of Korea which invested US $ 95 million, followed by Western Germany (US $ 28.6 
million), Austria (US $ 28.5 million), Switzerland (US $ 18 million) and the Netherlands 
(US $ 9.8 million).(lO) 
Poland 
Western countries' participation In Polish joint ventures (see table 8.12) shows that 
Germany established not only the largest number of joint ventures (981 joint ventures, 
43% of total number), but also invested the largest amount of capital (US$ 108.9 million, 
38% of total foreign capital). Germany is followed by Sweden, Poland's second greatest 
joint venture investor, having established 256 joint ventures and invested US $ 32.5 
million; and the United States which established 214 joint ventures and invested US $ 
29.3. Overall foreign capitalisation, however, in Poland has remained small, totalling US 
$ 289.4 at the beginning of 1991. The largest average capital investments have been 
made by Israel (US $ 350,300), followed by the Netherlands 
(US $ 246,600), Japan (US $ 203,600), Switzerland (US $ 160,700) and Italy 
(US $ 147,()OO). 
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Table 8.12 Foreign Participation in Polish Joint Ventures 
COUNTRY NO. OF TOTAL *AFCI 
JVS CAPITAL (thousands 
(millions of of US$) 
US $) 
Germany 981 108.9 111 
Sweden 256 32.5 127 
USA 214 29.3 137 
Austria 200 22.0 110 
Great Britain 145 13.9 96 
Italy 131 19.4 148 
France 130 14.3 110 
Netherlands 108 26.7 246.6 
Switzerland 90 14.4 160.7 
Israel 20 7.0 350.3 
Japan 5 1.0 203.6 
TOTAL 2280 289.4 127 
* Average Foreign Investment Capital per joint venture 
Source: Table adapted from Pole Position (April 1991), p.6 
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Bulgaria 
At the time of writing only a few statistics were available, giving the breakdown of 
foreign joint venture investments in Bulgaria. Figures published in Business Eastern 
Europe at the beginning of 1991 (11) revealed, however, that the greatest number of joint 
ventures were established by Austria (16 joint ventures), followed by the United Kingdom 
(12 joint ventures), Italy (11 joint ventures), Germany (10 joint ventures) and the United 
States, France and Switzerland (5 joint ventures each). No figures, however, were 
published at the time of writing, giving the amounts of capital contributed by the different 
foreign countries. 
Romania 
A report in Business Eastern Europe established Germany as Romania's leading 
investment partner, having invested US $ 22.4 million by April 1991, followed by Italy 
(US$ 16.3 million), the Netherlands (US $ 11.5 million), Greece (US $ 10.1 million) and 
Switzerland (US $ 9.2 million).(l2) No data was available, however, for the number of 
joint ventures registered by these foreign countries individually. 
Czechoslovakia 
By June 1990 the data on Czechoslovak joint ventures gave only the number of joint 
ventures established by companies of different Western countries. Austria and Germany 
took the lead with sixteen and thirteen joint ventures respectively, followed by France (5 
joint ventures), the Netherlands (4 joint ventures), the United Kingdom and Denmark (3 
joint ventures each), Switzerland and Belgium (2 joint ventures each) and finally Sweden, 
Italy and Canada (1 joint venture each) as well as one multi-partner joint venture. As 
with Romania and Bulgaria, no statistical data was available giving the size of foreign 
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capital investments per country. 
On the basis of the data presented in the above paragraphs about foreign participation in 
joint ventures in Eastern Europe the following observations have been made: 
a) German firms appeared to have established the greatest number of joint ventures in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; 
b) Austrian firms seemed to be the dominant Western joint venture partner in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, where they often had the largest number of joint ventures; 
c) although Germany often established the largest number of joint ventures in the former 
CMEA area, it did not always make the largest capital investments. Nevertheless, it has 
competed favourably with other Western countries including the United States and often 
ranks among the top three joint venture investors (in terms of invested statutory capital); 
d) the largest average foreign statutory capital investment has been made by the Republic 
of Korea (US $ 30.3 million for one joint venture in the former Soviet Union and US $ 
95 million for two joint ventures in Hungary); 
e) the average Western statutory capital investment per joint venture has remained small 
in general, ranging between US $ 100,00 - 500,000, except for the former USSR where 
it ranged between US $ 1.2 and 2.2 million. 
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WESTERN INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
Introduction 
Having examined individual Western countries' participation in joint ventures based in 
Eastern Europe and the fonner Soviet Union this section discusses the influence of 
institutional support on East-West trade and industrial co-operation. The tenn 
'institutional support' is used by the author to refer to export credits and financial support 
granted by state or government organisations to their exporters and customers. The role 
of trade delegations, exhibitions and fairs which are organised by governments, and 
although important in maintaining good East-West trade relations, has, however, been 
excluded because they do not provide exporters with any direct financial supports. 
In the subsequent paragraphs, therefore, the policies of Western governments on 
East-West trade and the support given to firms engaged in trade with the Eastern bloc in 
the post-war era, and particularly since the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union are presented. The institutional support of the United States, the Federal Republic 
and the United Kingdom are referred to in particular because the United States and 
Gennany have played an important role in East-West relations in the post-warera(13), and 
the British government's recent support provides useful background for the study of 
Anglo-Soviet joint ventures in chapter ten. 
Historical Background 
Since as early as' 1917, it appears that trade finance has been used by Western 
governments as a political lever with the aim of achieving either "denial and leverage" or 
"export promotion" in East-West trade. (I 4) In adopting a policy of leverage, for example, 
governments release trade credits to would-be importers only when political conditions 
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set by the exporting government are fulfilled.(15) By contrast, however, when 
governments are committed to trade promotion, they undertake much of the risk of 
lending, thereby reducing the cost to exporters of financing trade which in turn makes 
their exports more attractive to importers.(16) 
In the following paragraphs the development of US and West European policies on 
East-West trade are presented with examples of both conflicts and co-operation between 
the United States and Western Europe. 
By receiving financial and economic help from the United States after the Second World 
War in the form of Marshall Aid and support in finding new markets in developing 
countries after loosing markets in Eastern Europe in the nineteen fifties (17), a number 
of countries, particularly West Germany, became financially, and to some extent 
politically, dependent on the United States. Consequently, there was little opposition to 
some of the US restrictive trade policies towards the former socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe in the early post-war years.(18) 
During the latter half of the nineteen fifties, following improvements to their economies, 
some West European countries began, however, to re-establish some of their old trading 
links with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This led not only to occasional 
conflict with the United States, which preferred to restrict trade and finance to exporters, 
but also with a number of other West European countries, which were competing for the 
same business in Eastern Europe. As, therefore, individual West European countries 
began to compete amongst each other for trade with Eastern Europe, they extended long-
term credit facilities and reduced the amount of cash for down payments. In 1958 in an 
attempt to limit competition among Western exporters, the United States tried to appeal 
to West European governments, asking them to adhere strictly to a five year period for 
official direct credits and guarantees, and demand from the former USSR at least twenty 
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per cent of the purchase price as a cash down payment for all imported goods. This five-
year rule, however, was soon violated by West European governments because they feared 
a decline in East-West trade as CMEA countries sought long-term credits from Japan.(l9) 
Britain was the first country to break the five-year rule, when in 1960 it responded to East 
European requests for long-term loans by introducing its "matching policy", a policy 
which committed the British government to match any terms of finance offered by any 
other foreign competitor involving long-term financing. The ECGD (the Export Credit 
Guarantee Department) also undertook to finance sales by foreign subsidiaries of British 
firms in order to improve its competitive position.(20) Whilst other West European 
countries (e.g. Italy and France) joined the United Kingdom in breaking ranks with US 
policy, West Germany continued to follow the US in denying trade and finance to Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union during the nineteen sixties. 
For a period in the latter half of the nineteen sixties the United States also began to 
change its policy on trade with the former CMEA countries. The aim of the new policy 
was to erode East European unity by intensifying rather than restricting trade relations in 
an effort to break up the CMEA.(21) During the Nixon administration in the nineteen 
seventies, however, when policies of detente were being actively promoted, the emphasis 
was rather on integrating the former Comecon countries more into the world economy 
through trade in an attempt to safeguard world peace.(22) The United States had, 
therefore, for a short period moved closer in its East-West policies to those of Western 
Europe. Following Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration and Soviet activities in 
Angola and Africa, however, public opinion in the United States towards the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe swung back resulting in a reversal of American liberal trade 
practices.(23) 
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Having supported American detente efforts and pursued its own 'Ostpolitik', a policy 
which aimed at reconciliation rather than confrontation, the Federal Republic was no 
longer willing to follow the United States' return to restrictive practices with the CMEA 
countries. Consequently, conflicts arose between West Germany and the United States. 
An example, of a major conflict between the US and West Germany over the former 
Soviet Union revolved around the construction of the Urengoi natural gas pipeline which 
provided Soviet gas to Germany. The Americans had opposed the gas pipeline because 
they feared that Western Europe would become dependent upon Soviet gas deliveries. 
The view taken by West Germany, however, was that oil and gas imports from the former 
USSR would spread their general dependence on foreign energy. Moreover, as their 
energy imports from the Soviet Union only amounted to 5% of their total energy imports, 
West Germany did not think that this would make them dependent on Soviet energy 
supplies.(24) 
Despite conflicting policies over East-West trade, agreement and co-operation have been 
achieved in two important areas. Since May 1982 the United States and European 
governments (mainly OECD countries) have agreed to adhere to guidelines set by the 
Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (first formed in 1978) 
which sets minimum rates (adjusted every six months) for export credits. This 
co-ordinated action between US and West European governments is also repeated in the 
Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export controls (CoCom) which was established 
in January 1950, mainly among NATO member countries. Within this framework, 
members agree to co-ordinate national export controls lists, designed to prevent the sale 
or transfer of technology which might pose a threat to national security.(25) 
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Western Institutional Support since 1989 
Since 1989 Western governments have been meeting together to discuss how best to 
support Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in their efforts to restructure their 
economies. This has led to several joint as well as individual initiatives by Western 
governments. although. as in the past. conflicts between the United States and some 
Western governments over financial packages and export credits have continued. In the 
subsequent paragraphs those areas in which joint co-operation has been achieved are 
summarised. This is followed by recent examples of divergent policies on East-West 
trade and export credit restrictions. 
(i) Joint Co-operation 
The first joint initiative came from the 24 member countries of the OECD. the Group of 
24 (which includes the European Community and EFT A countries. the' United States. 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Turkey) at their summit meeting in July 1989, 
when the Group of 24 (G-24) pledged to help East European countries (initially Hungary 
and Poland) in their efforts to create pluralist societies in their respective countries.(26) 
As a result of this meeting, the member countries of G-24 made the following funding 
available in 1990 which is presented in table 8.13. 
Despite, the tendency in the past by the United States to withhold financial support to 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, table 8.13, nevertheless, shows that the 
United States has made the greatest contribution of the G-24 countries (60.7% of all 
grants), followed by Denmark (22.2% of all grants), Switzerland (8.6% of all grants and 
Japan (4.7% of all grants). This suggests a softening in the United States' policy towards 
Eastern Europe and a rapprochement between United States and West European policies. 
The remaining countries in table 8.13 have made up the remaining 3.8% of the total grant 
figure. The United Kingdom has contributed the least out of the G-24 countries. 
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Table 8.13 Group of 24 Aid: Finn commitments by the Group of 24 to 
grant aid to Poland and Hungary, as from August 1990. 
COUNTRY GRANTS LOANS 
(mn ecu) (mn ecu) 
Belgium 3.47 ----
Denmark 106.9 ----
Gennany 1.4 ----
Italy 1.33 33.2 
Spain 1.0 ----
United Kingdom 0.3 ----
Austria 2.1 ----
Canada 8.4 ----
Japan 22.5 ----
New Zealand 0.05 ----
Switzerland 41.4 ----
Turkey 0.54 ----
USA 292.8 ----
TOTAL 482.19 83.20 
Source: EuroBusiness (5 April 1991) p.32. 
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Other international organisations which have been established to assist Eastern Europe, 
include the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), both of which are an arm of the World Bank. 
The IFC provides loans and risk capital for private sector enterprises operating in Poland, 
whilst the IBRD grants loans for financial reform, export development and environmental 
management. 
Encouraged by the G-24, the European Community also set up its own programme of 
assistance in 1990, called Phare (an acronym for 'Poland and Hungary: assistance for 
restructuring the economy') which initially applied to Hungary and Poland only, but has 
since then been extended to include Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Between 
1991 and 1993 the Phare programme is expected to grant 2 billion ecu mainly to support 
projects in the following priority areas: 
- supply of agricultural equipment, pesticides and products; 
, 
- removal of restrictions on exports from the East European countries covered by the 
scheme; 
- vocational training in all forms, but particularly in banking and financial services; 
studies of ways to improve the environment.(27) 
Other joint efforts by the European Community countries include the granting of loans of 
up to 1 billion ecu by the European Investment Bank to Hungary and Poland, as well as 
a total of 10 billion ecu from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), which was founded in 1991. The money from EBRD is to provide equity 
finance to private sector companies already established in the region which are interested 
in expanding existing operations and increasing their investments. EBRD will itself be 
able to have 30% of its investments in equities.(28) 
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Besides these joint projects individual OECD countries have established their own national 
grants and loan schemes. The British government, for example set up the Know-How 
Fund in July 1989 for Poland which now also extends to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union. The money from the Know-How fund is to assist 
British businesses wanting to invest in the long term in Eastern Europe and provides a 
grant of up to a maximum of £50,000 for feasibility studies and management training for 
East European business partners. The money from this fund acts as pump-priming for 
British business investments in Eastern Europe.(29) 
(ii) Conflicting Policies 
Although the above paragraphs indicate greater international co-operation and support for 
the economies in transition in Eastern Europe, the events leading up to the Group of 7 
countries' talks (members include the US, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom and Italy) in July 1991 are presented to highlight the tendency still, by the 
United States and the United Kingdom, to use financial aid as a political lever.(3!) 
The main dispute between the Group of 7 (G-7) in the run up to their meeting in London 
in July !99l concerned the request made by former President Gorbachev to attend the G-7 
talks as an observer, after having made a request to the G-7 countries for US $ 100 billion 
Western aid. The United States and the United Kingdom were opposed to former 
president Gorbachev's presence at the G-7 talks, as the United States in particular, feared 
that it would be harder for the G-7 countries to refuse the former Soviet leader aid if he 
were present. Moreover, President Bush had hoped to dissuade the G-7 countries from 
granting the former USSR this aid, unless certain conditions such as the implementation 
of plans for currency convertibility and further reduction in arms control were met by the 
former Soviet Union.(3!) This action was, however, rejected by Germany, Italy and 
France whose policy was to grant the request unconditionally. In the end these latter 
countries managed to persuade the other G-7 countries to allow Gorbachev to attend and 
248 
negotiate a financial aid package.(32) 
(iii) Export Credits 
In view of the former USSR's mounting debts, which were expected to reach US $ 75 
billion by 1992, and its repayments on US $ 15 -20 billion debts servicing, Western 
countries were forced in 1991 to reassess their guarantees to exporters to the former 
USSR.(33) Only the British government, however, decided in May 1991 to withdraw 
insurance on exports to the former Soviet Union.(34) The consequences of this action on 
the performance of British exporters to the Soviet Union were felt immediately, especially 
as the other West European governments had decided to continue granting export 
guarantees to their exporters. Thus in April 1991 for example, the decision by the ECGD 
not to grant export insurance cover to a privately-owned British company, initially chosen 
to build the £150 million British-Soviet Trade Centre in Moscow, resulted in that British 
company loosing the contract to a French contractor who was able to offer a more 
favourable export credit package, protected by Coface (the French state-owned credit 
insurance agency).(35) The importance of government supported export credits in East-
West trade is clearly illustrated by this example and may explain why other West 
European countries have been more successful in East-West trade and joint ventures than 
countries which withhold export credits.(36) 
Institutional support can also be measured in terms of guaranteed bank loans. Recent 
figures published by the European Financial Digest(37) in 1991 have shown that out of 
a total of US$ 41.2 billion bank loans to the former USSR, German banks have accounted 
for almost 25% (or US$ 11 billion) of the total loans. Moreover, 2/3 of the US $ 11 
billion have been guaranteed which illustrates German support for its exporters to the 
former Soviet Union. By comparison, French banks have the largest exposure of 
non-guaranteed lending at US $ 6 billion, whilst Japanese exposure is US $ 4.5 billion and 
the United Kingdom registered banks have lent US $ 4 billion, 80% of which has, 
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however, been backed by the British government. By contrast, American exposure at US 
$ 500 million is considerably less than any of the Western countries quoted here (by at 
least a factor of 8), which suggests that the United States has still been reluctant to grant 
guaranteed financial support.(37) 
CONCLUSION 
The rapid growth in the number of joint ventures during the latter half of the nineteen 
eighties has occurred for two main reasons. Favourable joint venture tenns were 
introduced by all fonner CMEA countries by 1989 and radical political changes in these 
countries in 1989 enabled them to introduce measured aimed at liberalising trade relations 
with the West. 
Despite the high number of joint venture registrations, the amount of equity capital 
invested by Western companies in the fonner CMEA area has, nevertheless, remained 
relatively low, particularly in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. This suggests, that Western 
companies still consider equity investments in Eastern Europe to be risky, and has resulted 
in a greater number of non-capital intensive joint ventures in the poorer East European 
countries. 
The need for financial aid has, however, been recognised by Western countries, including 
the United States, and joint organisations have, therefore, been set up to co-ordinate 
policies and resources in an effort to assist these economies in becoming market 
economies and encourage further investments by Western companies. The influence of 
institutional support on a country's export perfonnance is reflected not only in the trade 
figures, but also in joint venture investments. Consequently, the consistently strong 
representation of Gennan companies in East-West joint ventures (as well the Federal 
Republic having the highest trade turnover with the fonner CMEA countries out of all the 
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G-7 countries) suggests that the Federal Republic grants its exporters to Eastern Europe 
greater institutional support than any other West European country. By comparison, it 
appears that the United Kingdom has been more conservative in granting institutional 
support to its exporters to the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. This has 
resulted in trade contracts being lost to other West European competitors, and may also 
account for Britain often lagging behind Austria, France and Italy in the number of joint 
venture investments. The United States, on the other hand, has managed despite its 
restrictive trade policies towards the former USSR and Eastern Europe to participate as 
actively in joint ventures in Eastern Europe as the Federal Republic of Germany, 
particularly in the former Soviet Union and Poland, both in terms of numbers and invested 
capital. Moreover, American participation in joint international organisations and 
meetings, set up to provide aid to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
nevertheless demonstrates concern and a commitment to extending support to the former 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe in their effOlts to restructure their economies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CASE HISTORIES OF EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES 
IN THE EAST: 1986 - 1989 
INTRODUCTION 
Following a research visit to Hungary in June 1986 to study companies' responses to the 
1985 joint venture amendments, the author came to a number of conclusions which led 
to the collection of the early case studies. These conclusions have been listed below: 
(i) the positive joint venture amendments in 1985 suggested that joint 
ventures were being promoted as a foreign trade activity by the 
Hungarians; 
(ii) the increase in the number of joint ventures, as a consequence of the 
1985 amendments (from 46 in 1984 to 77 in 1987 - table 8.1), illustrated 
Western companies' growing interest in East-West joint venture activities; 
(iii) the subject of East-West joint ventures had remained relatively under-
researched because of the low numbers of East-West joint ventures prior 
to the nineteen eighties, in the CMEA area (19 joint ventures in total - see 
table 8.1).(1) 
Consequently, the author decided to extend her research and add new data to the subject 
of East-West joint ventures, by focussing on Western company experiences in the CMEA 
area and presenting the data in the form of case studies. The subsequent sections describe 
the aims and objectives of the first case studies, the methodology employed to obtain the 
information and some of the difficulties encountered during the research. This is then 
followed by the case study collection and a summary of the findings. 
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Aims 
The aims of the fIrst case study collection were to provide practical illustrations of 
East-West joint ventures in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, to present 
Western fIrms' views of their joint venture experiences, and to obtain views of companies 
from more than one Western country about joint ventures in the former CMEA area. 
Objectives 
Having identifIed certain issues of particular relevance and importance for joint ventures 
in chapter two-and in the literature search on East-West joint ventures in chapter 8, the 
objectives of the case study material were to obtain information on the following: 
- the type of joint venture model chosen by the partners; 
- the amount of statutory capital invested by the Western partner; 
- the location of the joint venture (country, area); 
- the extent of the Western partners' business experience in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union before participating in the joint venture; 
- the length of time the joint venture had been operational (in the case of the Soviet 
Union, whether it was already operational); 
- the activities of the joint venture (e.g., service, manufacturing); 
- the Western firm's reasons for entering into a joint venture with a Soviet or East 
European partner; 
- the Western firm's opinions of their partners' motivations for entering into a joint 
venture with them; 
- the contributions made by the partners to the joint venture; 
- the markets for the joint venture activities (i.e., based in the East European country, 
Soviet Union or third countries); 
- the percentage of hard currency sales; 
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- the degree of countertrade business involved; 
- Western firms' views of any operational difficulties as a result of legislative restrictions; 
- Western firms' views of management and control of the joint venture (particularly in 
view of the fact that only the shared and dominant East European joint venture models 
existed). 
Method 
The author chose to obtain the case study material by interviewing a sample of companies 
from several West European countries, using a structured questionnaire for the interview. 
Once the interview had been completed, the company received a written version of the 
case study for comment. In the subsequent paragraphs the reasons for choosing the 
structured interview technique in obtaining the case study material, the choice of 
companies selected for the interviews and the difficulties encountered during the field 
research are presented. 
a) Structured interviews 
Structured interviews were conducted with a selection of Western firms because: 
(i) it seemed an appropriate technique for collecting detailed case study 
information from a relatively small number of joint ventures; 
(ii) the structured interview method enabled comparative data to be 
obtained, through the use of standard questions; 
(iii) the structured interview allowed some flexibility, without becoming 
unfocussed; 
(iv) by conducting a personal interview with the companies, the companies 
were able to overcome any suspicions they might have had about the 
author's motives for obtaining information about their joint venture 
activities;(2) 
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b) Company selection 
One of the aims of the research was to provide case studies from more than one West 
European country. Consequently, besides the three British firms actively engaged in joint 
ventures at the time, companies in West Germany, Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United States were contacted by a letter introducing the author, her 
research project and requesting their contribution to the area of research by participating 
in a structured interview with the author, or by filling in the questionnaire (see appendix 
1). Where the letter was sent to French and German-speaking countries, the letter was 
translated into the target language in order to maximise responses. Owing to the non-
availability of total joint venture numbers, or a list of company names, 25 companies were 
selected according to: 
(i) press reports which named Western companies engaged in joint venture 
activities; 
(ii) their nationality, so as to include a mix of nationalities; 
(iii) their size, choosing medium to large sized companies because they 
were considered more likely to be engaged in manufacturing activities, 
requiring greater capital investment and reliance on labour and supplies in 
Eastern Europe, rather than the small service joint ventures which 
predominated in Hungary and were less complex operations. 
Of the 25 companies contacted, eight companies agreed to be interviewed, including one 
French company, only considering the joint venture option (and which has been excluded 
from the case studies because it did not enter into a joint venture partnership), and two 
Austrian companies which could not be visited by the author, but returned the interview 
questionnaire and have, therefore, been included in this sample. Although the results of 
eight companies are included in this collection, the case studies give information about 
nine joint ventures (APV Paracal is engaged in two joint ventures in Hungary and 
Bulgaria) as well as other industrial co-operation agreements in the former CMEA area 
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(see Schwarzkopf and Adidas). 
c) Difficulties 
The difficulties encountered during the first field research included the non-availability 
of information relating to the total number of joint ventures and who the Western partners 
were, engaged in this type of activity. Moreover, the phenomenal increase in the numbers 
of joint ventures did not come to light until databanks were set up in 1989 to update and 
keep pace with the growing numbers. Other difficulties included financial as well as time 
constraints in interviewing companies outside the United Kingdom. 
As a result of the rapid changes in Eastern Europe the author decided to up-date the 
existing case studies at the end of 1990 by contacting the participating firms in the case 
studies by letter to see if any of the information provided between 1986 and 1988 had 
changed. Owing to a poor response at the beginning of 1991 (only Siemens replied), the 
author contacted the Western firms again by telephone at the beginning of 1992 obtaining 
additional up-dated information which has been included in the case studies below. 
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CASE STUDIES (1986 - 1988) 
Introduction 
The case studies are presented under headings which relate to the questions put to the 
companies interviewed (see appendix 1 for example of questionnaire) and provide 
information on the following: 
(i) the Western company's background and experience in East European 
markets; 
(ii) the Western company's equity shareholding and the type of joint 
venture model; 
(iii) the Western partners' statutory capital contributions; 
(iv) the activities of the joint venture; 
(v) the joint venture's markets or outlets; 
(vi) both partners' objectives for entering into the joint venture agreement; 
(vii) the contributions made to the joint venture by the partners; 
(viii) the management and control of the joint venture activities; 
(ix) quality control; 
(x) profit transfer for the Western partner. 
Additional information obtained as interviews sometimes exceeded the boundaries of the 
questionnaire has also been included where applicable, and all up-dated information is 
presented, where applicable, at the end of each case study. 
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Sequence of Case Studies 
The case studies in this chapter appear in the order outlined below: 
United Kingdom: Waiters International Ltd. 
Federal Republic 
of Germany: 
Austria: 
APV Paracal 
Rank Xerox 
Siemens 
Schwarzkopf 
Adidas 
Bramac 
Voith AG 
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United Kingdom 
1. WaIters International: Hungary Shared Joint Venture 
(49:51 equity shareholding by Waiters International and Videoton respectively) 
Statutory capital 
Company Background: 
£500,000 
£1 million 
in 1985 
in 1986 
The British company was a medium sized company based in High Wycombe, specializing 
in the manufacture of matrix printers for use with computer systems. Despite the fact, 
that it had no previous experience of trading in the CMEA area, Waiters International was 
the first British company to set up a joint venture in 1985 in Hungary. 
As neither partner had previous trade contacts with each other, it was decided to set up 
a licensing agreement first so that the production of computer printers could begin as early 
as 1984 whilst joint venture negotiations were in progress. This gave both partners the 
opportunity of working together before being committed to each other by a joint venture, 
and enabled production to begin immediately. 
Joint Venture Activities: 
The joint venture manufactures matrix printers under licence by Waiters International and 
carries out joint research and development for product improvements. 
Markets: 
The joint venture supplies the Hungarian market through which it also attempts to sell to 
other East European countries, namely Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Some of the work 
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resulting from the partners joint research and development has been built into WaIters 
International's own designs which have helped to improve the marketing and sales 
potential of Waiters International products on Western markets. 
Motivation of Waiters International: 
The main reason for wanting to set up a joint venture with a Hungarian partner has been 
to extend the product life cycle of the matrix printers and to take advantage of new 
technology developed by the joint venture. Access to new markets was also mentioned. 
Motivation of Videoton: 
According to WaIters International the main motivation of the East European partners was 
to obtain WaIter's licence and initial know-how which would help them to develop and 
expand their range of computer peripherals. 
Partner Contributions to the Joint Venture 
WALTERS INTERNATIONAL VIDEOTON 
licence manufacturing premises 
manufacturing know-how technical personnel 
capital investment research and development 
technical personnel managerial personnel 
sales and marketing know-how 
Management and Control: 
Management decisions are reached jointly by both partners and WaIters International is 
satisfied with the management structure of the company. 
Quality Control: 
Quality control of the Videoton built computer printers is carried out by Hungarian 
engineers who are trained at WaIters International's plant in the United Kingdom. The 
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western partner is very satisfied with the Hungarian engineers' abilities to carry out 
quality control. 
Profit Transfer: 
Waiters International are satisfied with the arrangements and guarantees by the Bank of 
Hungary for the transfer of their share of the profits. As part of the joint venture 
arrangement, the British company is involved in a buy-back arrangement of some product 
items and components which are then sold on Western markets. 
Update on Waiters International (1992) 
After a couple of unsuccessful attempts at receiving updated information on this 
Hungarian joint venture, the author discovered that Waiters International had gone into 
receivership in January 1992. Consequently, the author contacted Videoton in the UK. 
According to their information, the joint venture had been bought by another company, 
suggesting that Waiters International's and perhaps also Videoton's shareholding had been 
taken over by the purchaser. The author tried to confirm this, by telephoning Walton in 
Budapest, but was informed that the company had moved addresses. 
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2.APV Paracal: Hungary Shared loint Venture 
(49:51 equity shareholding between British and Hungarian partners: 
25% APV International, 24% APV Paracal, 21 % Tatbanya Colliery, 20% GEPSZEV, 
10% Komplex foreign trade organisation.) 
Statutory Capital not divulged 
Company Background: 
APV Paracal is a multinational company based in Crawley, a manufacturer of plant and 
equipment for the food and pharmaceutical industries. It has been trading with Eastern 
Europe since 1967. APV had co-operated with its joint venture partners before registering 
the joint venture through sub-contracting agreements for the manufacture of components 
for dairy machinery. Other co-operation agreements with its Hungarian partners included 
the building and equipping of food processing plants for Hungarian and other former 
CMEA customers. These industrial co-operation agreements involved many countertrade 
deals through which APV agreed to receive payment by delivery of Hungarian made 
machine tools and other industrial products. 
loint Venture Activities: 
The joint venture supplied and installed food-processing equipment in Hungary for forint 
and in other former Comecon countries for hard currency. 
Motivation of APV: 
The British partners' objectives in entering a joint venture agreement has been to 
consolidate existing trade relations, strengthen APV's market position in Hungary as well 
as gain access to other CM EA markets and reduce payment by countertrade goods because 
the profit transfer guarantees enable APV to transfer its hard currency profits to the parent 
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company. 
Motivation of Hungarian Partners: 
According to APV the partners were primarily interested in gaining access to their 
technology and know-how as well as having the opportunity to sell in other markets for 
hard currency. 
Markets: 
... "" Supply and engineering contracts are carried out mainly in Hungary,,(other East European 
countries including Yugoslavia. The joint venture has also been looking to expand into 
the Austrian market. 
Contributions to the Joint Venture' 
APV HUNGARIAN PARTNERS 
technology technical staff 
technical know-how market access 
marketing know-how manufacturing premises 
capital raw matelials 
low cost labour 
Management and Control: 
APV is satisfied with the joint management of the joint venture and expressed full 
confidence in the management expertise of its Hungarian partners. 
Quality Control: 
Hungarian technical staff are considered to be highly skilled and motivated, but to ensure 
APV's technical know-how is transferred and implemented successfully to its Hungarian 
partners, regular exchanges of technical staff take place which also ensures that effective 
quality control is achieved. 
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Profit transfer: 
Through the profit transfer guarantees granted by the Hungarian authorities, APV has been 
able to reduce its receipt of countertrade goods for payment and transfer its hard currency 
earnings through the Bank of Hungary. 
Update: APV Hungary (April 1992) 
Since 1986, the British partner increased its shareholding from 49% to 60%, leaving the 
Hungarian partners with a 40% shareholding. Consequently, the joint venture capital has 
increased to 25 million forints. Owing to the improved joint venture provisions in 
Hungary, the joint venture has expanded its activities to include manufacturing of 
equipment and machinery for the food processing and dairy industry. The joint venture's 
markets remain the same, mainly in Hungary and other East European countries. 
3.APV: Bulgaria Shared Joint Venture 
(55:45 equity shareholding by APV and Bioinvest respectively: 
counted as shared joint venture model because Managing Director had to be Bulgarian 
national.) 
Statutory capital invested £120,000 in 1985 
Company Background: 
See details above. 
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Joint Venture Activities: 
The joint venture is engaged in offering engineering and consultancy services In 
biotechnology, refrigeration, air-conditioning and food engineering. 
Markets: 
The joint venture is mainly active in the Bulgarian market, but sells to other socialist 
countries in hard currency. 
Motivation of APV: 
An opportunity to invest in the bio-technology market in Bulgaria. 
Motivation of Bioinvest 
According to APV the motivation of the East European partner has been to gain access 
to Western technology and hard currency markets. 
Contributions to the Joint Venture 
APV BIOINVEST 
technology technical personnel 
marketing know-how knowledge of the local market 
capital local resources 
Management and Control: 
Despite the 55:45 shareholding in APV's favour, there have been problems with control 
and decision-making in the management of the joint venture. Unofficially, there seemed 
to be more bureaucratic state interference in the joint venture than in Hungary which has 
affected APV's control of the joint venture and slowed down management decisions. 
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Quality Control: 
At the beginning of the joint venture, it was difficult to find adequately trained Bulgarian 
technical personnel to employ. This meant that technology was not being transferred 
effectively to the joint venture which has affected the quality of the services of the joint 
venture. 
Update: APV Bulgaria (April 1992) 
There had been no changes to this joint venture since 1987, but the company implied that 
its Bulgarian partner, Bioinvest, was in the process of becoming privatised. Consequently, 
the future of the joint venture looked unsure. 
4.Rank Xerox: Soviet Union Shared loint Venture 
(49:51 equity shareholding by the British and Soviet partners) 
Statutory capital £150,000 - £250,000 
Company Background: 
Rank Xerox is a multinational company manufacturing and assembling business 
equipment. It has been active in East European markets since 1968 and has established 
a market presence in Eastern Europe and the USSR as a supplier of copying machines. 
Rank Xerox negotiated a joint venture in 1988 (which became operational in 1989) with 
a view to setting up a second joint venture subsequently. 
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Joint Venture Activities: 
The first joint venture consisted of a series of copy shops which provide photocopying 
services locally as well as copying materials from Russian archives. Subject to the 
agreement of the Soviet authorities Rank Xerox hoped to set up a second joint venture 
which would manufacture and assemble copiers. 
Some difficulties: 
At the beginning Rank Xerox had hoped to set up joint venture which would have 
included the activities of the first and the potential second joint venture, but having to 
negotiate with two separate Soviet ministries for one joint venture proved too difficult 
because of non-communication between the two ministries. Consequently, Rank Xerox 
settled for the registration of one joint venture with a view to registering the second one 
later. In this way, Rank Xerox managed to overcome bureaucracies created by Soviet 
ministries. 
Markets: 
The joint venture sells business equipment to the former Soviet and East European 
markets, although the Soviet partners in the joint venture are seeking to gain access to 
hard currency markets outside Eastern Europe. The responsibility for the export market, 
however, rests with the Soviet partners. The partners have managed to harmonise their 
different objectives by agreeing the following. Rank Xerox provides the equipment, 
know-how to the former Soviet market, whilst the Soviet partners copy the archives which 
are sold on Western markets. 
Motivation of Rank Xerox: 
The company's main reason for setting up a joint venture has been to expand and protect 
its market share as well as establish further business contacts. Of considerable importance 
has also been the Soviet partner's interest in forming a joint venture with Rank Xerox. 
272 
Motivation of Soviet Partners: 
The Soviet partners have been greatly motivated by the possibility of gaining access to 
Rank Xerox's distribution channels in the West, achieving import substitution through the 
joint venture, possibly expanding its hard currency exports as well as gaining access to 
newer technology and know-how. Although of lesser importance, the partners also value 
the training of technical personnel which is carried out by Rank Xerox, and the acquisition 
of Western management 'skills. 
Contributions to the joint venture 
RANK XEROX SOVIET PARTNER 
capital equipment (machines) fixed assets (premises, etc.) 
technical personnel technical personnel 
managerial personnel managerial personnel 
licences direct labour (machine operators, 
workers, service technicians for 
machines) 
know-how 
up-to-date technology 
modem management techniques 
materials for setting up assembly 
(parts and components) 
Management and Control: 
Equal numbers of partners are present on the board of directors, and although the 
chairman of the board is a Soviet citizen Rank Xerox is content with the management of 
the joint venture. 
Quality Control: 
Rank Xerox has insisted that the responsibility for quality control lies with them and not 
their Soviet partner. This has been written into the contract. 
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Profit transfer: 
At the time of the interview the Soviet joint venture legislation did not contain any profit 
transfer guarantees. The joint venture was based, therefore on a countertrade deal, 
whereby Rank Xerox was paid back in parts. In addition, prior to 1990 Rank Xerox was 
able to repatriate profits by purchasing goods for roubles on the Soviet market (e.g. wood) 
which it then sold to associated industries in the West. Purchasing goods in roubles were, 
however, no longer permitted during 1990 and 1991. (See comments by Anglo-Soviet 
joint ventures on this ban, company numbers 3 and 4, under 'Repatriation of profits') 
Other issues: 
- Rank Xerox has obtained special clauses in the contract which protect the rights of Rank 
Xerox staff based in the Soviet Union. 
- At the time of the interview in 1988 Rank Xerox did not think that Soviet joint venture 
provisions had been disadvantageous for foreign investors, but needed improving. 
Update: Rank Xerox (1991) 
The 1989 joint venture proved to be a commercial success and is now wholly-owned by 
Rank Xerox. It has expanded its operations through the opening up of new copy shops 
which offer similar services as the joint venture did previously. The company is however, 
developing a new distribution system and is recruiting new dealers to promote and sell 
the company's products to customers. The company found it relatively difficult, however, 
to recruit personnel with awareness of Western business practice and sales techniques, and 
set up a joint venture in Moscow to provide business training. The joint venture was 
signed with the National Institute for the Graphic Arts. 
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Another joint venture has also been established in Czechoslovakia (Brno) which provides 
complementary training in sales and service techniques as well as technical instruction on 
the maintenance requirements of the machines. These two joint ventures provide the copy 
shops with local personnel which have been trained in the Rank Xerox methods of doing 
business as well as having received technical knowledge of Rank Xerox equipment. Since 
the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Rank Xerox cites the Baltic and 
the Muslim states as those offering the most potential for business. 
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West Germany 
5. Siemens: Hungary Shared joint venture 1974 - 1990 
(49:51 equity shareholding by German and Hungarian partners respectively: 
49% Siemens, 1.9% Electromodul, 28.5% Remix Radio-Technical Company, 20.6% 
others) 
100% Siemens subsidiary from 1990 
(see updated information at end of case study) 
Statutory capital investment 
(Siemens' contribution not divulged) 
Company Background: 
38.8 million forint in 1988 
(16 x more than in 1974) 
Siemens is a large multinational company specialising in many areas, particularly 
electronics and has been active in the Hungarian market for over a hundred years. It is 
also represented in other former CMEA countries. In 1969 Siemens opened up an office 
in Budapest which eventually formed the base for the Sicontact joint venture in 1974. 
Siemens was among the first Western companies to set up a service joint venture in 1974. 
Joint Venture Activities: 
The joint venture was mainly a service and consultancy business In the electronics 
industry. The type of work carried out included: 
- consulting on the implementation of transferred know- how in Hungarian factories; 
- helping with quality assurance; 
- advising on the implementation of systems (e.g., automation, measuring and control 
systems for the supply of domestic water, protection of the environment, improving 
communications). 
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In 1980, after the Hungarian joint venture legislation was modified in 1979 to permit 
production joint ventures, Siemens and its Hungarian joint venture partner Interco-
operation Ltd. decided to form a separate undertaking for the manufacture of passive 
electronic components. Although this manufacturing company operates separately from 
Sicontact the two companies have equity links through common ownership. Two 
additional Hungarian partners were taken on, Remix Radiotechnikai, a production 
enterprise and Electromodul, the foreign trade organisation for electronic components. 
Markets: 
Hungary has been the joint venture's main market, with occasional sales in Western 
Germany. The joint venture sells 80% in soft currency and 20% in hard currency 
markets. Siemens has, therefore, been engaged in countertrade deals to ensure sufficient 
hard currency earnings have been achieved for profit transfers. 
Motivation of Siemens: 
Siemens was interested mainly in improving its sales in Hungary and furthering its good 
business contacts in order to secure its market position in Hungary, although its partners' 
enthusiasm also helped to persuade Siemens. 
Motivation of Hungarian Partners: 
According to Siemens, the Hungarian partners were primarily interested in acquiring 
know-how and technology from Siemens, having their staff trained by Siemens and 
attracting Western capital. 
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Partners Contributions to the joint venture 
SIEMENS HUNGARIAN PARTNERS 
know-how labour (office and secretarial) 
technology technical personnel 
managerial personnel managerial personnel 
technical personnel fixed assets (production premises) 
capital 
capital goods (machinery and 
equipment) 
Management and Control 
The board of directors was composed of one managing director from Siemens and one 
representing the Hungarian partners. At the time of the interview, Siemens expressed 
satisfaction with the management of the joint venture (N.B. although one of the 'reasons' 
for changing from joint venture to subsidiary has been to facilitate management decisions). 
Quality Control: 
Siemens stressed the importance of having staff with good technical abilities, especially 
in this type of service activity. The Hungarian staff have, therefore, been trained by 
Siemens in order to acquire Siemens' techniques and know-how. In this way, Siemens 
has been able to assure good quality control. 
Profit transfer: 
Siemens has been satisfied with the profit transfer guarantees by the Hungarian authorities, 
although it has had to be engaged in countertrade arrangements in order to achieve the 
necessary hard currency profi ts for repatriation. 
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Other Issues: 
- Siemens' major competitors in the Hungarian market are French and Japanese 
electronics companies. 
- Cocom regulations have sometimes restricted joint venture activities, but this has 
affected all Western companies engaged in this type of industry. 
- The Investment Guarantee Agreement signed between Hungary and Germany was 
considered helpful, but not crucial in deciding whether or not to engage in joint venture 
activities in Hungary. 
Update on Siemens(l991) 
Sicontact became a wholly-owned subsidiary in 1991 because Siemens wanted to expand 
their activities following the improved political and economic situation in Hungary. As 
their Hungarian partners lacked sufficient capital to participate in these expansion plans 
the partner agreed to sell its equity shareholding to Siemens. Siemens believes that the 
wholly-owned subsidiary enables them to achieve better quality control and speedier 
management decisions. 
Activities: 
The activities of the subsidiary are in consulting, service, distribution and development 
of software. 
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6. Schwarzkopf: Hungary Shared joint venture 
(51 :49 equity shareholding by German and Hungarian partners respectively: 
51 % Schwarzkopf, 46% Caola Cosmetics and Chemical company, 3% Chemo-Caola 
foreign trade organisation.) 
Statutory capital investment not divulged 
Company Background: 
Schwarzkopf is a multinational cosmetics company which has been trading in Eastern 
Europe since 1968, and was first represented in Czechoslovakia. It now operates 
throughout Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia and has concluded licensing agreements with 
all former CMEA countries. The joint venture agreement was signed on 31.01.85 and 
production began on 12.02.86, twelve months later. An important achievement by 
Schwarzkopf at the time was obtaining the 51 % foreign shareholding which has enabled 
the joint venture products to be sold under the Schwarzkopf brandname. 
Schwarzkopf's earlier industrial co-operation agreements in Hungary began with a three 
year licensing agreement in 1977 for the production of one of Schwarzkopf's soap 
products. This agreement was extended in 1980 and again in 1981 to include the 
production of hair preparations, colour rinses, shampoos, washing agents, home hair 
permanents and body creams. 
Joint Venture Activities: 
The joint venture was set up to distribute the products manufactured under licence in 
Hungary. Moreover, the joint venture opened retail shops in Budapest and a Schwarzkopf 
hair salon. 
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The joint venture is dependent on imports of chemical substances (approximately 40%) 
from the West because of the inferior quality of chemicals available in Hungary. Other 
necessary supplies not obtainable on the Hungarian market are obtained from companies 
operating under Schwarzkopf licensing agreements elsewhere and "swopped" for goods 
made in Hungary (e.g. pumps produced in Czechoslovakia are exchanged for bottle tops 
manufactured in Hungary). In this way Schwarzkopf has managed to reduce the amount 
of hard currency imports required for the joint venture. 
Markets: 
The joint venture has sold to both the Hungarian and German market. 70% of the 
products destined for the Hungarian market have been sold through hard currency shops, 
whilst only 30% of the joint venture sales have been made in forint. The forint sales have 
involved Schwarzkopf in countertrade arrangements such as the ones mentioned above, 
where certain parts have been obtained from other Schwarzkopf licensees elsewhere in the 
former CMEA area. These countertrade deals have been dealt with by Schwarzkopf's 
responsible in-house department. 
Motivation of Schwarzkopf: 
The company's main objectives were to improve its business opportunities in Hungary and 
to further secure its market position there. It had enjoyed good co-operation agreements 
previously and used the joint venture as a cheaper production base for goods destined for 
the German market. 
Motivation of Hungarian Partner: 
According to Schwarzkopf the Hungarian partners were able to substitute hard currency 
imports through the joint venture whilst at the same time meeting the demand in Hungary 
for Schwarzkopf goods. It also gave them access to Western technology and know-how 
and new export opportunities. 
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Partner Contributions to the joint venture 
SCHW ARZKOPF HUNGARIAN PARTNERS 
licences scientists 
brandname managerial personnel 
know-how technicians 
better quality chemicals production premises 
managerial personnel 
Management and Control: 
The joint venture's managing director is a full-time Schwarzkopf employee and with a 
51 % shareholding the casting vote is in the hands of Schwarzkopf. The company is 
satisfied with the management of the joint venture on this basis. 
Quality Control: 
This is the responsibility of Schwarzkopf. One of the most important issues for ensuring 
quality is the quality of the chemicals used in the products. As already mentioned above, 
Schwarzkopf imports the chemicals from the West as supplies in the former CMEA 
countries have sometimes been inferior in quality. 
Profit Transfers: 
Schwarzkopf has been satisfied with the profit transfer guarantees granted by the 
Hungarian authorities, and as a large proportion of its products are sold in Germany and 
for hard currency, few countertrade arrangements have been necessary. 
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Additional Information: 
(i) Sales Turnover 
The joint venture turnover had exceeded its original projections as follows: 
Estimates(in mil. forint) Actual 
year 1 (1986/87) 
year 2 (1987/88) 
year 3 (1988/89) 
(ii) Staffing 
60 
75 
100 
75 
122 
160 (projected) 
In 1988 the personnel of the joint venture consisted of approximately 30 Hungarians who 
had all been trained in West Germany at the Schwarzkopf company. The staff are usually 
given a two week in-service training per year. For technicians the in-service training is 
usually four weeks per year. 
Joint Venture Potential in the former Soviet Union 
Schwarzkopf has been active in the former Soviet Union selling its BAC and DANE 
brand products, but at the time of the interview it was also considering a joint venture 
agreement for the distribution of Schwarzkopf products in roubles in return for the supply 
. of raw materials. 
Schwarzkopf's opinion of joint ventures in the former USSR in 1988 was that the joint 
venture legislation gave a broad framework for Western investors. Nevertheless, foreign 
investors were still confronted with the problem of having to find suitable export markets 
for the joint venture products or services. Finally, there were no guarantees for the 
transfer of profits. This acted as a major disincentive for foreign investors. 
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Update: Schwarzkopf (April 1992) 
The Hungarian joint venture became a wholly-owned Schwarzkopf subsidiary at the 
beginning of 1992. Schwarzkopf bought the partner's equity shareholding because its 
major Hungarian partner (Caola Cosmetics) was being privatised and rumoured to be 
taken over by a Western competitor to Schwarzkopf. Moreover, improved investment 
opportunities in Hungary encouraged Schwarzkopf to buy the remaining shares. 
The activities and the markets of the company in Hungary have remained the same, 
although additional personnel (approximately 12 - 15 people) have been engaged in the 
marketing and distribution departments. 
As for establishing a joint venture in the former Soviet Union, the company is still 
negotiating and waiting for more favourable investment conditions. 
7.Adidas: Hungary Shared Joint Venture 
(51 :49 equity shareholding by Adidas and Hungarian partners: 51 % Adidas, 15% Tricotex, 
10% Hungrocoop, 9% Artex, 15% Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank) 
Statutory capital investment 
Sales turnover 
Company Background: 
1 million DM 
2.5 million DM 
in 1986 
in 1987 
Adidas is a German manufacturer of sportswear and sports articles. It has been trading 
in Hungary since the nineteen fifties, and succeeded in establishing regular and substantial 
sales in the nineteen seventies and nineteen eighties by selling sports goods, with the help 
of Konsumex foreign trade organisation, to hard-currency shops. Before establishing a 
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joint venture in 1986, Adidas had signed a licensing agreement with Hungarocoop to 
produce sports shoes. A similar agreement was also made with Artex to manufacture 
Adidas clothing in Hungary. The foreign trade organisation Tricotex was responsible for 
Adidas exports from Hungary. Following the success of the production of Adidas goods, 
a joint venture was fonned between Adidas and its above mentioned Hungarian business 
partners. 
Joint Venture Activities: 
The joint venture is responsible for the distribution of Adidas goods. It runs a very 
successful retail shop in the exclusive shopping area in central Budapest where it sells its 
branded goods manufactured under licence in Hungary as well as goods imported from 
West Gennany. 
Markets: 
The joint venture goods are sold mainly on the Hungarian market. Only 5% of turnover 
achieved in Hungary is earned in hard currency. Most of sales are in Hungarian currency. 
Countertrade plays, therefore, an important role in maintaining the balance of the hard 
currency accounts. Some of the goods produced in Hungary are also sold back onto the 
West Gennan market for hard currency, without competing too much against goods 
produced at home. 
Motivation of Adidas: 
Adidas have been encouraged to enter into a joint venture partnership because they 
already had very good business contacts there and their partners had approached them 
about the joint venture. Other important motivating factors included the possibility of 
improved sales and good joint venture conditions in Hungary. The joint venture was also 
seen as an opportunity to strengthen Adidas' market position in Hungary, especially 
against other foreign competitors (e.g. PUMA), by selling under its own brandname. 
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Motivation of Hungarian Partners: 
According to Adidas the Hungarian partners were primarily motivated by the demand for 
Adidas products in Hungary and the possibility of gaining access to Adidas' distribution 
outlets in the West. The joint venture also provided the partners with import substitution, 
access to Western know-how and technology, as well as staff training. 
Joint Venture Contributions 
ADIDAS HUNGARIAN PARTNERS 
know-how personnel (e.g. shop assistants) 
distribution outlets capital investment (50% of founding 
capital) 
licences assets (50% of joint assets) 
modern technology management personnel 
capital investment (50% of founding 
capital) 
management personnel 
assets (50% of joint assets) 
Management and Control: 
Adidas has the controlling shareholding, although the joint venture is run jointly between 
Adidas and its partners. The board of directors is made up of one Hungarian and one 
Adidas director. Decisions are usually made by the relevant person(s) and usually by 
mutual agreement. Adidas has been satisfied with this type of arrangement. 
Quality Control: 
Adidas assumed responsibility for the quality of the joint venture products as they carry 
the Adidas brandname. 
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Other Issues: 
At the time of the interview, the Hungarian government had just signed an investment 
protection agreement with the West German government and new laws had been published 
relating to personal income tax which put a heavier burden on the employer. Adidas' 
response to the investment protection agreement was that it was not very relevant for the 
day-to-day running of the business. However, the personal income tax reform obliged the 
joint venture to pay the extra costs which diminished company profits. 
The joint venture employed 25 people. 
Joint Venture Prospects in the former Soviet Union 
At the end of 1988 Adidas signed a licensing agreement in Tbilisi, Georgia, for the 
manufacture of textile goods (e.g tracksuits and other sportswear). The licensing 
agreement took two and half years to negotiate. The co-operation was for a small-scale 
production aimed at the former Soviet market. Some exports were envisaged from the 
former USSR through Adidas' own distributor in Lucerne (Adidas-Handels AG, Luzern). 
Exclusive agreement: 
Adidas signed an exclusive agreement which permitted only Adidas sportswear and 
equipment to be worn or used at international competition by the former Soviet sports 
teams. 
Production facilities: 
Some suitable machinery was already installed in the Soviet factory. The licensee has, 
nevertheless, had to buy in machinery from Western manufacturers in order to be able to 
produce Adidas sportswear. 
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Joint Venture: 
A joint venture was being negotiated on the Hungarian model, with a view to opening a 
shop in central Moscow for the sale in hard currency of Adidas goods. 
Issues of concern: 
Adidas has been particularly interested in negotiating a 51 % equity shareholding so as to 
sell goods under the Adidas brandname. This was, however, still impossible at that time 
because Soviet joint venture legislation at that time did not permit foreign majority 
shareholding. 
Joint Venture Prospects in Bulgaria 
(Telephone interview February 1989) 
Adidas signed a licensing agreement at the beginning of 1989 to produce Adidas goods 
in preparation for setting up a joint venture. An agreement was signed between Hungary 
and Bulgaria permitting Hungary to buy Adidas goods manufactured in Bulgaria in soft 
currency which are then sold on the Hungarian market. 
Adidas comparison of joint venture conditions: 
As the company was already active in a joint venture in Hungary and was negotiating 
similar joint venture agreement in the former Soviet Union and Bulgaria, it was asked to 
make a comparison between joint venture conditions in the three countries. According 
to Adidas Hungary offered the most flexible conditions and was the most dynamic of the 
three with regard to business operation and know-how. Asked to compare joint venture 
conditions on a scale of 0 - 20 Adidas gave the following ratings: 
Hungary: 20 Soviet Union: 3 Bulgaria:0.5 
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Update: Adidas Hungary (April 1992) 
The Hungarian joint venture has now become an 85: 15% equity joint venture with Adidas 
having bought out its Hungarian partners, except for the bank which has only a financial 
interest in the joint venture. The main reason for increasing Adidas shareholding was due 
to further liberalisation of foreign trade in Hungary. The Adidas joint venture's statutory 
capital investment in 1992 was registered at 3 million OM and its sales turnover for the 
end of 1991 was 34 million OM (compared with 1 million OM statutory capital 
investment in 1986 and sales turnover of 2.5 million OM in 1987). In addition, the joint 
venture now employs 76 people (compared with 25 previously), and Adidas now has 5 
franchise shops which are run by Hungarian business partners. 
Adidas joint venture prospects in Bulgaria and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
The licensing agreement signed in Bulgaria and the exclusive agreement signed with the 
former USSR at the beginning of 1989 have both become obsolete because of the political 
and economic instability in Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union, although Adidas is still 
considering the joint venture opportunities in the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Nevertheless, Adidas' prospective joint venture partners have changed because of the 
political and economic changes there. 
Adidas direct investments in Poland and Czechoslovakia 
Adidas has established wholly-owned subsidiaries in Poland and Czechoslovakia which 
are engaged in similar activities to the Hungarian joint venture, although Czechoslovakia 
only permits Adidas to carry out retailing and not wholesale activities. Both in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, Adidas work with local manufacturers which produce for the local 
and export markets. 
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Austria 
8. Bramac: Hungary Shared joint venture 
(49:51 equity share holding by Bramac and Hungarian partners respectively: 49% Bramac, 
47% State Development bank, 2% Brick and Roof Tile industrial trust, 2% Nikex foreign 
trade organisation.) 
Statutory capital invested 60 million Austrian Schilling 
Company Background: 
Bramac is a building company specialising in the production of roof tiles. The joint 
venture was set up in 1984 when Bramac invested 60 million Austrian Schilling in the 
joint venture. 
Joint Venture Activity: 
The joint venture produces roof tiles. 
Markets: 
The joint venture has been mainly active in the Hungarian market. Only 5% of its sales 
have been received in hard currency and the joint venture has been engaged in 5% 
countertrade business. 
Motivation of Bramac: 
The main objective has been to improve Bramac' s market position in Hungary against its 
major competitors (Asbest und Tondachziegel). Other motivating factors have included 
making a profit, and responding to their Hungarian partners' interest in setting up a joint 
venture. Moreover, good joint venture conditions in Hungary have also been an 
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encouraging factor. 
Motivation of Hungarian Partners: 
According to Brarnac the Hungarian partners have been mostly interested in acquiring 
know-how and technology, as well as acquiring management skills. They have also been 
keen to have their Hungarian personnel trained by Bramac. An important incentive for 
the partners has been import substitution. The partners have, however, been less 
interested in acquiring access to Western distribution outlets, or in attracting Western 
capital. 
Joint Venture Contributions 
BRAMAC STATE DEVELOPMENT NIKEX 
BANK 
sales and marketing finance export markets 
export markets personnel supplies 
suppl y of materials materials 
research and 
development 
finance 
quality control 
Management and Control: 
The board of directors has two representatives from Bramac and two from the bank. All 
decisions are made unanimously and Bramac is very satisfied with the decision-making 
process of the joint venture. 
Quality Control: 
This is Bramac's sole responsibility. 
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Other Issues 
Bramac considered the Investment Protection agreement signed by the Hungarian and 
Austrian government to be very important for assuring their investment in Hungary. 
The new laws on income tax and V.A.T. (Value Added Tax) have not made any 
differences to the joint venture business. 
2nd Bramac Joint Venture: Hungary Dominant joint venture 
(30:70 equity shareholding by Bramac and the Hungarian partner) 
Statutory capital invested not divulged 
Company Background: 
In April 1987 Bramac was invited to enter into partnership with a Hungarian company 
which is also a producer of tiles. This company had been running at a loss because it had 
been unable to implement Western technology bought in from the West. Bramac was, 
therefore, invited to participate in this joint venture as the Hungarian company needed 
Bramac's know-how to help them implement the technology. 
Despite several attempts to receive updated information, none was received by the author. 
9. J.M. Voith AG: Soviet Union Shared joint venture 
(49:51 equity shareholding by Voith and Soviet partners: 49% Voith, 35% 
Petrosawodskbumash, 6% Chimmashexport, 10% Sojuzorgbumprom.) 
Statutory capital invested 10 million Austrian Schilling 
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Company Background: 
Voith is a large company supplying machines and plant installations for the timber and 
paper industry. The company had been doing business with the former Soviet Union 
since 1924 and had been engaged in industrial co-operation with Petrosawodskbumash (a 
manufacturer of machines for the paper industry) for several years before becoming the 
first Austrian company to sign a joint venture agreement in 1987 with the Soviet Union. 
Joint Venture Activity: 
The joint venture supplies and equips plants within the paper industry. 
Markets: 
The joint venture's markets have included the former Soviet Union (rouble trade), other 
Comecon countries, and hard currency markets. 
Motivation of Voith: 
Voith was primarily interested in strengthening its market position against other foreign 
competitors (mainly Finnish companies) within the former Soviet Union. This together 
with the fact that the company already had very good business dealings has led Voith to 
respond positively to their partners' invitation to form a joint venture. 
Motivation 'of Soviet Partners: 
According to Voith the main motivating factors of the Soviet partners were to gain access 
to Western management skill, know-how and technology to achieve import substitution 
through the joint venture agreement. The Soviet partners were also interested in using 
Voith's distribution outlets in the West, attracting capital, receiving training and trying to 
earn hard currency through sales in third markets. 
293 
Joint Venture Contributions 
vorTH SOVIET PARTNERS 
know-how personnel 
management personnel raw materials 
research and development factory premises 
licence startup capital 
modem technology working capital 
export markets capital goods 
startup capital 
capital goods 
working capital 
Management and Control: 
The board of directors comprised one Soviet managing director and a Voith representative 
as the deputy managing director. The joint venture has been managed jointly and 
decisions have been reached unanimously. By agreement the deputy managing director 
is responsible for conducting business in the West. 
Quality Control: 
This is achieved by making constant checks on the quality of the joint venture output, as 
well as running a bonus scheme for quality work. Moreover, regular visits by Voith's 
technical experts help to monitor the quality of the joint venture output. 
Other Issues: 
Compensation and buy-back deals form an important part of the joint venture business in 
the former USSR. 
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Update: Petrovoith (April 1992) 
Having been satisfied with the activities of this joint venture Voith increased its equity 
shareholding by another 1 % to 50% in 1990 in order to equip two additional 
manufacturing locations. The number of employees engaged in the joint venture has 
increased to 21 and the joint venture managed to achieve profits in 1990 and 1991. The 
joint venture continues to deliver to the paper industry in Eastern Europe and the People's 
Republic of China. 
As a result of the positive joint venture experience in the former Soviet Union, Voith set 
up two joint ventures in 1990 and 1991 in Czechoslovakia (Bratislava) and China 
(Shanghai) respectively. The Czechoslovakian joint venture, EGPA Entwicklung- und 
Investititonsgesellschaft fUr die CSFR Zellstoff- und Papierindustrie GmbH offers an 
engineering consulting service for the paper manufacturing industry as well as finance, 
distribution and technological support. Voith owns 25% of the equity shareholding. 
The Chinese joint venture, SVC -Shanghai Voith Paper machinery Limited Company, 
however, resembles the Petrovoith joint venture as it grew from an existing co-operation 
agreement with the Shanghai Paper Machinery Works. Voith's shareholding in this latter 
joint venture is 33%. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Background 
An examination of the backgrounds of the Western companies engaged in joint ventures 
show that they have nearly all been trading with Comecon countries for some considerable 
time (at least 20 years and in the case of Siemens over lOO years) and have had previous 
experience in industrial co-operation with their joint venture partners. The only exception 
to this has been Waiters International, although they preceded the joint venture briefly 
with a licensing agreement. 
Equity Shareholding 
The majority of Western companies in the case studies have been engaged in a shared 
joint venture (including those with up to 55% equity shareholding), except for Bramac's 
second joint venture which is a dominant joint venture (30:70 in the Hungarian partner's 
favour). 
Statutory capital invested 
The size of capital initially invested by the Western companies has been comparatively 
small as expected from information presented in chapter eight (see table 8.3). 
Markets 
The joint ventures' market outlets have been primarily in the local East European market, 
although some have also sold to other former Comecon countries, and only a few of the 
case study companies (e.g. Schwarzkopf, Voith and Adidas) have been selling the joint 
venture products in Western markets. 
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Activities 
All joint ventures in this sample are engaged in manufacturing or production activities 
(including Siemens which began as a service joint venture). 
Partner objectives 
The Western case study companies have been primarily interested in entering into a joint 
venture in order to secure their market position in Eastern Europe and respond to their 
partners' invitation to form a joint venture. Other reasons for establishing a joint venture 
included wanting to reduce existing countertrade deals (e.g. APV in Hungary) and make 
use of a cheaper production base for goods destined for the home market (e.g. 
Schwarzkopf in Hungary). 
East European partners have been mainly interested in gaining access to Western 
technology and know-how and substituting hard currency imports through the joint 
venture. Some were also keen to gain access to hard currency markets through their 
Western partners' distribution outlets. 
Partner contributions 
All Western companies in the case study sample have contributed primarily know-how 
and technology (mainly through the sale of licences and in training technical staff), and 
have helped the partners to implement this by having overall responsibility for quality 
control. For their part the East European partners have been able to provide 
manufacturing or factory premises, labour and local knowledge (although this has not 
always been specified in the case studies). 
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Management and Control 
Most of the Western companies have expressed satisfaction with the overall management 
arrangements for the joint venture. This was particularly the case for those joint ventures 
operating in Hungary. although reservations have been voiced about the management of 
joint ventures in Bulgaria. 
Quality control 
The Western partners in this sample of case studies have taken on the responsibility of 
checking the quality of the joint venture output and have also provided training for East 
European staff on a regular basis to ensure that they are adequately trained to do their 
jobs. 
Countertrade 
All companies have been engaged in countertrade activities. although in the case of APV 
the joint venture enabled the company to reduce its countertrade business in Hungary. 
Updated Information 
All Western joint venture partners (except for Waiters International). about which the 
author was able to obtain updated information (7/8 companies). increased their equity 
shareholding. Three Western companies. Rank Xerox. Schwarzkopf and Siemens bought 
out their partners. and three Western partners. Rank Xerox. Adidas and Voith signed 
additional joint venture agreements with new partners in Moscow. Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. In two cases (see Schwarzkopf and APV updated information). 
privatisation efforts affecting their East European partner have caused the Western 
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company to reconsider the future of the joint venture. 
On the whole, joint ventures in Hungary seemed to have prospered and Western firms 
have commented on the improved investment conditions in Hungary. Some of the 
Western firms have also been attracted by joint venture prospects in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, but Bulgaria's unstable political and economic situation has given rise 
to concern and caused Schwarzkopf to halt its activities there. Despite continued 
hesitation on the part of Schwarzkopf and Adidas in the former Soviet market, Rank 
Xerox and Voith appear to have made satisfactory progress with their joint ventures, 
causing them to increase their joint venture investments. Moreover, in the case of Voith, 
the company adopted a similar joint venture model in Czechoslovakia as in the former 
Soviet Union. 
CONCLUSION 
In general, the case studies collected between 1986 and the beginning of 1989 present a 
favourable picture of Western joint venture investments in Eastern Europe, and in 
particular in Hungary. Encouraged by their positive joint venture experiences in Hungary, 
a number of Western companies in the sample have sought to establish joint venture 
agreements in other East European countries, notably the former USSR and Bulgaria. It 
appears, however, from the comments made by Rank Xerox, Adidas and Schwarzkopf that 
conditions for Western investors have not been as attractive in these countries as those in 
Hungary. Moreover, neither Schwarzkopf nor Adidas have yet found conditions in the 
former Soviet Union sufficiently improved for their particular requirements to conclude 
a joint venture. 
Much of the information in the case studies confirm many of the findings presented in the 
literature survey of this chapter which relate to issues such as partner objectives for 
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entering into an East-West joint venture and the preferred joint venture model in operation 
prior to 1989 (i.e. shared). Moreover, the joint venture returns for both joint venture 
partners seemed to be positive in that the Western partners have been able to receive pay-
offs through the sale of technology, know-how and licences to the joint venture, while the 
East European partner has benefitted from being able to sell branded Western goods, or 
better quality goods at home (and sometimes even abroad for hard currency) as well as 
receiving up-dated training for its personnel from their Western partners. 
As far as the author is aware, none of the joint ventures in the case studies have ceased 
operations since being interviewed, although some have become wholly-owned 
subsidiaries and Waiters International has gone into receivership, leaving the effect of this 
on the Walton joint venture in Hungary unclear. Consequently, it seems that the joint 
venture partners in this sample have had compatible objectives, made complementary 
contributions to the partnership and overcame cultural differences. The joint ventures in 
this case study sample have been successful on the whole and have resulted in some of 
the Western partners, notably in Hungary, to increase their capital shareholding even to 
one hundred per cent. A less favourable view, however, has been presented by Western 
companies about actual and potential joint venture operations in the former USSR and 
Bulgaria, where provisions for profit transfers and quality control apparently remain a 
problems for Western investors. Some of these concerns have been raised in the Anglo-
Soviet survey which are presented in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Notes 
1. Owing to the lack of joint venture provisions in the CMEA area prior to 1980 most of 
the publications prior to 1980 were concerned with joint ventures in Romania. See, 
- United States Department of Commerce, "Taxes and Import Duties" in Joint Venture 
Agreements in Romania, Washington D.C., June 1977. 
- Bulletin officiel de la Republique Socialiste de la Roumanie, "Citroen fournira it la 
Rournanie it la fois l'usine et la voiture", Bucharest, No. 116, 27 December 1976. This 
paper published details about the Citroen and Control Data Corporation and Renk joint 
ventures in Romania. 
- McElroy D., "The Control Data Joint Venture in Romania", in The International Lawyer, 
Washington D.C., no. I, vol. 10, January 1976, pp. 55 - 58. 
2. Some Western companies were wary about jeopardizing their joint venture operations 
through the publication of any information wrongly interpreted by an intelViewer. 
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CHAPTER 10 
ANGLO-SOVIET JOINT VENTURES: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 1990 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the rapid increase in the number of joint ventures in Eastern Europe and 
particularly in the former Soviet Union which occurred as a result of Soviet joint venture 
amendments in 1988 and 1989 (see chapter 7 and 8) and the political changes since the 
end of 1989, the author chose to extend her research at the end of 1990 to include a 
survey of Anglo-Soviet joint ventures. This chapter presents, therefore, the reasons for 
incorporating the additional field research, the aims and objectives of the survey, the 
method used to obtain the information as well as some of the difficulties encountered 
during the research, followed by the results and evaluation of the survey. 
Reasons for the survey 
Whilst the case studies in chapter mne provide an important and a representative 
illustration of established Western companies' experiences of joint venture activities in 
Hungary, the former Soviet Union and Bulgaria in the period before 1989, it soon became 
evident, as statistics were being released, that a more targeted sample of Western 
companies joint venture experiences were required. 
The author chose, therefore, to extend her studies of joint ventures between British and 
Soviet firms as the USSR had attracted the largest foreign joint venture capital and the 
second largest number of joint ventures compared to any other CM EA country by the end 
of 1990 (see tables 8.2 and 8.3 ) and seemed, therefore, to offer interesting business 
opportunities to foreign companies. As the author was based in the UK, it appeared 
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sensible to obtain the views of British companies because of their geographic proximity. 
Aim and objectives 
The aim of the Anglo-Soviet survey was to establish and evaluate British companies' joint 
venture activities in the former Soviet Union by determining as in chapter nine the 
partners' equity shareholding and capital investment, the partners' motivation and 
contributions to the joint venture, the joint ventures' market outlets, as well as the British 
companies' views on issues such as the management of the company, repatriation of 
profits and general level of satisfaction with their joint venture activities in the former 
USSR. 
Method 
Having obtained a list of the names of 65 Anglo-Soviet joint ventures published by the 
British-Soviet Chamber of Commerce (see table 10.1), the author decided to use the postal 
questionnaire method rather than structured interviews because: 
(i) a postal questionnaire would enable the author to contact all listed 
companies; 
(ii) it was less time consuming than preparing and conducting structured 
interviews in the 65 companies; 
(iii) the feedback from the British companies would be more immediate. 
As the list did not have the British companies' business addresses a visit was made to 
Companies House in London in October 1990 to obtain the relevant addresses to which 
the questionnaires could be sent. 
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Difficulties 
This research itself revealed, however, certain difficulties. According to the record at 
Companies House a number of the British companies listed had been dissolved (9 
companies), one had gone into receivership, three were dormant and one had not yet 
recorded any business transactions. Moreover, quite a large number (23 companies) did 
not appear to have a registered business address which according to information received 
from Companies House meant that these businesses were either unlimited businesses, 
partnerships, or off-shore companies. Of the remaining twenty-six companies on the list 
one company had formed two joint ventures and Rank Xerox was excluded from the 
survey because it had participated in the early case studies. This left. therefore, twenty-
five companies to which the postal questionnaire was sent. 
Of the twenty-five companies contacted, nine replies were returned. One of the replies, 
however, claimed never to have been engaged in any business, let alone a joint venture, 
in Eastern Europe or the former USSR. The information on Anglo-Soviet joint ventures 
is, therefore, based on the returns of eight companies. 
THE COMPANY INFORMATION 
Introduction 
Before presenting the data on the eight Anglo-Soviet joint ventures, the activities of the 
companies listed by the Anglo-Soviet Chamber of Commerce (see table 10.1) are 
summarised. 
On the assumption, that the missing twenty-five companies on the list have at least been 
engaged in joint venture negotiations, they have been included in an analysis of the 
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activities of the joint ventures listed in table 10.1 and summarised in table 10.2. The list 
illustrates that the majority Anglo-Soviet joint ventures have been engaged in non-
manufacturing activities (38 or 58% of the companies), followed by production (12 or 
16.5% of the companies). Other joint venture activities included distribution (2 
companies), research, development and design (3 companies) and supply of equipment 
(1 company). The rest of the joint venture activities have either been listed as unknown 
or been given an ambiguous description (14 companies). 
Table 10.1 List of UK/USSR Joint Ventures 
(Compiled by the Moscow Officc of the British/Soviet Chamber of Commerce, October 1989) 
Name of Joint Venture Activities 
AB-IN ENTERPRISES Consumer goods production; hotel and 
entertaining services. 
AEROMAP Food supply for passenger airplanes. 
ASMARAL Production and distribution of Arabian cheese and 
other Arabian food. hotel construction. tourism. 
ASPEKT Entertainment projects and services. 
ASTAIS Research and design. and other services. 
ASTO Development of new types of consumer 
goods, rcnt-a-car services. 
PC assembling. LAN and software 
creation. 
AVTOKOMP Entertainments projects, advertising, 
promotion and artist guest tours. 
BRISK·SHOW Entertainments projects. advertising, 
promotion and artist guest tours. 
GALA·CAMERON Production of balloons and other 
devices. 
DlAMED Diagnostic catheters projects. PC 
hardware and software development 
and production. 
DlNAMIKA Computer systems for teaching and 
word processing. 
ECLIPSE Establishment of Tairfil additive 
delivery network stations for vine 
production. 
ENERGO· Computers and computer based 
INFORMATICA information systems. 
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Table 10.1 (conld.) 
ENGELS AIR MAZE Air and fuel maze development and 
production. 
FARUS Not known 
FEMCARE Manufacture of sanitary products. 
FEMTEK Manufacture of sanitary products. 
FORPOST Personal computers, specialised software for forestry 
and technology application. 
IBIS Research and design in science. 
education and other social 
programmes. 
ICON Software and hardware development 
and installation. communication 
and information. etc. 
INPROGRESS Not known 
INTERCLUB Leisure hotels. communication 
and other services. 
INTEREKO Engineering, research and 
designs. consultancy, leasing, 
and other services. 
INTERSHELF Oil and gas field development, 
particularly off-shore, vessel 
chartering and off-shore drilling. 
INTERVERSO Not known 
IVK INTERNATIONAL Hardware and soflware production. 
KITEKSIM Peat and peat products. 
KOMETA CLK Health care projects. 
KOMP ANIY A PO . Advertising, concert tours 
RAPROSTRANENIYU and exhibitions. 
GRUZINSKOY 
KULTURY 
KOMPASS Information technology. 
KOMSTAR Telecommunications hardware. 
KONSORTIUM Sports clubs. restaurants. 
hotels. etc. 
KOMTEKH Personal computers and 
software. 
KONTAKT Consultancy. engineering. research 
and design and other services. 
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Table 10.1 (contd.) 
LADAELCON Car design. hotel construction 
CORPORATION and other services. 
MIKROGRAPH Not known 
MORSKIE Not known 
KOMPUTERNUYE 
SYSTEMY 
MOSKOVSKIY Tourist sezvices. 
KONSULTATSIONNYE 
CENTRE 
NAUKA TEKHINFORM Not known. 
NOVOIMPEX Commodity import and export. 
products and services. and 
consultancy. 
PARALLELY Not known 
PREDPRIY A TIY A Rock music magazine publishing. 
PARKA GORKOVO 
PREMBREED Farm animals embryo transfer. 
REPROCENTRE Photocopying and reproduction. 
ROMOS Entertainments projects. 
ROSBRI Consumer products. 
SHEROTEL Not known. 
SLOVO Printing materials. culture and 
tourist activities. agency and 
other services. 
SOVENGO Establishment of golf facilities in the 
USSR. hotel and other services. 
SOVETSKO- Cinema. art and culture exchange 
BRITANSKOE and development. 
TVORCHESKOE 
SODRUZHESTVO 
SOVMORTRANS Cargo transportation services. -
SPECTRUM Custom networks. PC specifications. 
software development. 
STARLIGHT Film production. 
TEKKOM Development of digital and local 
area networks. 
TOP SAIL Sea tourism in the USSR and other countries, yacht 
leasing and yacht 
maintenance. 
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Table 10.1 (contd.) 
TRIO Computer products. 
TVORCHESKOE Audio and video entertainment programme. 
OBYEDINENIE "SBF" 
TROIKA Renl-a-car services. 
UKRAlNA-LAVYSTOK Not known. 
UNIFARM Not known. 
URAL Development and production of 
robots and computers. 
VILNIUS ROADTELS Hotel construction and running. 
tourism. hotd computerisation. 
services. marketing, etc. 
WEST-OST Marketing, production and sales 
of construction products. building 
restoration and hOIc1 construction. 
Table 10.2 Joint Venture Activities 
ACTIVITY NUMBER OF JOINT VENTURES 
Services 24 
Research and development 12 
Production 10 
Research and design 2 
Research and development and 1 
production 
Production and distribution 1 
Construction and service 1 
Ambiguous 4 
Unknown 10 
TOTAL 65 
Note: table 10.2 has been compiled by the author and based on the information contained 
in table 10.1. 
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ANGLO-SOVIET JOINT VENTURES 
Introduction 
The British companies' responses are presented in the following pages and have been 
interpreted from the questionnaire responses (see appendix 2) which were returned to the 
author at the end of 1990. The results of the questionnaire are summarised in table 10.3 
and figures 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3, thereby providing a global view which is subsequently 
followed by the detailed results of each of the company's questionnaire returns and a 
summary of the findings. The issues discussed in the Anglo-Soviet case studies include 
the type of joint venture model, the equity shareholding of the partners, the capital 
invested by the British company, the background to the joint venture, the joint venture's 
activities, its markets, partner objectives and contribution to the joint venture as well as 
the British company's satisfaction with the joint venture in general and the system for 
repatriating profits. Where the British company has been required to give an evaluation 
(e.g. about partner motivation, the joint venture and the system for repatriating profits) the 
company has awarded points on a scale of I - 5 (1 = irrelevant and 5 = very important) 
which have been noted in brackets. To conclude the case study section, the general points 
which emerge from the Anglo-Soviet joint ventures are summarised. 
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Table 10.3 Summary of Results of Anglo-Soviet Joint Venture Questionnaire 
ACTIVITIES OF JOINT VENTURES NUMBER OF JOINT VENTURES 
Service 4 
Manufacturing 3 
Construction I 
TOTAL 8 
TOTAL CAPITALISATION £6.67 million 
(average capitalisation £1.1 million) 
JOINT VENTURES WITH 
Soviet Chairman: 7 
Foreign Chainnan: I 
TOTAL 8 
JOINT VENTURE MODEL TYPE 
dominant (Soviet) 5 
shared 3 
TOTAL 8 
BRITISH FIRMS' EXPERIENCE IN 
THE SOVIET MARKET. 
more than 2 years: 3 
less than 2 years experience: 5 
TOTAL 8 
NO. OF JOINT VENTURES 
operational: 7 
non-opcrational: I 
TOTAL 8 
JOINT VENTURE MARKETS 
more than 70% in Soviet Union: 7 
more than 60% in Western markets: I 
TOTAL 8 
BRITISH COMPANIES 
satisfied with the joint venture: 3 
dissatisfied with the joint venture: 4 
TOTAL 7 
BRITISH COMPANIES 
satisfied with profit transfer: 0 
dissatisfied with profit transfer: 6 
TOTAL 6 
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Figure 10.1 
Partner Contributions 
IOOr--------------------------------------------. 
KH CE T Mf TP R&D MP FA C 
IBritisb PartnerDSoviet Partner 
Figure 10.1 based on the replies of 8 joint venture partners 
KH Know-How 
CE Captial Equipment 
T Technology 
MT Management Techniques 
TP Technical Personnel 
R & D Research and Development 
MP Management Personnel 
L Licence 
FA Fixed Assets (machinery. land. factory) 
C Cash 
DL Direct Labour (machine operators. 
workers. service of machines) 
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Figure 10.2 
British Partners' Motivation 
80r----------------------------------------, 
60 
40 
20 
o 
s MO MP L 
Investment incentives 
lID! British motivation 
Based on the replies of 8 British joint venture partners 
Key 
S Suggested by Soviet partner 
MO Improve Market Opportunities 
MP Improve Market Position 
L Attractive Joint Venture Legislation 
P Increase Company Profits 
B Get More Business 
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Figure 10.3 
Soviet Motivation 
100.--------------------------------. 
KH D I E M F OE 
Motivation 
III Soviet motivation 
Based on the replies of 8 British joint venture partners 
KH Access to Technology and Know-How 
D Access to Distribution Outlets 
I Import Substitution 
E Improved Export Performance 
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M Access to Management Techniques 
F Access to Finance 
OE Access to Office Equipment 
Company No .• 
Name wished to remain anonymous 
Joint venture model Soviet Dominant Parent 
(Equity shareholding 20:80 by the British and Soviet partners respectively.) 
Capital £20,000 
Location Togliatti 
Company background: 
The British company started doing business in the former Soviet Union in 1988 and has 
had no other business experience in Eastern Europe. The joint venture was registered in 
May 1989 and has been operational since then. 
Joint venture activities: 
The joint venture is operating in the construction industry. 
Markets: 
40% of the joint venture sales are in the former USSR, 60% in Western and developing 
markets for hard currency. 
Management: 
The Chairman is a Soviet citizen. 
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Western partner's motivation: 
The British company was mainly motivated by the fact that its Soviet. business partner 
suggested a joint venture partnership (scored maximum 5 points on the questionnaire). 
Other important factors mentioned were wanting to achieve expansion, protection or 
diversification of market opportunities through the joint venture, obtain more business, 
improve their market position against competitors and increase the company's profits in 
the Soviet market (4 points). The joint venture conditions in the former USSR were not 
seen as a particularly motivating factor (3 points). 
Soviet partner's motivation: 
According to the British partner the Soviet partner's main objective was to acquire their 
know-how, technology and Western management techniques (5 points), followed by 
the opportunity to obtain Western factory or production equipment in the form of 
machinery, office equipment (e.g. computers, software), as well as the opportunity to 
improve their export performance and gain access to the British company's distribution 
outlets (4 points). Finally, the Soviet partner did not appear to have been greatly 
motivated to use the joint venture as a vehicle for substituting imports (3 points). 
Partner Contributions to the loint Venture 
MAJOR BRITISH CONTRIBUTION MAJOR SOVIET CONTRIBUTION 
Know-how (80%) Cash (80%) 
Capital equipment (80%) Direct laoour (machine operators, workers, service of 
machines). (80%) 
Technology (80%) 
Management Techniques (80%) 
Technical personnel (80%) 
Research and development (80%) 
Managerial personnel (80%) 
JOINT CONTRIBUTION BY THE PARTNERS 
licences. fixed assets (machinery, land. factory) 
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Repatriation of Profits: 
The British partner did not seem too concerned with the system used to define the joint 
venture's profits, the taxation on the joint venture's profits, nor the system for 
guaranteeing the transfer of hard currency (scored 2 = no great problem). The British 
partner did, however, encounter some problems with the regulation restricting the purchase 
of goods in the former Soviet market in roubles for countertrade purposes. (3 points). 
Satisfaction with Joint Venture: 
The joint venture partner seemed quite satisfied with the joint venture (4 points). 
Company No. 2 
Name of British company not disclosed 
Joint venture model Shared 
(49:51 equity shareholding by the British and Soviet partners respectively) 
Statutory capital invested not divulged 
Location Bamaul, Siberia. RSFSR. 
Company background: 
The British company started doing business in the former USSR in 1987 and began 
business dealings also in Czechoslovakia in 1990. The Anglo-Soviet joint venture was 
registered in April 1989. but has been operational since September 1988. 
316 
Joint venture activities: 
The joint venture has been engaged in a wide range of activities involving co-production, 
marketing, joint research and development as well as distribution. 
Markets: 
The joint venture market outlets have been mainly in the former Soviet market (80%). 
The British company did not, however, specify where the remaining 20% of its market 
outlets have been. Approximately 25% of the joint venture's sales have been earned in 
hard currency. 
Management: 
The Chairman of the joint venture was a Soviet citizen. 
Western partner's motivation: 
The Western partner did not seem to express great motivation for any of the objectives 
mentioned in the questionnaire, although of relative importance was the opportunity of 
generating more business through the joint venture and improving the company's market 
position (3 points). 
Soviet partner's motivation: 
The Soviet partner seemed to have been primarily motivated by the opportunity of gaining 
access to the British company's know-how, technology, management techniques and being 
able to achieve import substitution through the joint venture (5 points). Of some relative 
importance to the Soviet partner was the ability to obtain office equipment (computers and 
software programmes) through the joint venture, gain access to the British company's 
distribution outlets in the West as well as the potential for improving their export 
performance (3 points). Access to finance and factory or production equipment have not 
played an important part in the Soviet partner's joint venture objectives (2 points). 
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Partner Contributions to the Joint Venture 
MAJOR BRITISH CONTRIBUTION MAJOR SOVIET CONTRIBUTION 
Know·how (100%) Fixed assets (machinery. land. factory) 
(100%) 
Capital equipment (100%) Direct labour (machine operators, workers. service of 
machines) (100%) 
Licences (100%) 
Research and development (100%) 
Management techniques (75%) 
EQUAL CONTRIBUTION BY PARTNERS 
Technology, managerial personnel 
Repatriation of Profits: 
The British partner was very concerned about the banking system (a "hopeless banking 
system" - 5 points), the system used to define profits and the restrictions on the purchase 
of goods on the Soviet market in roubles for countertrade purposes (4 points). The 
company was, however, less concerned with the system for taxing joint ventures (3 
points). 
Satisfaction with Joint Venture: 
The British partner was not very satisfied with the joint venture (2 points). 
Additional Comments: 
The British company listed some of the difficulties which led to its dissatisfaction with 
the joint venture: poor communications by telephone and post, with letters arriving 
between three and six months late, or getting lost altogether; low morale in the USSR 
among personnel; cases of pilfering; and the poor quality and unacceptable handling in 
the former USSR of goods intended for sale in the West. The British company's final 
comment in this section underlined the company's total dissatisfaction with the joint 
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venture: 
"our joint venture was the first operative joint venture between the United Kingdom and 
USSR. I was encouraged initially, but now I wish to pull out. Maybe I'll get over the 
disillusionment." 
Company No. 3 
Name of British company Satra 
Joint venture model Shared joint venture 
(49:51 equity shareholding between Satra and Soviet partners) 
Capital £100,000 
Location Moscow 
Company background: 
Satra has been doing business in the former Soviet Union since 1950, but has no other 
business experience in Eastern Europe. The joint venture was registered in March 1989 
and has been operational since that time. 
Joint venture activities: 
This joint venture has been engaged in the service industry and in distribution. 
Markets: 
75% of the joint venture outlets have been in the former USSR, 12% in Western markets 
and 13% developing countries. All of the joint venture's earnings have been in hard 
currency. 
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Western partner's motivation: 
The main objective of the British partner was to generate more business in the former 
Soviet market (5 points), followed by the decision to respond positively to the Soviet 
business partner's suggestion to enter into the partnership, achieve diversification of 
market opportunities, improve the company's market position against competitors, increase 
British company's profits in the Soviet market and have the chance of "getting qualified 
staff'. 
Soviet partner's motivation 
The Soviet partner was mainly interested in USIng the joint venture as a vehicle for 
achieving import substitution, gaining access to finance and "freedom from state laws" (5 
points), and obtaining Western management techniques (4 points). The Soviet partner did 
not appear to be motivated by the desire to acquire the British company's know-how or 
technology, factory or production equipment, or office equipment (J point). 
Partner Contributions to the Joint Venture: 
The British partner contributed 'cash' to the joint venture. No other contributions were 
mentioned by the British company. 
Management: 
The British and Soviet partners have taken turns in alternating the chairmanship. 
Repatriation of Profits: 
The major problem apparently has been the Soviet partner's "unwillingness" to help the 
British company repatriate its profit share (5 points). Moreover, the system used to define 
profits has also been causing a problem (4 points). The following issues, however, have 
not been causing any problems: the joint venture taxes, the ability to buy countertrade 
goods with local money, and the system for guaranteeing the transfer of hard currency 
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profits. 
Satisfaction: 
The British partner was completely satisfied with the joint venture operations "workwise". 
This statement was qualified, however, with the additional comment below: 
"Common objectives are the major problem with joint ventures. If they were common 
at the signing they soon became separate once the company began' trading. It is very 
difficult to keep the Soviets concentrating on a business instead of opportunities." 
Company No. 4 
Name of British company Anglo-Soviet Shipping Co. Ltd. 
Joint venture model Dominant joint venture 
(30:70 equity shareholding by the British and Soviet partners respectively.) 
Capital £2.5 million 
Location Moscow 
Company background: 
This British based company is a Soviet joint venture based in the United Kingdom and 
has been doing business with the former USSR since 1969. The Anglo-Soviet joint 
venture in Moscow was registered in July 1989 and has been operational since January 
1990. 
Joint venture activities: 
The joint venture has been engaged in service activities. 
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Markets: 
100% of the joint venture sales are in the fonner Soviet Union and the joint venture earns 
50% of its sales in hard currency. 
Western partner's motivation: 
The British company's main objective was to achieve more business and improve its 
market position against competitors (5 points). It also considers the Soviet joint venture 
provisions to be quite favourable and an incentive for entering into the joint venture (4 
points), but was less motivated by wanting to respond to the Soviet partner's suggestion 
to fonn a joint venture, or achieving expansion, protection or diversification of market 
opportunities (3 points). The aim of the joint venture was not to try to increase the 
British company's profits in the Soviet market. 
Soviet partner's motivation: 
The Soviet partner was mainly interested in gaining access to finance and the British 
company's distribution outlets in the West as well as the potential for improving its export 
perfonnance (4 points). Acquisition of know-how, technology, management techniques, 
factory or production equipment or office equipment from the British partner played an 
unimportant role (I point). 
Partner Contributions to the Joint Venture: 
The only contribution made by the British partner to the joint venture was cash. 
According to the questionnaire, the British company contributed 30% of the total 'cash' 
coritributions. No mention was made of any Soviet contributions (except that they 
provided 70% of the equity shareholding). 
Management: 
The joint venture has a Soviet chairman. 
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Repatriation of profi ts: 
As the joint venture had only been operational since January 1990, the British company 
felt it was too early to be able to make any comments about the system for transferring 
profits abroad. 
Satisfaction with joint venture: 
The British partner seemed only somewhat satisfied with the joint venture, awarding it a 
score of three points. 
Company No. 5 
Name of British company Window Trading Ltd. 
Joint venture model Dominant joint venture 
(24:76 equity shareholding by the British and Soviet partners respectively) 
Capital £550,000 
Location Novorossiysk 
Company background: 
The British company started doing business with the Soviet Union and Hungary in 1988. 
The joint venture was registered in January 1989 and has been operational since 1989. 
Joint venture activities: 
The joint venture has been engaged in import and export activities. 
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Markets: 
80% of the joint venture sales have been in the former USSR and 20% in Western 
markets. 50% of the sales are earned in hard currency. 
Western partner's motivation: 
The joint venture was seen as a way of generating more business in the Soviet market and 
the British company had as its main objective the wish" to become more involved in the 
Soviet economy" (5 points). Other important motivating factors were the wish to respond 
to the Soviet partner's suggestion to enter into a joint venture partnership and the 
opportunity for the British company to increase its profits in the Soviet market (4 points). 
Other objectives which were less important were the opportunity for expanding, protecting 
and diversifying the British company's market opportunities (3 points), the Soviet joint 
venture provisions and the ability to improve The British company's market position 
against competitors (2 points). 
Soviet partner's motivation: 
The Soviet partner's main objectives were to acquire their partner's know-how, 
technology, management techniques, access to factory or production equipment and office 
equipment as well as access to the British company's distribution outlets and improve 
their export performance (4 points). Apparently unimportant was the opportunity to attract 
Western finance (2 point). 
Partner Contributions to the Joint Venture: 
None were specified in the questionnaire. 
Management: 
The chairman of the joint venture was a Soviet citizen. 
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Repatriation of Profits: 
No repatriation of profits had taken place at the time of the questionnaire survey. 
Satisfaction: 
No comment. See 'additional comments'. 
Additional comments: 
"Novoimpex registered in January 1989 for general import-export trading. For 15 months 
it operated as a local foreign trade organisation fairly satisfactorily. However, a 
government decree in April/May 1990 restricted its import-export activities to own use 
of materials and commodities. It, therefore, diverted resources to manufacturing which was 
Inot the activity it had originally planned. The British company said they would like to 
increase their holding to 51 %+, "but only when Russia has managed to adopt proper 
economic reforms". 
Company No. 6 
Name of British company Andover Trading Ltd. 
Joint venture model Dominant joint venture 
(l :99 equity shareholding by British and Soviet partners respectively.) 
N.B. British shareholding had been 51 % to begin with. 
Capital £2.0 million 
Location Leningrad 
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Company background: 
The British company has been doing business in the former Soviet Union since 1979. 
The joint venture was registered in April 1989 and has been operational since June 1989. 
Joint venture activities: 
The joint venture has been active in the entertainments industry. 
Markets: 
99% of the joint venture sales have been in the former USSR and 1 % in Western markets. 
2% of the joint venture sales have been in hard currency. 
Western partner's motivation: 
"Having a joint venture shows serious intent in the Soviet market" (5 points). Another 
important motivating factor has been the Soviet joint venture legislation (4 points). 
However, wanting to respond to the Soviet partner's suggestion, expand, protect or 
diversify market opportunities and increase their profits in the Soviet market have played 
less of an important role (3 points). 
Soviet partner's motivation: 
The Soviet partner was concerned to acquire the British partner's know-how and 
technology, have access to finance, factory or production equipment as well as the 
"opportunity for foreign travel" (5 points). 
Partner Contributions to the loint Venture 
BRITISH CONTRIBUTION SOVIET CONTRIBUTION 
Know·how (30%) Know·how (70%) 
Management techniques (20%) Management techniques (80%) 
Cash (1%) Cash (99%) 
Capital equipment (1%) Capital equipment (99%) 
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Management: 
The chairman of the joint venture was a Soviet citizen. 
Repatriation of Profits: 
Major problems for the joint venture, according to the British company, were the 
restrictions on the purchase of goods in the Soviet market in roubles, intended for 
countertrade, and the fact that no profits had been made at the time the questionnaire was 
being filled in (5 points). 
Satisfaction: 
The British company was relatively satisfied, although it did have some reservations (3 
points). 
Additional comments: 
"We are still searching for finance." 
Company No. 7 
Name of British company wished to remain anonymous 
Joint venture model Dominant joint venture 
(15:85 equity shareholding by the British and Soviet partners respectively.) 
Capital not specified 
Location Moscow 
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Company background: 
The British company has been doing business in the Soviet Union since 1988. The joint 
venture was registered in June 1988 and was still not operational at the time the postal 
questionnaire survey was being conducted. 
Joint venture activities: 
The joint venture was hoping to operate a licensing agreement. 
Markets: 
The joint venture market outlet was to be exclusively in the former Soviet Union. 
Western partner's motivation: 
The British company was mainly motivated by the opportunity to improve its market 
position against competitors and "to generate publicity in the West" (5 points). Less 
important was the opportunity for expanding, protecting or diversifying its market 
opportunities, generating more business or increasing the British company's profits in the 
Soviet market (3 points). The British company was not motivated by any suggestions 
made by the Soviet partner to form a joint venture, nor had it been attracted by 
particularly favourable joint venture terms. 
Soviet partner's motivation: 
The Soviet partner was apparently primarily motivated by the opportunity of acquiring the 
British partner's know-how and technology (5 points), followed by improving its sports 
performance (4 points), acquiring factory or production equipment (3 points), Western 
management techniques as well as being able to achieve import substitution through the 
joint venture (2 points). The Soviet partner was not, however, interested in acquiring 
office equipment, finance or gaining access to the British company's distribution outlets 
in the West Cl point). 
328 
Partner Contributions to the Joint Venture 
BRmsH CONTRIBUTION SOVIET CONTRmUTION 
Know-how (100%) 
Licence (100%) 
Technology (100%) 
Research and development (100%) 
JOINT CONTRIBUTIONS 
Management: 
Management techniques 
Managerial personnel 
The joint venture's chairman was to be a Soviet citizen. 
Repatriation of Profits: 
The British company viewed the system used to define profits as a major problem (5 
points). Less of a problem appeared to be the joint venture taxes and the guarantees for 
transferring hard currencies (3 points). The difficulty of buying goods on the Soviet 
market in roubles for countertrade seemed to be of little importance to this company (1 
point). 
Additional Comments: 
"Will probably be a waste of time in the end!" 
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Company No.8 
Name of British company Caterair International 
Joint venture model Shared joint venture 
(49:51 % equity shareholding by the British and Soviet partners respectively) 
Capital £ 1.5 million 
Location Moscow 
Company background: 
The company had no previous experience of doing business in the former Soviet Union 
until 1989, when the joint venture first became operational. The joint venture, however, 
was not officially registered until December 1989. 
Joint venture activities: 
Airline catering. 
Markets: 
80% of the joint venture sales have been in the Soviet market, 15% in Western markets, 
only 2% in developing countries, and 3% in other East European markets. 20% of the 
joint venture sales have been in hard currency. 
Western partner's motivation: 
The main motivation for the British company was to expand, protect or diversify its 
market opportunities (5 points), followed by its wish to respond positively to partner's 
suggestion to enter into the joint venture partnership, do more business in the Soviet 
330 
market and to improve its market position against competitors (4 points). The joint 
venture terms in the USSR have not been a great incentive (3 points), and even less 
important was the British company's desire to increase its profits in the Soviet market (2 
points) 
Soviet partner's motivation: 
The main objective of the Soviet partner was to obtain the British partner's know-how and 
technology, achieve import substitution through the joint venture and improve its export 
performance (5 points). Gaining access to finance, factory or production equipment was 
also of some importance (3 points), but the opportunity to gain office equipment (2 points) 
and access to the British company's distribution outlets (I point) were not very important 
joint venture considerations for the Soviet partner. 
Partner Contributions to the Joint Venture 
BRmsH CONTRIBUTIONS SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS 
Know·how (100%) 
Cash (55%) Cash (45%) 
Management: 
The chairman of the joint venture was a Soviet citizen. 
Repatriation of Profits: 
The system used to define profits posed a major problem (4 points). The lack of 
guarantees for transferring profits and the restrictions preventing joint ventures from 
buying goods in the Soviet market in roubles for countertrade were only of some concern 
(3 points). Joint venture taxes were of little importance to this joint venture (2 points). 
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Satisfaction: 
The British company was on the whole quite satisfied with the joint venture (4 points). 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Background 
The British companies participating in this survey were engaged in both service and 
manufacturing activities (and one company in construction). The average capital 
investments made by the British joint venture partners (£ 1.1 million) was about the same 
as the average foreign capital investment of $ 1.5 million shown in table 8.3. In the 
survey, however, capital investments varied between £ 20,000 and £ 2.5 million, 
depending on the size of the British partner's equity shareholding and the industry they 
were engaged in. Unlike the earlier case studies, a considerable proportion of the sample 
of British companies (5 joint ventures) entered into the joint venture with virtually no 
previous business experience in the markets of the former socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe, and this (together with the fact that one company was still not operational at the 
time of the survey) may have had a bearing on the number of companies which were 
dissatisfied with the joint venture operations (4 companies). 
Joint venture model and control 
The preferred Soviet joint venture model, the dominant model (see chapter 7), was 
adopted by five of the joint ventures. The remaining three were shared joint ventures, 
with the Soviet partners retaining at least 51 % of the equity shareholding. No British 
company in this sample owned more than 49% of the equity shareholding, despite Soviet 
legislation, published in 1989, permitting foreign majority shareholding. Moreover, most 
joint ventures had a Soviet Chairman (7/8 joint ventures), emphasising once again Soviet 
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preference for controlling joint ventures. 
Markets 
The information given by the eight British companies indicated that the joint ventures' 
markets were predominantly in the former Soviet Union. Only one of the joint venture 
companies in the survey had considerable sales outlets outside the former CMEA area. 
Partner Contributions 
The view of the British companies in the questionnaire survey (see graph 10.1) was that 
they made a greater contribution to the joint venture than their Soviet partners, particularly 
in the area of research and development and know-how, in supplying licences, technology 
and technical personnel for the implementation of the technology, whilst their Soviet 
partners were the main providers of fixed assets (such as office or factory premises) and 
cash. The graph suggests, therefore, that the eight British companies responded to the 
Soviet's major joint venture objective (see figure 10.3), namely to acquire Western know-
how. 
Partner Motivation 
(See figures 10.2 and 10.3) 
As already indicated above the Soviet partners of the eight Anglo-Soviet joint ventures 
had as their main objective the acquisition of Western know-how, followed by the desire 
to improve their export performance and receive capital investment. Access to their 
British partners' distribution outlets or receiving new office equipment are the least 
important. The British companies' objectives appeared in the main to be concerned with 
generating more business and improving their market position and opportunities. The 
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British companies were less encouraged by the Soviet joint venture provisions or in being 
able to increase their own company profits through the joint venture. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of the Anglo-Soviet joint ventures present a less favourable view of their joint 
venture experiences than those in the previous chapter. This more negative experience 
gained by British companies may be due to the following reasons. 
The Western companies in the previous case study chapter were primarily operational in 
Hungary (except for Voith and Rank Xerox), where favourable joint venture conditions 
exist. Moreover, all except one company had been doing business in the former CMEA 
countries for many years prior to entering into a joint venture partnership, and all had, 
therefore, gained considerable experience of the operational and cultural differences of the 
foreign environment. In the Anglo-Soviet sample, however, relatively few had more than 
two years experience of trading in the former USSR, so that a number of British 
companies engaged in Soviet joint ventures were having to confront the cultural 
differences for the very first time. Moreover, the joint venture conditions were less 
favourable in the former Soviet Union because of the lack of guarantees provided by the 
authorities for the transfer of the foreign partners' profits, and the restriction placed on 
purchasing goods in roubles for countertrade transactions outside the former CMEA area. 
The author's research on Anglo-Soviet joint ventures has revealed once again the 
difficulty of obtaining reliable and up-to-date information on Western companies actively 
engaged in East-West joint ventures. The list published by the Anglo-Soviet Chamber of 
Commerce demonstrates, however, that a large number of British businesses (23 
companies) which had expressed interest in joint ventures in the former Soviet Union 
were not registered companies and likely to be unlimited businesses or perhaps even off-
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shore operations seeking new business opportunities in the former Soviet Union. 
To conclude, the case studies in chapters 9 and 10 clearly underline again the points 
mentioned in chapters 2 and 7 of the thesis, namely that successful joint venture 
operations depend on the foreign partners having had several years of experience of doing 
business in the host country prior to entering into a joint venture agreement, the partners 
being able to harmonise their objectives and cultural differences as well as the importance 
of the host country offering flexible and attractive joint venture conditions to foreign 
investors. 
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CHAPTER 11 
COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
COMMENTS 
Introduction 
At the commencement of the project described in this thesis, the author selected three 
research methods to investigate the development of East-West joint ventures, namely 
literature search, structured interviews and a questionnaire survey. The reasons for 
employing these different methods and their associated advantages and limitations are 
examined below. 
Literature search 
Several literature searches were carried out in order to establish the extent of knowledge 
and the current levels of research in the role of joint ventures in business; economic 
reforms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; and the development of East-
West trade, industrial co-operation and joint ventures since 1960. 
The literature searches revealed that the above subjects, except for the particular topic of 
joint ventures in the former Comecon countries had been extensively researched. This 
lack of comprehensive research material on East-West joint ventures based in Eastern 
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Europe and the fonner Soviet Union, was apparently due to the absence of adequate joint 
venture provisions and flexible conditions for foreign trade activities in many of the 
former socialist countries prior to 1987, particularly in the former USSR. Consequently 
the number of joint ventures in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, before 
1987 was very small (table 8.1). 
The growing importance of East-West joint ventures in the former socialist countries, 
however, soon became evident after the fonner USSR had issued its joint venture decrees 
in 1987. This resulted in the first comprehensive study of East-West joint ventures being 
published by the United Nations in 1988 which presented: 
statistical data on the growth of joint ventures since the first joint venture 
decrees in 1972; 
the joint venture provisions by the individual CM EA countries up to 1987; 
Western companies' experiences of establishing and subsequently operatini}~nt yentur~s 
in Eastern Europe. 
Owing to the positive responses of Western companies to joint venture provisions and 
economic refonns introduced by the fonner CMEA countries, the number of joint ventures 
rose dramatically which soon rendered the United Nations' report out-of-date. In an effort 
to keep up-to-date with the growth of joint ventures the United Nations then set up a 
databank to keep pace with the rapidly changing data. 
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This survey of statistical data was supplemented by a search of press reports and 
government publications which enabled the author to: 
analyse the trends in the quantity of joint ventures; 
examine the type of activities and industries in which East-West joint 
ventures have been engaged, on a country by country basis; 
provide estimates of the amount of foreign direct capital invested in the 
various countries of Eastern Europe; 
investigate the financial support extended to the former CMEA countries 
in their efforts to transform their economies into market economies. 
It became apparent, however, that information was limited on individual company level 
activities of Western firms in their East-West joint venture operations. To research this 
topic further, therefore, it was decided to use structured interviews and questionnaire 
surveys. 
Structured Interviews 
The main advantage offered by the structured interview was the potential to record any 
new issues experienced by companies engaged in joint venture activities that had not yet 
percolated through to the written media. Other advantages included the opportunity to 
obtain immediate feedback on issues identified through the literature research, namely the 
partners' motivations for entering into a joint venture, the partners' contributions to the 
joint venture, and the Western company's experience with transfer of profits to the West. 
By using the same format of questions, it was also possible to collect comparative data 
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from the finns intelViewed. This method also provided a certain degree of flexibility to 
expand on any points raised during the intelView. 
The personal contact originally established through intelViewing the companies also made 
it easier for the author to subsequently contact those companies after a few years, and to 
obtain an up-date on their joint venture activities. Consequently, the use of the structured 
intelVjew method made it possible to monitor the development of some of the earlier joint 
ventures and their responses to the economic and political changes after 1989. 
As the number of joint ventures increased from less than one hundred in 1987 to several 
thousands in 1989, it became evident, however, that another research method was required 
to quantify statistical data as well as reach a larger, yet more defined sample of joint 
venture companies in a shorter space of time. The author consequently chose to carry out 
a questionnaire sUlVey which offered the following advantages and limitations. 
The Questionnaire Survey 
Having recognised the need for a research method which could take account of the 
growing statistical data and provide results with the minimum time delay, the author 
decided to carry out a postal questionnaire sUlVey among a more defined sample of 
companies, namely British partners of Anglo-Soviet joint ventures. 
This research method offered several advantages over the structured intelView, namely the 
ability to contact a greater number of British companies, and record their joint venture 
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experiences quickly. In addition, by receiving questions in a written form rather than in 
an interview the respondents had more time to give considered answers to the questions. 
Moreover, by focussing on a defined sample, the questionnaire survey enabled the author 
to quantify certain information and data common to the companies surveyed as well as 
register the extent of British companies' interest in Soviet joint venture activities by the 
number of replies received. 
One third of the compames contacted replied (8 companies) within one month, a 
considerably shorter period of time compared to structured interviews, which took 
approximately nine to twelve months to set up and process the results. This research 
method, however, was less flexible than the structured interview, and did not permit the 
researcher to explore in greater depths the experiences of individual companies. 
By the use of both of these methods, therefore, the author was able to gain comprehensive 
information on the current advantages and problems of Western companies' joint venture 
activities in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Development of Joint Ventures 
The information presented in section B of the thesis revealed that the former CMEA 
countries became interested in expanding their foreign trade activities with Western 
countries during the nineteen sixties, following efforts to reform and Improve the 
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efficiency oftheir centralised planning systems. The recognition by many of the former 
CMEA countries of the importance of foreign trade, together with the onset of the United 
States' policy of detente at the beginning of the nineteen seventies, resulted in an 
expansion of East-West trade and industrial co-operation, including joint ventures in 
developed economies. The main purpose of the former CMEA countries in pursuing joint 
ventures with developed Western economies was to promote import substitution, domestic 
production, and export development. 
These activities might have continued to expand in the nineteen eighties had not certain 
economic and political factors intervened which had a profound effect on Comecon and 
East-West trade, and the development of East-West joint ventures. These included the 
second oil crisis of 1979, the subsequent fall in world oil prices during a time of world 
. recession and shrinking export markets (chapters 3 and 5). These factors influenced both 
intra-CMEA trade and East-West trade (chapters 4 and 5). The fonner Soviet Union, 
however, was affected differently from the other socialist countries. As an important 
producer of energy and other natural resource commodities, the former USSR could not 
earn its former levels of foreign currency from the export of these products because of 
falling world prices; although it could still obtain similar, or even increased levels of 
earnings from the former socialist countries as prices changes in that market lagged 
behind world price changes. Nevertheless, the USSR was still unable to earn sufficient 
hard currency income to sustain its import requirements for Western products. The 
remaining Eastern European countries, in their turn, were obliged to sell comparatively 
higher levels of products to the former USSR in exchange for their raw material 
requirements, leaving fewer goods for Western markets which were also in recession. As 
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a consequence, Eastern European countries were also unable to import necessary levels 
of goods to meet their needs, from Western countries. Joint ventures were consequently 
an attractive option to overcome hard currency shortages, particularly for the purchase of 
equipment and services. 
Moreover, with the changes in the Soviet leadership in 1985 and the introduction of 
perestroika and glasnost, a new wave of economic reforms was introduced in the latter 
half of the nineteen eighties in the former CMEA countries which aimed to reactivate 
foreign trade with little hard currency expenditure. Having gained considerable experience 
in the nineteen seventies with industrial co-operation agreements, and particularly joint 
ventures in developed economies (chapter 6), the more reform-minded countries of Eastern 
Europe, among them Hungary, began promoting joint ventures on their own territory. 
With the overthrow of communist governments and their replacement by democratically 
elected governments in 1989 and 1990, foreign trade continued to be reformed. These 
policies of these governments promoted a rapid liberalisation of foreign trade and 
particularly of joint venture provisions (chapter 7). 
The effect of these foreign trade reforms throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union caused a rapid increase in the number of joint venture registrations in the former 
CMEA area (chapter 8). These joint ventures received, on average, only small amounts 
of foreign capital investments, however, owing to the economic and political instability 
of some of the East European countries (e.g. Romania, Poland and Bulgaria in particular). 
Clearly, the political changes in the former CMEA countries which enabled these 
countries to continue with their economic and foreign trade reforms have had the most 
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profound effect on the growth and development of East-West joint ventures. The extent 
to which foreign capital contributions will increase, will depend, however, on how 
successful the former CMEA countries will be in stabilising their economies, and 
implementing foreign fmancial aid (chapters 4 and 8) chiefly in the forms of debt 
rescheduling and loans made available from the European Community and the G-7 and 
G-24 groups of countries. 
The Role of Joint Ventures in East-West Trade 
The information presented in chapter 2 of this thesis described the ways in which joint 
ventures have been used as a tool in business in order to penetrate foreign markets, and 
also to consolidate existing business operations abroad. This information also illustrated 
the complexity involved in establishing and managing joint ventures, particularly shared 
joint ventures, and especially for partners to identify their joint venture objectives and find 
a compatible or complementary partner. Despite these difficulties, the chapter concluded 
that with clear objectives and a clear business plan, joint ventures could bring business 
advantages for both parties, namely access to markets, technology or know-how; and joint 
research and development opportunities as a way of rationalising the partners' business 
operations. 
The issues raised in chapter 2 served, therefore, as a theoretical basis for devising the 
structured interview questionnaire and the postal questionnaire used to obtain the company 
information presented in chapters 9 and 10 of the thesis, guiding the author to focus on 
the partners' motivation for entering into the joint venture, their respective contributions 
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and activities, the joint venture's markets, and management of the joint venture. 
The evidence in chapter 8 and the case study samples suggests that Western companies 
have been mainly engaged in conuibuting technology and know-how to the joint ventures 
in exchange for gaining access to East European markets. The case studies, in particular, 
demonstrated the impact of the economic and political reforms at the micro level after 
1989. In the early case studies (chapter 9) many Western partners increased their equity 
shareholding either to a majority or 100% shareholding. This was due to the fact that 
most of the early case studies were based in Hungary where the most extensive 
liberalisation of foreign trade had taken place. In addition, some extended their activities 
to include manufacturing (see APV and Siemens) or formed secondary joint ventures in 
the former Soviet Union and Bulgaria (see Rank Xerox, Voith and Adidas respectively). 
These changes to existing joint ventures and the setting up of additional joint ventures 
showed a positive response by Western joint venture partners to the post-1989 reforms in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The importance of political and economic stability of the country to foreign investors was 
brought out by some of the Western companies' responses in chapter 9 (e.g. Adidas and 
Schwarzkopt). These two companies which expressed interest in participating in a joint 
venture in the former Soviet Union in 1988, have remained hesitant and even negative in 
1992, about any joint venture prospects for their companies in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States because of the political and economic instability. 
A less positive picture at the micro level about joint ventures in the former Soviet Union 
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has also been obtained from the Anglo-Soviet joint venture survey. The main concerns 
of the British companies included in the survey have been the difficulty of transferring 
profits abroad and the restrictions imposed on buying goods in roubles for sale abroad in 
hard currency. In addition, Soviet bureaucracy often caused delays to the joint venture's 
operations. However, it was noted in chapter 10 that most of the companies experiencing 
these problems had little or no previous experience of doing business with the former 
Soviet Union, compared with Rank Xerox and Voith (see chapter 9) which had 
considerable experience and gave positive feedback about their joint venture operations 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States. As in the earlier case study sample in 
chapter 9, British companies perceived their contributions to the joint venture to be mainly 
know-how, technology and capital, whilst the Soviet partners offered the foreign partners 
premises, labour and above all, access to the Soviet market 
To summarise, East-West joint ventures in the CMEA area developed initially as a 
response to stagnating export trade and hard currency shortages in the nineteen eighties. 
Their growth, however, has been accelerated following fundamental political changes in 
Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 which have brought about greater liberalisation of 
foreign trade practices. Despite the sharp increase in the number of joint ventures, 
capitalisation has, nevertheless, remained small, although at the micro level there are signs 
of successful joint ventures having increased their capital contribution. The relatively low 
level of capitalisation recorded at'the end of 1990 suggests that Western partners' 
perceptions of the economic and political situation of some of the former CMEA 
countries, notably Bulgaria, Romania and to some extent Poland, remained one of 
fragility. 
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The case studies have demonstrated, however, that both Western and Eastern partners have 
benefited from their co-operation. By responding to host government pressure, Western 
companies have been able to penetrate the foreign market more effectively, whilst the East 
European partners have been able to gain access to foreign technology, know-how and 
capital with little hard currency expenditure. By insisting on a majority or shared joint 
venture model and an East European national as Chairman of the joint venture in the 
majority of cases prior to 1989, the former CM EA countries were also careful to retain 
control of joint venture activities. This controlling factor as well as the economic and 
political factors may well have had a restraining influence on the amount of capital 
Western companies were prepared to invest in Eastern Europe. 
The changes to the rules regarding majority shareholding and wholly-owned foreign 
companies, as well as the political changes, have certainly had a positive effect on 
persuading Western companies already operating successfully in Eastern Europe to 
increase their capital contributions. The overall picture presented in chapter 8 suggests 
that initial investments by foreign companies, on average, however, have remained small, 
but the case studies in chapter 9 point out that experienced companies in East-West trade 
are responding favourably, although cautiously to changes to joint venture provisions and 
the political situation. By comparison, however, many of the British companies which 
took part in the questionnaire survey had little prior experience of doing business in the 
former Soviet Union, and it seems have consequently had less success than the case study 
companies in chapter 9. 
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On the evidence presented in this thesis, it appears that East-West joint ventures will 
continue to grow in numbers, although the size of their capital contributions will remain 
modest and influenced by the economic and political developments in the former CMEA 
countries. If, however, their reforms take effect and create greater political stability 
together with a liberalisation of foreign trade, Western firms will be encouraged not only 
to increase their equity shareholding, but also to extend their activities into the production 
sphere (see case studies 'Siemens' and 'APV'). 
It can be concluded, therefore, that joint ventures have helped to re-activate interest in 
East-West trade, particularly during a period when hard currency problems and the effects 
of a world recession had brought about stagnation. Whilst not having made any 
significant contribution in terms of the amount of capital contributed by foreign firms, 
joint ventures have, nevertheless, enabled the former socialist firms to gain access to 
newer technology and know-how without having to commit large amounts of hard 
currency. 
Foreign Direct Investment since 1990 
Before making suggestions for further research into joint ventures in the former CMEA 
countries, it is important to consider some of the major changes which have occurred 
since 1990, and their effect on foreign direct investments. These include permission for 
foreign partners to own wholly-owned subsidiaries, the break-up of intra-CM EA trade 
referred to in chapter 4 of the thesis, the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and reform 
measures, notably privatisation and foreign financial assistance. The effect of these 
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changes and measures are considered in the following paragraphs. 
a) Wholly-owned subsidiaries 
Hungary was the first former CMEA country to permit one hundred per cent foreign 
shareholding in 1989. By 1991 all other East European countries had passed legislation 
allowing wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries to operate in their countries, and the former 
Soviet Union 99% foreign shareholding .. This change in legislation has been particularly 
attractive to foreign multinationals, who normally aim to establish wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in an effon to retain control and implement their company policies. 
Moreover, wholly-owned foreign companies are more likely to receive greater amounts 
of capital injections from the parent company than a joint venture because of the greater 
control enjoyed by the company, and the fact that they do not have to share their profits 
with a partner. 
b) The break-up of intra-CMEA trade (1) 
The substantial decrease in world oil prices in the early to mid-nineteen eighties, as well 
as the fall in Soviet oil production in the latter half of the nineteen eighties, led to reduced 
levels of revenue for the former USSR. Not only had the former Soviet Union less 
foreign currency to purchase products on the international market reducing total impons 
by 44%, but purchases from Eastern Europe were also reduced by a more significant 
amount, namely 62%. The subsequent switch from transferrable rouble to hard currency 
trade in intra-CMEA transactions from January 1991, caused funher reduced impon orders 
from the Soviet Union and the reduced usage of the transferable rouble left the other East 
European countries with not only a reduced expon market, but also with a host of 
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unsettled credit and capital transactions which needed to be cleared. This resulted in a 
series of bilateral trade agreements based on barter trade between the former Soviet Union 
and the oil dependent countries, notably Bulgaria. Hungary and Czechoslovakia met 
repayment of these accounts with hard currency at a conversion rate at approximately 
ninety per cent of the rouble value. Consequently, the hard currency reserves of the 
former socialist countries were depleted even further. The need for foreign direct 
investments as a form of import substitution and a means of having access to Western 
technology and know-how will, therefore, continue in the nineteen nineties. Moreover, 
the desire to attract foreign direct investments is likely to encourage the former CMEA 
countries to continue with some economic and political reform efforts in the nineteen 
nineties. 
c) The fragmentation of the Soviet Union 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the setting up of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States at the beginning of 1992 the former Soviet Union has been 
decentralised and former republics have been able to set up their own time-table for the 
implementation of reforms. Consequently, some of the new states have already introduced 
internal convertibility, a certain degree of price liberalisation and the granting of foreign 
trade rights to all enterprises and privatisation measures. The effect of these measures and 
the greater commitment by Russia to the introduction of economic reforms after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, should bring about the further 
liberalisation of foreign trade. Providing, therefore, that political and economic stability 
is achieved, foreign investors should be attracted to the new business opportunities and 
wealth of resources available in the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
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d) Privatisation 
By selling state enterprises either gradually as in Hungary or by auction and voucher 
scheme as proposed by Czechoslovakia and Russia in 1992, the governments of the 
former socialist countries will be able to devolve financial responsibility to the 
management of these companies. The sale and purchase of shares will require a 
stockmarket and a capital market which have to be supported by relevant financial 
institutions. Moreover, by allowing foreign parties to purchase shares, foreign companies 
are given the opportunity to purchase land, premises and assets in the former CMEA 
countries. Consequently, privatisation should encourage greater flows of money within 
the domestic market as well as flows from foreign investors. 
d) Foreign Financial Assistance (2) 
Since 1990 financial assistance has been organised and co-ordinated by the 0-24 countries 
and the European Community and extends to all the former CMEA countries, except the 
Commonwealth of Independent States for which separate arrangements have been made 
mainly on a bilateral basis. The United Nations has calculated that the smaller East 
European countries received gross financial resource flows of US $ 4.2 billion in 1990 
from the European Community and the 0-24 countries. This figure included private 
capital (i.e. officially supported export credits and foreign direct investments) of US $ 2 
billion and official capital of US $ 2 billion received from development banks, the 0-24 
and European Community countries as well as from the IMF. Owing to the bleak 
economic outlook for these countries at the end of 1990, however, the official capital 
received from the international community increased to US $ 8.6 billion. Increases in 
private capital have also been estimated at US $ 3.8 billion, amounting to gross financial 
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flows of approximately US $ 12.4 billion in 1991. On the basis that the economic outlook 
for the East European countries improved at the end of 1991, the United Nations has 
estimated that official capital will decrease to US $ 5.0 billion and private capital will 
increase to US $ 4.8 billion in 1992. (See table 11.1) Consequently, the growth in 
foreign direct investments in Eastern Europe is likely to continue. 
Financial assistance to the former Soviet Union has been mainly granted on a bilateral 
basis among the G-7 countries. Assistance began with an emergency effort in the winter 
of 1991/92, following a breakdown in the Soviet distribution system and a shortage of 
supplies and food. The international community consequently organised transportation 
and food distribution within the former Soviet Union, and gave assistance primarily in the 
form of credit facilities, humanitarian and technical assistance. From the European 
Community alone, the former USSR received ecu 400 million in 1991 and a further ecu 
500 million in 1992 for technical assistance projects. 
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Table 11.1 Eastem Europe: gross financial resource flows, 1990, and 
outlook for 1991 and 1992 
(in billions of US dollars) 
Type of capital 1990 199 la 1992b 
Prh'ate Capital(c) 2.0 3.8 4.8 
of which: 
Foreign direct 0.6 1.6 1.9 
investment 
Official Capital 2.2 8.6 5.0 
Development banks 0.2 1.6 3.0 
(d) 
G-24/EC 1.5 3.0 0.6 
IMF 0.5 4.0 1.4 (e) 
TOlnl new capital 4.2 12.4 9.8 
Rescheduled 
obligations 5.8 7.4 4.7 
Towi resources 10.0 19.8 14.5 
Sources: United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (May 1992). p.IS3. For 1990, EeE estimates based on 
OEeD figures taken from Flows 10 Central and Eastern Europe in 1990, Paris, October 1991. Private capital reflects 
only publicised credits and foreign direct investments. 
NOTES: 
a Revised outlook. 
b Preliminary. 
c Includes officially supported export credits. 
d IBRD and EBRD 
e Reflects only programmes arranged in 1991. 
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The growing financial support since 1990 for the smaller East European countries, and 
more recently for the former Soviet Union by the international community, has helped 
these countries to begin with the implementation of stabilisation and reconstruction 
policies. If successful in stabilising their economies, it is probable that greater flows of 
foreign capital will occur. In the subsequent paragraph the growth of foreign direct 
investments since 1990 is examined. 
e) Foreign Direct Investment since 1990 (3) 
The effect of the above outlined changes and policies have already had a positive effect 
on the development of foreign direct investment registrations. Between the beginning of 
1991 and January 1992 the number of joint ventures and wholly-owned affiliates 
registered in Central and Eastern Europe increased by 150%, rising from a total of 13,722 
joint ventures (see table 8.2) to 34,422. The East European countries to have been most 
favoured by foreign investors have been Hungary and Romania with 11,000 and 8,022 
foreign direct investments respectively, thereby shifting the emphasis away from the 
former Soviet Union. This shift away from the former Soviet Union may well be 
attributable to the political uncertainties experienced in the country in 1991 and at the 
beginning of 1992. 
Foreign capital investments by comparison, however, increased only modestly from US 
$ 7,264 million (see table 8.3) to US$ 9,420 million dollars. The average capitalisation 
of each joint venture in the former socialist countries nearly halved from US $ 0.53 
million in 1991 to US $ 0.27 million in 1992. This was due to the fact that many of the 
new foreign direct investments have been made in Romania, where service joint ventures 
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tend to dominate (see chapter 8) and consequently average capitalisation of each joint 
venture is the lowest (US $ 30,000) among the former CMEA countries. (See table 11.2 
and compare average capitalisation per joint venture in the Commonwealth of Independent 
states of US $ 1.05 million, where many manufacturing joint ventures were established.) 
Table 11.2 Foreign investment registrations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, by number and value of foreign equity participation, 
at the beginning of 1992. (in millions of US dollars) 
Country Number Foreign Average 
equity (a) foreign 
capital 
per jv 
Bulgaria 900 300 0.33 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 5,400 5,650 1.05 
Czechoslovakia 4,000 480 0.12 
Hungary 11,000 2,089 0.19 
Poland 5,100 670 0.13 
Romania 8,022 231 0.03 
Total 34,422 9,420 0.27 
Source: United Nations, Transnational Corporations and Management Divisions (1992), 
p.30, and the United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, "World Investment 
Directory 1992", New York, 1992. 
NOTE: 
a as of I October 1991. 
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To conclude, these latest United Nations statistics suggest that the fonner socialist 
countries have succeeded in taking the first positive steps towards improving the economic 
and political conditions within their countries. The response of Western companies has 
been accordingly positive in as far as the number of foreign direct investments has grown, 
yet cautious in tenns of the amount of capital invested. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The author's research findings have shown that: 
(i) the/role of joint ventures in East-West trade has been primarily to enable 
r 
the former CMEA_countries to ~~ access to foreign technology and 
/ know-how with tlle_minimum-of hard currency expenditure; 
--------------~-~ ____ 0-- '" • 
(ii) the effecnt'company·)evel-of-privatisation-and-more·liberal joint venture 
provisions in Eastern Europe on individual Western partners has resulted 
in attracting greater numbers of foreign direct investments and in some 
foreign partners increasing their equity shareholding, especially in Hungary. 
It seems, therefore, that promoting foreign direct investments in Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States will continue to play an important role in East-West 
trade and industrial co-operation in the nineteen nineties, particularly as the hard currency 
reserves of these countries remain low, and they continue to seek access to foreign 
technology and know-how. 
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Foreign direct investments in the former CMEA countries have, therefore, the potential 
to help these countries to achieve economic recovery through technology transfer and 
capital flows to the country. Consequently, funher research should focus on monitoring 
the growth in the number of foreign direct investments, and panicularly the size of foreign 
capital contributions as well as the extent of technology transfer through capital goods and 
the sale of licences. This will enable the international community to measure the degree 
of foreign companies' confidence in these markets and the success of East European 
countries in stabilising their economies. In addition, this information will assist Western 
governments to estimate the amount of official capital required by individual East 
European countries. 
Moreover, such institutional suppon from the international community as well as 
improved economic conditions, should encourage many of the foreign joint venture 
partners engaged in service activities to extend their activities into assembly and 
manufacturing. This in turn will increase foreign capital contributions as demonstrated 
in the earlier case studies in chapter 9. This extension of activities from a service joint 
venture or subsidiary to assembly and manufacturing indicates not only the foreign 
panners' increased confidence in the foreign market and satisfaction with the business 
environment, but also their success in penetrating the foreign market By monitoring the 
number of service joint ventures which extend their activities to include assembly and 
manufacturing it will be possible to measure the effectiveness of economic reform and 
joint venture operations in the former CM EA countries. As databanks have now been 
established, notably by the United Nations (and also the OECD), which release up-to-date 
data, it will be possible to obtain a more accurate and comprehensive statistical breakdown 
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of the development of foreign direct investments. 
Finally, whilst the statistical evidence enables researchers to quantify the common data 
on foreign direct investments, up-dating and obtaining fresh information from companies 
engaged in East-West joint ventures provides an immediate indication at grass-roots level 
of developments, and is therefore a useful complement to the statistical data and research 
literature. In view of the number of Western companies involved in East-West joint 
ventures, the information received from companies will need to be categorised in order 
to present the experiences of companies which have a similar profile. This can be done 
on various levels: 
(i) by industry, size and activity; 
(ii) by nationality of the Western partner; 
(iii) by examining Western partners' experiences in individual East European countries. 
To conclude, this thesis has focussed on East-West joint ventures at a critical moment in 
the economic and political development of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
(1985 - 1990) by drawing on existing research material and reports on the subject and 
including the experiences of Western companies. The up-dating of company data already 
collected will help to gauge the impact and development of economic reforms in the 
nineteen nineties as well as provide a collection of case studies in the evolution of 
individual East-West joint ventures. 
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Chapter 11: Notes 
1. The infonnation on the collapse of intra-CMEA trading since 1991 has been obtained 
from: 
- United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva), "Economic Survey of 
Europe in 1991 - 1992", New York, May 1992, pp.84 - 90. 
2. The infonnation on international support for Eastern Europe and the fonner Soviet 
Union has been obtained from, 
- United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (May 1992), pp.!73 - 190. 
3. The latest statistical information about foreign direct investment (including joint 
ventures) in the former CMEA countries has been obtained from, 
- United Nations, Transnational Corporations and Management Divisions, Department of 
Economic and Social Development, "World Investment Report 1992: Transnational 
Corporations as Engines of Growth", New York, 1992, p. 30. 
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Appendix 1 STRUcrURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUESTIONNAIRE WaIters International: Hungary 
1. In which sector has your company established a joint venture? 
("'delete as appropriate) 
*assembly/production of matrix printers/product development 
2. How long have you been active in East European markets? Since 19_? 
3. Why did you establish a joint venture in Hungary? Please circle. 
(1 = very important, 5 = irrelevant) 
Existing business contacts 
Favourable joint venture terms offered by the host country 
Expansion, protection or diversification of market opportunities 
Use of joint venture agreement to provide further business contact 
with East European partners 
Joint venture proposal put forward by East Euorpean partner 
Matching investments or operations of your competitors 
Increase profi ts 
Extension of product life cycle 
1 2 345 
1 2 345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1 234 5 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Which of the following do you consider to be the main motives of your East European 
partner in wanting to participcate in a joint venture? Please circle 
1 = very important, 5 = irrelevant 
Use of your company's distribution channels 
Acquisition of your company's managerial skills 
Acquisition of newer technology and know-how from your company 
Training of technical personnel within your company 
To attract foreign capital investment 
Import substitution 
Other: 
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1 2 345 
1 234 5 
12345 
1 2 345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 234 5 
5. Which partner has made the following contributions? (please tick). 
CONTRIBUTIONS EAST EUROPEAN WESTERN 
PARTNER PARTNER 
Cash 
Capital equipment 
Fixed assets (machinery, land, factory) 
Direct labour (machine operators, workers. sCIVice of 
machines) 
Technical personnel 
Managerial personnel 
Know-how 
Licence(s) 
Up-ta-date technology 
Modern management techniques 
Research and development 
6. Is the aim of the joint venture to sell to East European markets/ Western marketslboth* 
"'Please delete as appropriate. 
7. Please name the first three major hard and soft currency markets: 
Major hard currency markets 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Major soft currency markets 
1. 
2. 
3. 
8. What % of the sales volume is in hard currency? 
9. What advantages do the joint venture products have over exisiting products In the 
market? 
10. Which disnibution outlets do you use: Your'slParnter'slBoth*? 
"'Please delete as appropriate 
11. Are the joint venture profits increasing/decreasing/staying the same*? 
*Please delete as appropriate. 
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12. How great is Waiters International's profit share in countertrade? %? 
13. Does repatriation of profits pose a problem? YES/NO 
14. Do you pay for the following in hard or soft currency? (Please tick.) 
BUSINESS COSTS SOFT CURRENCY HARD CURRENCY 
Raw materials 
Employees'/workcrs' wages 
Capital equipment 
Research and development 
Publicity materials 
Transport costs 
General overheads 
Profit for reinvestment 
15. How great is your company's shareholding? 
16. How great is your company's investment in the joint venture? 
17. How many people are on the joint venture Board of Directors from: 
Your company: Partner's: 
18. What is the voting distribution? 
19. Is the hiring and firing of staff made by You/Partner/Jointly*? 'Please delete as appropriate. 
20. Is Quality Control the responsibility of *You/Partner!Both? 'Please delete as appropriate. 
21. As a result of recent V.A.T. and income tax have, (>please delete) 
(i) prices on local and imported raw materials/supplies risen? 
(ii) employees' and workers' wages been increased? 
(iii) profits been reduced? 
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YES/NO* 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
Appendix 11 ANGLO-SOVIET QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. When did your company first start doing business in: 
2. 
3. 
The Soviet Union 
other East European countries; 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Poland 
19_ 
19_ 
19_ 
When was the JV registered? 
When did the JV become operational? 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Czechoslovakia 
19_ 
19_ 
19_ 
19_ 
If not yet operational, please state when the JV is expected to become 
operational: in ___ months. 
4. How large is your company's shareholding in the JV? 
5. If possible, please state the JV's startup capital. 
6. In which of the following activities is the JV engaged: (please tick) 
Co-production 
Licencing Agreement 
Turnkey Operation 
Service 
Construction 
Marketing 
Other (please specify) .......................................... . 
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Joint R & D 
Distribution 
_% 
£_---
7. Did your company enter into a IV in the Soviet Union because: 
Please circle the appropriate number on a scale of 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (very important). 
Your Soviet business partner suggested it 1 2345 
The IV terms in the USSR are favourable 12345 
The IV provides expansion, protection or 
diversification of market opportunities 12345 
The IV agreement opens the door for more business 1 2345 
The IV will improve your market position 
against competitors 1 2345 
The JV will increase your profits 
in the Soviet market 1 234 5 
Other (please specify) 
12345 
8. Which of the following do you think were your Soviet partner's reasons 
for entering a JV agreement with you? 
Please circle the appropriate number on a scale of 1 (irrelevant) 10 5 (very important) 
Access to your company's know-how/technology 
Access to Western management techniques 
IV provided opportunity for import substitution 
Access to finance 
Access to factory/production equipment (machinery) 
Access to office equipment (computers, software) 
Opportunity for improving export performance 
Access to your company's distribution outlets 
Other (please specify) 
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12345 
12345 
1 2345 
1 2345 
12345 
1 2345 
12345 
1 2 345 
1 2345 
9. Please give the approximate % of contributions made by your company to 
the JV, for each of the categories listed below: 
10. 
Cash 
Know-how 
Capital Equipment 
Licence(s) 
Fixed Assets (machinery, land, factory) 
Technology 
Management Techniques 
Technical Personnel 
R&D 
Direct Labour 
Managerial Personnel 
Direct Labour (machine operators, workers, 
service of machines) 
Other (please specify) 
Did the JV receive any financial loan/backing? 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
YES/NO 
If YES, please state the name of the institution and the amount (in £) 
11. What percentage of the JV's sales are in 
The Soviet Market 
Western Markets 
Developing Countries 
Other East European Markets (please specify) 
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_% 
_% 
_% 
_% 
12. What percentage of the sales volume is in hard currency? 
13. If possible, indicate to what extent your company receives payment for 
your share of the JV earnings in countertrade goods: (please tick appropriate band) 
125% 26 - 50% 51 - 75% 76 - 100% 
14. To what extent do the following pose a problem in the repatriation of your 
share of the profits? 
Please circle appropriate number on a scale from 1 (no problem) to 5 (major problem). 
JV taxes 
System used to define profits 
Guarantees for transferring hard currencies 
Ability to buy countertrade goods 
with local money 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
Are there any other problems posed by the repatriation of the JV's profits, 
other than those indicated above? 
(Plcase specify) 
1 2345 
15. To what extent are you satisfied with 
16. 
the quality of the JV output? 1 2 3 4 5 
Please circle the appropriate number on a scale from (totally dissatisfied) to 5 (completely 
satisfied), 
Is the Chairman of the JV: SovietIBritish 
Are there any other comments you may wish to add about your company's 
Anglo-Soviet joint venture, or about Anglo-Soviet joint ventures in 
general? 
Thank you for your co-operation in this research project 
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